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The Amalgamation Movement was an outbreak of bank mergers and acquisitions in 
England and Wales that began around 1870, lasted for half a century and transformed 
the English and Welsh banking industry into a concentrated oligopoly dominated by 
five banks.  This Amalgamation Movement was a response to the economic growth 
unleashed by the Industrial Revolution.  For the first time ever, a human population 
was experiencing a sustained increase in its per-capita incomes.  Economic growth 
like this made the British one of the wealthiest people on earth but it also gave rise to 
a monetary problem.  An expanding post-Industrial Revolution British economy 
required a growing money supply to finance the increase in the value of the 
transactions undertaken.  However, the supply of precious metals available to fashion 
into gold and silver coins was finite.  Post-Industrial Revolution Britain had to erect 
its money supply on a foundation of credit and the obligation to furnish much of that 
credit ultimately fell upon the domestic banks.  The solvency of the banking system 
became a vital economic consideration under these circumstances. 
 
The Amalgamation Movement secured monetary stability by putting the banking 
industry in England and Wales under the control of five well-resourced and effective 
bureaucracies.  Large banks subject to good administration maintained public 
confidence in a money supply composed of a growing proportion of bank deposits.  
Bank amalgamations also compensated for the loss of the inland bill of exchange, a 
financial security that was the English and Welsh banking industry’s favourite 
reserve asset prior to 1870.  Finally, the Amalgamation Movement accommodated 
the banking industry’s conversion to a regime of limited liability during the 1880s.  
Britain acquired one of the safest banking systems in the world because of the 
Amalgamation Movement.  The run of monetary good fortune continued until a 
global financial crisis in 2007/08 exposed the dangers inherent in Britain’s 
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Affiliate A bank controlled by another bank by means of share ownership.  An 
affiliate remained a separated bank and was its parent bank’s subsidiary. 
Bank amalgamation A merger that removed the target from the banking industry.  
The predator absorbed most or all of the target’s assets and liabilities before 
liquidating it. 
Bank of deposit A bank that did not issue bank notes. 
Bank of issue A bank that issued bank notes.   
Big Five The five largest English and Welsh banks created by the Amalgamation 
Movement.   
Bill of exchange An unconditional written order addressed by a drawer to a drawee 
requiring the drawee to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable date a certain 
sum to a payee or to a payee’s order or to the bearer.  The drawee becomes the bill’s 
acceptor by indicating a willingness to obey the order. 
Correspondent The product of a principal-agent relationship whereby banks 
transacted business on each other’s behalf in their local districts.  London banks 
generally acquired country correspondents and acted as their agents in the 
Metropolis.  
Country bank An English and Welsh bank that had no banking offices in London. 
Economies of scale Reductions in average unit cost realised when a firm 
manufactures a solitary product in greater numbers.  
Economies of scope Reductions in average unit cost brought about by a proliferation 
in the range of products manufactured. 
Fiat currency Money reliant on government edict, law and/or custom to function as 
a means of payment and a store of value.  Fiat currency has no intrinsic worth and its 
issuer has no obligation to redeem it.   
Fixed costs Operating expenses incurred irrespective of the level of output produced.   
Gross Domestic Product All the income generated over a period within a 
geographical area by the labour, land and capital located there.   
Gross National Product All the income earned over a period by the residents of a 
geographical area utilising their labour and all the land and capital they own.  Unlike 
Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product includes the income derived from 
nett foreign investments. 
Guarantee and suretyship association An institution that guaranteed the good 
conduct and fidelity of persons put in positions of trust and responsibility.  
Horizontal integration Growth in the size of a firm brought about by expansion at 





Inland bill of exchange A bill of exchange drawn and payable within the British 
Isles and Ireland or drawn within the British Isles and Ireland upon some person 
resident therein.   
Law of diminishing returns A principle in modern economics that states the extra 
output generated by an increase in one factor of production will diminish if the other 
factors of production remain constant.   
Legal personality A privilege bestowed on natural and artificial persons that allows 
them to pursue or defend legal actions in a court of law.  A corporation has a legal 
personality whereas a partnership does not. 
Liquid assets Cash and other assets capable of conversion into cash at little cost and 
at relatively short notice. 
Malthusian poverty trap A situation in which demographic growth causes mass 
poverty.  Average living standards vary little between geographical locations and 
remain unchanged over the long-term in a Malthusian poverty trap because the 
population always grows until it exhausts the means of sustenance available to it. 
Partnership A common law arrangement in which two or more people undertake a 
business in common and share in any profits or losses made.  Partnerships are 
unincorporated entities.  An association incorporated under an act of parliament or a 
royal charter is not a partnership. 
Predator A bank that took another bank over during the Amalgamation Movement. 
Private bank An English or Welsh bank operated as a sole proprietorship or a 
common law partnership.   
Promissory note made payable to the bearer on demand A bank note that relied 
upon the issuer’s obligation to redeem it at call to function as money.   
Transaction cost A cost (other than the price paid) imposed by a market exchange.   
Target A bank taken over by another bank during the Amalgamation Movement. 
Unincorporated joint stock company An amalgam of the laws of partnership, trust 
and agency.  A quasi-corporation that replicated some of the advantages of 
incorporation (such as issuing transferable shares) without the need for an act of 
parliament or a royal charter. 
Vertical integration Growth in the size of a firm brought about by expansion at 
different levels in the value chain.  A firm integrates vertically when it takes its 







INTRODUCTION:  BRITAIN’S ECONOMY DURING THE  
AMALGAMATION MOVEMENT 
This sudden transformation of the leading and most dynamic industrial 
economy into the most sluggish and conservative in the space of thirty or 




This thesis examines the Amalgamation Movement, an outbreak of bank mergers and 
acquisitions in England and Wales that began around 1870, lasted for 50 years and 
laid the foundations of the twentieth-century British banking industry.  The 
Amalgamation Movement transformed English and Welsh banking into an oligopoly 
dominated by the ‘Big Five’ who accounted for 80 per cent of the deposits taken.
2
  
The Big Five were the National Provincial Bank, the Westminster Bank, the Midland 
Bank, Lloyds Bank and Barclays Bank.
3
  By 1909, every one of those five banks 
ranked amongst the ten biggest banks in Europe.
4
   
 
Joseph Sykes undertook the last comprehensive analysis dedicated exclusively 
to the Amalgamation Movement in 1926.
5
  Scholarship undertaken in the fields of 
economics, business, management and banking over the intervening eight decades 
offers contemporary historians insights into the Amalgamation Movement denied to 
Sykes in 1926.  Significantly, Sykes’s study also failed to explain why the 
Amalgamation Movement happened.  Much of the subsequent historiography 
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dedicated to the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century British has done 
much the same thing.  The question as to why English and Welsh banks 
amalgamated in the first place remains largely unanswered.  This thesis attempts to 
answer that question and in so doing it reaches the following conclusions. 
 
1. A financial crisis in 1825/26 demonstrated the small banks established in 
England and Wales during the Industrial Revolution constituted a threat to 
Britain’s financial stability.  
2. Those who participated in the Amalgamation Movement drew upon a precedent.  
Scottish experience suggested bigger banks were more likely to survive financial 
crises than the smaller ones found in England and Wales because they were less 
vulnerable to runs. 
3. The limits imposed on the English and Welsh bank note issue by the Bank 
Charter Act of 1844 delayed the Amalgamation Movement by two decades.  
English and Welsh banks of issue would not amalgamate until the lucrative right 
to issue bank notes lost its significance to them. 
4. The demise of the inland bill of exchange turned participation in the 
Amalgamation Movement into a necessity for many banks.  The demise of the 
inland bill of exchange forced banks to seek amalgamation partners to affect a 
rational distribution of the banking system’s liquid asset reserves.     
5. The adoption of limited liability in the 1880s accelerated the rate of bank 
amalgamations.  Limited liability removed an important safeguard of the 
creditors’ interests by placing limits on the amount the proprietors would 
contribute when a bank failed.  Large banks with ample reserves acquired 
competitive advantages because creditors deemed them less likely fail.   
  
The conclusions listed above share a common theme.  The stability of English and 
Welsh banking industry became a pressing consideration during the nineteenth 
century because post-Industrial Revolution Britain erected its growing money supply 




meet their obligations under these circumstances and the Amalgamation Movement 
played its part in furnishing that assurance.   
 
This thesis draws upon primary and secondary sources to construct a narrative 
account of the Amalgamation Movement.  However, one thing the reader will notice 
is the relative absence of archival material produced by the amalgamating banks 
themselves.  One reason for the omission becomes apparent when one considers the 
nature of the banking industry.  Most of a bank’s assets were loans and advances 
with fixed or indeterminable maturity dates.  Most of its liabilities were repayable at 
call or at short notice.  A bank’s survival depended on its creditors’ confidence 
because those creditors could destroy the bank if they panicked and orchestrated a 
run on it.  In addition, a bank amalgamation was a commercial transaction involving 
the sale of a business.  A target’s officers had a duty to their proprietors to maximise 
the amount paid by a potential predator and to express confidence in their bank’s 
prospects even when they were negotiating the sale of its business to another bank.  
Bankers did not to admit their bank’s failings in public for good reason and if they 
held such conversations in private, they rarely committed what they said to paper.  A 
historian perusing the archival material produced during the Amalgamation 
Movement looking for a tacit exposition of the weaknesses a bank amalgamation was 
supposed to rectify will meet with disappointment.
6
  One has to deduce the reasons 
for bank amalgamations from the economic, institutional and business contexts in 
which they occurred and from commentaries about the health and security of the 
banking industry produced at the time.   
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This chapter puts the Amalgamation Movement into its historical and economic 
context.  This thesis investigates the reorganisation of the banking industry in a 
country with a remarkable economic and business history.  The Industrial Revolution 
made Britain one of the first countries in the world to escape the Malthusian poverty 
trap.
7
  This revolution also stimulated the demand for banking services, which 
resulted in a proliferation of the number of banks in the British Isles.  Later in the 
nineteenth century, other countries industrialised too and began to compete with the 
British in the global marketplace.  Consequently, the English and Welsh 
Amalgamation Movement occurred at a time when Britain’s manufacturers lost some 
of the advantages early industrialisation bestowed upon them.  Britain’s 
manufacturers compounded their difficulties during this period by remaining wedded 
to the industries and technologies they inherited from the Industrial Revolution.  The 
United States and Germany embraced the emerging technologies of the day more 
readily than the British did.  Economic and business historians have expended much 
effort trying to account for the change in British manufacturing’s fortunes after 1870, 
but one of them made an observation that is pertinent to this thesis.  Alfred DuPont 
Chandler argued British manufacturing struggled after 1870 because British firms 
were too small.  Chandler’s depiction of Britain as a land populated by small firms 
clearly did not apply to the English and Welsh banking industry.  The Amalgamation 
Movement yielded some of the biggest banks in world.   
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The Amalgamation Movement is a paradox.  Britain’s small manufacturing 
firms thrived prior to 1870 only to experience declining fortunes afterwards.  In 
contrast, the Amalgamation Movement changed the English and Welsh banking 
industry’s fortunes for the better.  The small banks erected in England and Wales 
during the Industrial Revolution proved susceptible to financial crises; and yet, by 
1920 a post-Amalgamation Movement English and Welsh banking industry was one 
of the most stable in the world.   
 
SECTORAL CHANGES IN BRITAIN 
For much of recorded history, an average human being consumed an annual real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
8
 that had changed little since the Neolithic 
Revolution.
9
  During the pre-industrial age, growing prosperity normally induced an 
increase in the number of mouths demanding nourishment.
10
  Good harvests, 
technological breakthroughs or some other stroke of economic good fortune might 
yield higher standards of living in the short term but eventually population growth 
would erode any economic gains made.  The rich always consumed more than their 
average share of what was available during this period but wealthy landowners like 
Pride and Prejudice’s William Darcy “were few” and “the poor plentiful.”
11
  Life 
really could be “nasty, brutish and short”
12
 for a predominately agricultural 
workforce enduring inescapable poverty.  Jane Austen (1775-1815) wrote Pride and 
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Prejudice during the Industrial Revolution.
13
  According to Eric Hobsbawm, this 
novel was the product of a society undergoing “the most fundamental transformation 
of human life in the history of the world recorded in written documents.”14  The 
average Briton’s standard of living has improved dramatically since the publication 
of Pride and Prejudice.
15
   
 
During the Industrial Revolution, workers left the countryside to find work in 
an urban manufacturing economy to turn Britain into ‘the workshop of the world.’
16
  
People knew Britain was changing at the time although few really understood just 
how profound the changes would be or whether they would last.  As early as 1814, 
the merchant, statistician and magistrate Patrick Colquhoun (1745-1820) considered 
it “impossible to contemplate the progress of manufactures in Great Britain within 
the last thirty years without wonder and astonishment.”
17
  By 1844, Friedrich Engels 
(1820-1895) could argue the Industrial Revolution “altered the whole [British] civil 
society.”
18
  In the 1880s, Arnold Toynbee (1852-1883) finally introduced the term 
‘Industrial Revolution’ to his British audience before telling them that this revolution 
was one of the most important events in their history.
19
  The bankers engaged in the 
Amalgamation Movement should have known Britain’s manufacturing industries 
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changed Britain beyond all recognition.  However, Joseph Chamberlain’s (1836-
1914) campaign for tariff reform at the turn of the twentieth century also suggests the 
Amalgamation Movement coincided with a time when British manufacturing faced 
an uncertain future.
20
  In 1903, Chamberlain lamented: 
We were to … lose those industries for which the country has been so 
celebrated, and which have made it great and prosperous in the past, and 
deal with inferior subsidiary industries.  Sugar has gone.  Let us not weep 
for it.  Jam and pickles remain!  Now, of all these workmen, these 
intelligent artisans, who were engaged tending and making the machinery 
for sugar refining in this country, I would like to know how many have 
found a resting-place, have found equivalent ages and comfort, in stirring 




The notion that Britain’s manufacturing economy was suffering from relative decline 
became a recurring feature of British political debate during the twentieth century.
22
   
 
The question as to what a government might do to restore Britain’s economy to 
good health determined the outcome of at least two general elections after World 
War II.  Harold Wilson’s (1916-1995) Labour Party prescribed a collectivist solution, 
state interventionism modelled on French dirigisme, to win the first in 1964.  
Margaret Thatcher’s (1925-2013) Conservatives put their faith in markets and self-
interested individualism to win the second in 1979.
23
  One could argue things only 
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started to go wrong for the British economy after World War II.  Some historians 
claim misguided government policy, incompetent management and belligerent trade 
unionists undermined the British economy’s competitive strength after 1945.
24
  Other 
historians detect the first signs of decline at an earlier date.  They argued the late-
Victorian economy experienced a ‘climacteric’ caused by laissez-faire government 
policy, complacency, entrepreneurial failure, a reluctance to embrace emerging 
technologies or to adopt new methods of organisation, excessive investment abroad 
and an inappropriate system of education and training.
25
 
   
The British manufacturing economy’s share of total employment peaked in the 
1870s, then embarked upon a slow decline and finally collapsed because of the 
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deindustrialisation of the late twentieth century.
26
  Services accounted for most of 
Britain’s employment growth since 1870.
27
  One part of the British services economy 
proved extraordinarily resilient during this period.  An imaginary line drawn around 
Lancashire and Yorkshire’s West Riding enclosed the world’s preeminent industrial 
region in 1860.  At the same time, the City of London was the world’s leading 
financial centre.  By 1990, deindustrialisation had stripped Lancashire and the West 
Riding of most of their manufacturing capacity but London continued to rank 
alongside New York and Tokyo as one of the world’s great financial centres.
28
  The 
economic historian William Rubinstein once suggested the things the City of London 
does well (services, finance, commerce and trade) have always constituted Britain’s 
core economic strengths.  According to Rubinstein: 
Britain’s was never fundamentally an industrial and manufacturing 
economy; rather, it was always, even at the height of the Industrial 
Revolution, essentially a commercial, financial, and service based 
economy whose comparative advantage ... lay with commerce and 
finance....  Britain’s industrial decline ... can be seen, with greater 
accuracy, as a transfer of resources and entrepreneurial energies into 




This thesis examines one of Rubinstein’s alleged transfers of ‘resources and 
entrepreneurial energies into other forms of business life.’  The English and Welsh 
banking industry expanded rapidly during the Industrial Revolution as every city or 
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town of any significance in England and Wales acquired at least one private bank.
30
  
At the time, these private banks were small-scale affairs because the law limited 
every one of them to a maximum of just six members.
31
  The typical English and 
Welsh bank had changed little prior to the Amalgamation Movement.  As late as 
1860, most of the 397 banks in England and Wales were organisationally no more 
sophisticated than their predecessors during the Industrial Revolution were because 
300 of them were private banks.  The average English and Welsh bank only 
possessed 3.1 branches in 1860.
32
  The Amalgamation Movement changed the face 
of English and Welsh banking industry beyond all recognition.  By 1920, the Big 
Five banking corporations dominated the English and Welsh banking industry.  
These five banks administered national branch networks made up of hundreds of 
branches from their head offices in London.
33
    
 
The Amalgamation Movement’s reorganisation of the English and Welsh 
banking industry was an atypical event given what was happening to the rest of the 
British economy during this period.  The next section explains the English and Welsh 
banking industry embarked upon its period of radical change at a time when much of 
Britain’s economy appeared to lose some of the dynamism it had exhibited during 
the Industrial Revolution.  Some historians have argued the period 1870-1920 
coincided with the onset of Britain’s relative economic decline. 
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RELATIVE ECONOMIC DECLINE? 
Rondo Cameron once claimed the Industrial Revolution was “a long drawn out 
process, in no sense inevitable, which scarcely deserves the epithet 
‘revolutionary.’”
34
  The Industrial Revolution may have been slow but the sustained 
period of economic growth it initiated had no historical precedent.  Table 1.1 
indicates that by 1820, Britain’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was 
higher than that of the Netherlands, which made Britain the global economic leader 
and the British one of the richest people in the world.
35
  Table 1.2 suggests Britain’s 
economic good fortune persisted into the middle of nineteenth century.  Only a 
resource-rich economy like the United States of America’s could grow more quickly 
on a per capital basis than the British economy between 1820 and 1870.  The British 
remained one of the richest people in the world in 1870. 
 
Table 1.1 
Estimated Annual Real GDP per Capita 
Measured at Purchasing Power Parity (1985 United States Dollars) 
 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 
Great Britain $1,405 $2,610 $4,024 $5,651 $10,063 
France $1,052 $1,571 $2,734 $4,149 $10,323 
Germany $937 $1,300 $2,606 $3,339 $10,110 
Italy $960 $1,210 $2,087 $2,819 $8,568 
Japan $588 $618 $1,114 $1,563 $9,237 
Netherlands $1,307 $2,064 $3,178 $4,706 $10,267 
United States $1,048 $2,247 $4,854 $8,611 $14,103 
Source: Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, 6-7. 
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Estimated Mean Annual Compound Growth of Real GDP per Capita 
Measured at Purchasing Power Parity (1985 United States Dollars) 
 1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 
Great Britain 1.2% 1.0% 0.8% 2.5% 
France 0.8% 1.3% 1.1% 4.0% 
Germany 0.7% 1.6% 0.7% 4.9% 
Italy 0.4% 1.3% 0.8% 5.0% 
Japan 0.1% 1.4% 0.9% 8.0% 
Netherlands 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 3.4% 
United States 1.5% 1.8% 1.6% 2.2% 
Source: Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, 49. 
 
Britain’s relative economic fortunes changed during the Amalgamation 
Movement.  Other nations industrialised during the nineteenth century to compete 
with the British in the global marketplace.  Britain’s share of the world’s total 
manufactured exports, for example, fell from 41.4 per cent in 1880 to 29.9 per cent 
by 1913.
36
  Tables 1.1 and 1.2 indicate the British continued to get richer after 1870, 
but now others were getting richer too and some of them were getting richer more 
quickly than the British did.  This disparity in post-1870 per capita economic growth 
rates persisted into the late twentieth century.  By 1973, one really could have 
divided the developed world in two.  Some countries like the United States, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands were ahead of Britain on the measure of real GDP per 
capita.  Others like Italy and Japan would overtake Britain’s real GDP per capita 
eventually if their economies continued to grow more quickly than the British 
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  The world’s first industrialised nation appeared to have contracted a 
wealth-inhibiting malady known as “the British Disease.”
38
   
 
Some economic historians claim Britain’s post-1870 economic decline was 
more apparent than real.  They argue the perception of lost economic hegemony was 
an unavoidable consequence of Britain’s early industrialisation.  Barry Supple 
suggested the only remarkable aspect to Britain’s century-long descent into the 
developed world’s middle ranks where Britons continue to enjoy one of the highest 
standards of living in the world was that the process took so long.
39
  Similarly, Moses 
Abramovitz posited a ‘catch-up effect’ to argue economic leaders like nineteenth-
century Britain grow slowly because they operate close to the technologically 
imposed limits to prosperity.
40
  Abramovitz suggested that Britain held the economic 
lead because it had exploited most of the opportunities for growth available to it.  
Economic followers like Germany and the United States lagged behind Britain 
because they had yet to exploit all the opportunities for growth at their disposal.  
Rectifying that omission allowed these followers to catch the British up in a process 
that demanded their economies grow more quickly than the British economy to 
achieve parity.  According to Abramovitz, the perception of Britain’s relative 
economic decline was nothing more a product of nineteenth-century Britain’s 
unsustainable developmental superiority.  Economic leadership denied the British the 
growth-enhancing benefits of the catch-up effect.   
                                                          
37
 Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," The Journal of Economic 
History 46, no. 2 (1986): 396-97; Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: 6-7, 49; 
Crafts, "Forging ahead and falling behind," 195-97. 
38
 George Cyril Allen, The British Disease: A Short Essay on the Nature and Causes of the Nation's 
Lagging Wealth  (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976). 
39
 Barry Supple, "Fear of failing:  Economic history and the decline of Britain," The Economic History 
Review New Series 47, no. 3 (1994): 444-47. 
40





Deidre (née Donald) McCloskey exonerated late nineteenth-century Britain 
from the allegation that it failed economically.  According to her, late nineteenth-
century Britain “performed as one would expect a prosperous and competitive 
economy to perform.”
41
  McCloskey’s analysis suggested that Britain confronted 
insurmountable resource constraints during this period.
42
  Victorian Britain possessed 
little unemployed labour and was running short of agricultural workers awaiting 
transfer into more productive pursuits.  In addition, accumulating capital to raise the 
productivity of the labour at Britain’s disposal would have required either more 
savings or less foreign investment to fund it.  Britain’s rate of consumption would 
have had to fall to levels that have few historical precedents to finance greater 
investment at home.  Repatriating money invested abroad to achieve the same 
outcome would have entailed greater risk and a loss of income.  In 1882, the jurist 
and statistician Leone Levi (1821-1888) claimed “With the British investor, the 
simple question is which form of investment pays best.”
43
  In 1909, Winston 
Churchill (1874-1965) noted that British investors earned “£1,100,000 a year 
regularly ... without lifting a finger” from the Suez Canal.
44
  Both Levi and Churchill 
suggested British investors only bought foreign securities because they offered better 
risk-adjusted returns than the domestic investment alternatives forgone.  Redirecting 
funds invested abroad into inferior domestic investments should have impoverished 
the British.  McCloskey concluded late nineteenth-century Britain grew “as rapidly 
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as permitted by ... its resources and the effective exploitation of available 
technology.”
45
   
 
McCloskey depicted a late nineteenth-century British economy growing more 
slowly than others did because it had come closer than most to realising its full 
potential.  McCloskey’s Britain utilised its savings rationally to accumulate all the 
capital it could deploy productively at home before investing the excess in better 
opportunities overseas.  By the outbreak of World War I, Britons held the world’s 
largest stock of foreign securities.
46
  According to Maurice Kirby, “No country, 
before or since, has invested as high a proportion of its resources aboard over such a 
sustained period.”
47
  In 1882, Leone Levi defended this foreign investment, arguing a 
country as rich as Britain should export some of its wealth to keep it productively 
employed.
48
  McCloskey made a similar point in the 1970s.  She argued the British 
invested abroad because they had no need for “two Forth Bridges, two Bakerloo 
Lines, two London housing stocks [and] two Port Sunlights” and rightly declined to 
fund their construction.
49
   
 
McCloskey claimed late nineteenth-century Britain enriched rather than 
impoverished itself by funding other people’s economic development.  Other 
economic historians have argued vehemently that greater investment at home could 
have put British labour to more productive uses.  In 1882, Leone Levi conceded an 
unnamed correspondent had challenged his views on foreign investment.  This 
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correspondent asked Levi whether foreign investments afforded “foreign countries a 
better yield for labour than England?”
50
  In 1905, the Italian-born economist, 
politician and journalist Leo Chiozza Money (1870-1944) warned, “Large sections of 
the British people have … worked for the benefit of the foreigner and of the British 
colonist, never realising their own country sorely needed all the capital that their 
labour could create.”
51
  A doctoral thesis submitted to the University of London in 
1914 declared foreign investment “a running sore” sapping “the lifeblood of British 
industry” whilst “adding fresh strength to our most formidable rivals and 
competitors.”
52
  In the 1970s, William Kennedy made what had already become an 
oft-repeated allegation that British capital markets denied the nation’s manufacturers 
with the funds they needed “to exploit opportunities [for firth growth] which did 
exist.”
53
  The next section explains how the world underwent a period of 
technological change during the Amalgamation Movement.  Some economic 
historians claim Britain’s failure to exploit the technological advances on offer 
denied it a never to be repeated opportunity to enrich its people further.   
 
THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
According to David Landes, a “Second Industrial Revolution” began during the late-
nineteenth century.
54
  Breakthroughs in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, 
inorganic and organic chemistry, electrical and mechanical engineering, and 
transportation and communications gave rise to new industries, new modes of 
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production and new methods of industrial organisation during this period.  Alfred 
DuPont Chandler described this Second Industrial Revolution as follows: 
Old industries were transformed, including the making of steel, copper 
and aluminum; the refining of oil and sugar; the processing of grain and 
other agricultural products; and the canning and bottling of the products 
thus processed.  New industries were created.  In chemicals, new 
processes produced man-made dyes, medicines, fibres and fertilisers.  
New mass-produced office, agricultural and sewing machines ... came on 
the market, as did heavy machinery for a wide variety of industrial uses.  
The most revolutionary of the new technologies were those that 
generated and transmitted electricity for lighting, urban traction and 
industrial power.  These new industries drove economic growth and 
played a critical role in the rapid reshaping of commercial, agrarian and 




The British were slow to exploit the opportunities afforded by the Second 
Industrial Revolution and their efforts tended to focus on light industries rather than 
heavy ones when they did exploit those opportunities.
56
  The Second Industrial 
Revolution gave the United States great firms like Standard Oil (oil refining), U.S. 
Steel (ferrous metals), DuPont (chemicals), Westinghouse and General Electric 
(electrical engineering), Ford and General Motors (automobiles) and Singer (sewing 
machines).  Germany acquired Bayer, BASF, Hoechst (chemicals) together with 
AEG and Siemens (electrical engineering).  In contrast, Britain’s most visible 
contribution to the Second Industrial Revolution lay in the emergence of branded 
consumer products like Cadbury, Rowntree and Fry’s (confectionary), Schweppes 
(soft drinks), Sunlight, Lifebuoy and Lux (soap and detergents), Huntley and Palmer 
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(biscuits), Bovril and Marmite (beef and yeast extracts), Lea & Perrins 
Worcestershire Sauce and H. P. Sauce (condiments).
57
  Meanwhile, mature, low-
growth and labour-intensive industries inherited from the Industrial Revolution like 
coal, textiles, shipbuilding, railway equipment, etc. continued to account for the bulk 
of British industrial output and exports.
58
  It was as if Britain missed the best 
opportunities for growth on offer because it embarked upon the Second Industrial 
Revolution tentatively.  In 1982, William Kennedy attempted to construct a 
counterfactual Britain that embraced the Second Industrial Revolution with as much 
enthusiasm as the Americans did.  His analysis suggested that by 1913, a “vigorous 
and effective exploitation of the technological possibilities of the period” would have 
yielded gains in Gross National Product (GNP)
59





Economic historians have expended a great dealt of energy trying to account 
for Britain’s failure to embark upon the Second Industrial Revolution with more 
vigour.  The answer to that question was a relatively simple one for McCloskey who 
put her developmental faith in free markets and believed there were no ‘free 
lunches.’  A greater commitment to the Second Industrial Revolution would have 
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drawn resources away from established industries and foreign investments that 
generated good returns at acceptable levels of risk.  The late-Victorians and their 
Edwardian successors must have perceived the risks and returns involved and 
concluded a greater commitment to the Second Industrial Revolution was not in their 
best interests.
61
  However, some historians insisted that Britain’s reluctance to 
commit to the Second Industrial Revolution was evidence of a wealth inhibiting 
economic malady. 
 
Marxists like Eric Hobsbawm invested their developmental faith in the forces 
of collectivism and economic planning.
62
  It is not surprising he would regard an 
individualistic market economy like late nineteenth-century Britain’s with suspicion.  
Hobsbawm posited an ‘early start’ hypothesis to suggest early industrialisation 
coupled with an over reliance on the market inhibited British economic growth.  
Hobsbawm explained: 
A capitalist economy is not planned, but emerges from a multitude of 
individual decisions taken in the pursuit of self-interest....  [To] change 
from an old and obsolescent pattern to a new one was both expensive and 
difficult.  It was expensive because it involved both the scrapping of old 
investments still capable of yielding good profits and new investments at 
even greater cost; for as a general rule newer technology is more 
expensive....  It was difficult because it would almost certainly require 
agreement to rationalise among a large number of individual firms or 
industries, none of which could be certain where the benefits of 
rationalisation would go, or even whether in undertaking it they were not 
giving away their money to outsiders or competitors.  So long as 
satisfactory profits were to be made in the old way, and so long as the 
decision to modernise had to emerge from the sum-total of decisions 
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Hobsbawm believed late nineteenth-century Britain’s misfortune was that its 
industrial capitalists could live off incomes bequeathed to them by the Industrial 
Revolution.  Hobsbawm’s Britain was too well off to abandon old investments that 
generated acceptable returns.  This Britain was also too market orientated and too 
individualistic to invest in new technologies and new methods of production that 
rewarded collective effort and economic planning.  The result was an absence of 




Mancur Olson reached the opposite conclusion to Hobsbawn.  Olson thought 
late nineteenth-century Britain suffered from too much collectivism.  Underpinning 
Olson’s analysis was his belief that successful and stable societies like late 
nineteenth-century Britain play host to what he called ‘distributional coalitions,’ 
alliances made up of self-interested individuals who collude with each other to 
undermine competition, restrict output and increase the price others pay for their 
produce.  Such a coalition undermines its host’s capacity for economic growth by 
disrupting the allocative efficiency of its markets.
65
  Olsen’s account of Britain’s 
economic history before and after the Industrial Revolution, therefore, depended on 
his belief that distributional coalitions largely disappeared from British soil at the end 
of the seventeenth century only to re-emerge later.
66
  According to Olsen, the 
Industrial Revolution was the unintended consequence of the Glorious Revolution.  
The Glorious Revolution destroyed feudal distributional coalitions that relied on the 
power of the crown, the aristocracy and the established church to sustain them.  The 
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result, according to Olson, was the most socially mobile society in Europe and an 
outbreak of entrepreneurial energy that gave rise to the Industrial Revolution.  By the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century, post-Industrial Revolution Britain possessed one of 
the world’s most prosperous economies, a stable and functioning constitutional 
monarchy and virtual immunity from foreign invasion, which “made it easier for the 
firms and families that advanced ... [since the Glorious Revolution] ... to collude to 
protect their interests.”
67
  According to Olson, Britain suffered economically because 
it lacked the experience of a revolution, a civil war, a foreign invasion or some other 
national calamity that would have disrupted its re-emerging distributional coalitions. 
 
Hobsbawm and Olson disagreed fundamentally over the market’s efficacy as a 
facilitator of economic growth, but agreed that Britain’s sluggish growth rates had 
underlying economic causes.  Other historians have suggested that Britain’s culture 
lay at the heart of Britain’s economic lethargy.  Corelli Barnett blamed evangelical 
Protestantism for turning what had been an aggressively pragmatic country whose 
ruling elite pursued their self-interest unapologetically into a nation ruled by 
puritanical Christians who agonised over the morality of their actions.  
Accompanying these changes, he argued, was a loss of interest in industry, trade and 
commerce as a means of enhancing British power.
68
  Similarly, Martin Wiener noted 
the entrepreneurs who made their fortunes during the Industrial Revolution usually 
sent their male offspring to a public school and then to either Oxford or Cambridge.  
This education, Wiener claimed, introduced the heirs to Britain’s industrial fortunes 
to aristocratic elites who considered industrialisation a threat to the existing social 
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order.  These young aristocrats, and those who educated them, had no interest in 




Oxbridge trained a political leadership with a minimum of interest in or 
knowledge of the industrial world....  If Oxbridge insulated the sons of the 
older elites against contact with industry, it also gradually drew sons of 
industrial ... families away from the occupations of their fathers, 




Wiener believed the origins of Britain’s relative economic decline lay in an education 
system that had promulgated “an anti-industrial bias.”
71
  That bias shaped government 
policy and denied British manufacturing the talent and resources needed to realise its 
potential for growth.   
 
Yet another explanation for the failure to embrace the Second Industrial 
Revolution focused upon the relationship between City of London (the home to 
British financial capital) and the global economy.
72
  Those who sought to blame the 
City for Britain’s low rates of growth levelled two charges against it.  The first was 
the aforementioned allegation that the City’s addiction to low-risk foreign debt 
securities resulted in underinvestment at home.
73
  The second was that the City 
exploited its cultural and geographical proximity to the centre of government in 
Westminster to obtain policies that served its interests at British manufacturing’s 
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  Both allegations rested on the reality that by the late nineteenth century, 
the City of London was the world’s leading financial and trading centre and thus 
dependent upon incomes generated outside the United Kingdom, which fostered a 
cosmopolitan outlook that had little need for domestic economic success.
75
  As Scott 
Newton and Dilwyn Porter noted, “it was as if Britain had become the territorial base 
for two economies, which remained relatively independent of each other.”
76
   
 
The relationship between the City and the global economy turned the former 
into an advocate of economic liberalism, the world’s most potent globalising 
intellectual force during the late-nineteenth century.  Policies like free trade, a 
commitment to laissez faire and an unshakable faith in the gold standard sustained by 
cautious fiscal policy had the City’s full support.
77
  The City also enjoyed privileged 
access to what Geoffrey Ingham called “the core institutional nexus”
78
 of British 
policymaking in Westminster where it generally found a like-minded audience.  In 
Andrew Gamble’s words: 
The virtues of liberal political economy as an ideological doctrine would 
not have given it such ascendancy ... had it not also found continual 
reinforcement in some important features of the organisation of the 
British state and British economy.  British economic policy and British 
business have long been dominated by perspectives originating in 
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banking and trade rather than industry....  [Financial capital] has been 
strengthened in numerous institutional ways.  The widespread use of 
sterling as an international currency, the importance of London in the 
operation of the gold standard encouraged a tremendous expansion of 
banking, insurance and shipping services provided by businesses in the 
City....  The Bank of England ... grew to be the main channel for 
articulating the City’s view of the national interest in economic policy.  
Departments like, the Treasury and the Board of Trade, have always 
tended to share ... [the City’s] ... perspective on British national problems 





Economic liberalism may have promoted the City’s interests, but it did not 
always serve the needs of Britain’s manufacturers.
80
  The gold standard gave the City 
monetary stability and the most trusted currency in the world, but it precluded the 
devaluation of the pound needed to reduce the cost of British goods on foreign 
markets.
81
  Winston Churchill had good reason to lament that “I would rather see 
finance less proud and industry more content”
82
 when the City’s advocates pressed 
him for the gold standard’s return in 1925.  In addition, other nations protected their 
domestic manufacturers with tariffs, but Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff 
reform came to nothing.  Chamberlain argued tariffs would give British workers 
better employment opportunities and higher wages.
83
  His opponents in the Liberal 
Party claimed free trade yielded ‘big loaves’ made from cheap imported grain to win 
                                                          
79
 Gamble, Britain in Decline: 134. 
80
 S. G. Checkland, "The mind of the City, 1870-1914," Oxford Economic Papers New Series 9, no. 3 
(1957): 262-64; M. E. F. Jones, "The regional impact of an overvalued pound in the 1920s," The 
Economic History Review New Series 38, no. 3 (1985): 392-94; Cain and Hopkins, "Gentlemanly 
capitalism and British expansion overseas (II)" 3-6; Green, "Rentiers versus producers?" 607-12. 
81
 William M. Scammell, "The working of the gold standard," Bulletin of Economic Research 17, no. 
1 (1965); Nicholas Kaldor, "Conflicts in national economic objectives," The Economic Journal 81, no. 
321 (1971); Jones, "The regional impact of an overvalued pound."; Green, "Rentiers versus 
producers?"; Michael D. Bordo and Finn E. Kydland, "The gold standard as a rule: An essay in 
exploration," Explorations in Economic History 32, no. 4 (1995); Michael D. Bordo and Hugh 
Rockoff, "The gold standard as a “good housekeeping seal of approval”," The Journal of Economic 
History 56, no. 02 (1996). 
82
 Cited in Kaldor, "Conflicts in national economic objectives," 6.  Churchill was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer at the time.  
83
 "Mr. Chamberlain's campaign," The Times, 7 October 1903; "Mr. Chamberlain in the City," The 




the 1906 general election by a landslide.
84
  Some economic historians argued the City 
of London’s commitment to economic liberalism denied British manufacturers the 




The fact that the Amalgamation Movement laid the foundations of 
contemporary Britain’s banking industry by turning it into a concentrated oligopoly 
has made it a development some historians have deemed worthy of study in its own 
right.
86
  That this Amalgamation Movement also coincided with the onset of a period 
of perceived economic decline makes the Amalgamation Movement even more 
interesting because a causal relationship might exist between the two events.  The 
domestic banks were financial intermediaries after all that lent funds to British 
industry.
87
  Any absence of native demand for capital implied by Hobsbawm’s early 
start hypothesis would have denied lending opportunities to the domestic banks.  
Maybe the Amalgamation Movement was the industry’s response to a scarcity of 
lending opportunities available in Britain.  In addition, the Amalgamation Movement 
might have laid the foundations for one of Olson’s distributional coalitions because 
bank amalgamations eliminated competitors.  If this were the case, the Amalgamation 
Movement would have denied domestic manufacturers their due share of the nation’s 
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savings by increasing the rates of interest the banks charged.
88
  Furthermore, the 
relationship between Britain’s banking industry and the aristocracy was always a 
close one.
89
  The banking industry should have thrived in a cultural environment 
exhibiting an anti-industrial bias like the one posited by Wiener.  Finally, the Big Five 
English and Welsh banks maintained their head offices in London and some of the 
City’s most influential figures held positions in their managerial hierarchies and on 
their boards of directors.
90
  Any attempt to ascribe blame for economic decline to the 
City ought to consider the contribution made by the amalgamating banks.
91
  However, 
this thesis argues there is another reason why further study into the Amalgamation 
Movement is important.  The Amalgamation Movement created some of the biggest 
banks in the world at a time when the British appeared incapable of replicating the 
large firms found in other countries. 
 
MANAGERIAL AND PERSONAL CAPITALISM 
In 1905, the constitution theorist Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922) observed, 
“combination has gradually become the soul of modern commercial systems” 
because “one trade after another has passed from the management of private persons 
into the hands of corporate bodies.”92  The Amalgamation Movement exemplified a 
late nineteenth-century increase in firm size that elevated the economic importance 
of the corporate form.  However, the Amalgamation Movement would have 
perplexed Alfred DuPont Chandler, a historian who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1978 and 
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raised business history to the level of a credible field of study.
93
  Chandler suggested 
the British never really came to terms with the declining importance of the individual 
during the late-nineteenth century.  He argued that the British could not embrace the 




Chandler observed that many of the industries created by the Second Industrial 
Revolution were capital intensive, which imposed fixed costs of production.
95
  
Minimising average unit cost under these circumstances demanded that firms 
amortise their fixed costs over a large volume of output.  To do that, either firms 
produced a solitary product in very large quantities to realise economies of scale or 
they proliferated the range of products their manufacturing facilities produced to 
realise economies of scope.
96
  According to Chandler, achieving the high output 
volumes needed to realise economies of scale and scope demanded firms make three 
investments.
97
  First, firms acquired the manufacturing facilities capable of 
producing output in large volumes.  Second, firms invested in the marketing and 
distribution networks needed to sell and deliver the output produced to consumers.  
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According to Chandler, these first two investments often yielded firms that were so 
big that the task of administering them overwhelmed their owners.  Consequently, 
the largest firms made a third investment in a managerial hierarchy staffed by 
salaried administrators to coordinate the firm’s activities on the owners’ behalf.  
Chandler argued this third investment was revolutionary.
98
  For the first time, those 
with “no connection with the founders” of the firms they managed and “little or no 
equity” invested in them coordinated the fastest growing sectors of the economy.
99
  
The result was an unprecedented separation of ownership and control and the 
emergence of what Chandler called ‘managerial capitalism.’
100
  A new managerial 
class came into being that took control of the economy’s commanding heights.   
 
To illustrate how economies of scale and scope fostered an increase in firm 
size during the Second Industrial Revolution, Chandler noted that in 1882 a single 
act of horizontal integration put somewhere between a quarter to two-fifths of the 
global oil refining capacity under the control of John D. Rockefeller’s (1839-1937) 
Standard Oil Trust.
101
  Standard Oil then rationalised its operations by transferring all 
of its production to three great oil refineries where it realised economies that saw the 
cost to produce a gallon of kerosene fall from 2½¢ in 1880 to less than ½¢ by 
1885.
102
  After that, Standard Oil integrated vertically to acquire 20,000 oil wells, 
4,000 miles of pipeline and 5,000 tank cars to feed its refineries and distribute their 
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  In the end, Standard Oil’s dominance of the American oil industry became 
so great that in 1911 the United States’ Supreme Court deemed it in breach of 
America’s antitrust laws and ordered its breakup.
104
  That breakup created 34 
successor companies, but three of them (Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of 
New Jersey and Standard Oil of New York) remained so big that they became 
members of the global oligopoly that dominated the world’s petroleum industry 
during the twentieth century.
105
  Chandler argued Standard Oil’s growth typified 
many firms during the Second Industrial Revolution.  The pursuit of economies of 
scale and scope promoted oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures because a 
small number of large horizontally and vertically integrated firms possessed 
insurmountable competitive advantages.  These large firms administered by 
managerial professionals could minimise average unit costs in a way that smaller 
firms managed by their proprietors could not.
106
   
 
Chandler claimed the British embraced managerial capitalism far more 
reluctantly than either the Germans or Americans did.  He claimed that as late as the 
1930s, British firms remained small enough to operate “without the benefit of an 
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  In Britain, the separation of ownership and 
control was far less complete than in Germany or America because the families that 
established Britain’s firms generally remained “influential stockholders and senior 
executives of their companies.”
108
  According to Chandler, this reluctance to 
relinquish control to salaried administrators promoted a form of ‘personal capitalism’ 
that kept British firms small by American and German standards.
109
  Acts of 
horizontal integration might occur in Britain, but the commitment to personal 
capitalism ensured the component parts of a horizontally integrated British firm 
remained under the control of those who owned them previously.  Consequently, 
horizontal integration in Britain yielded nothing more than mere “federations of 
autonomous family enterprises”
110
 in which the centralisation of authority needed to 
rationalise production never occurred.
111
  The British commitment to personal 
capitalism also precluded vertical integration because a typical British firm lacked 
the managerial resources needed to administer another part of the value chain.
112
  
One of twentieth-century Britain’s most successful personal capitalists, the motor 
vehicle manufacturer William Morris (1877-1963), expressed this uniquely British 
reluctance to take over his suppliers as follows: 
There is no point producing any article ... you can buy from a specialist 
concern....  The outside firm that makes ... one ... important part ... can 
keep its governing brains concentrated on the problems connected with 
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In Chandler’s view, British manufacturers missed the most lucrative opportunities for 
growth the Second Industrial Revolution offered because their owner-managed firms 
lacked the ‘organisational capabilities’ needed to compete with their foreign 
counterparts.  British firms remained too small to realise economies of scale and 
scope.
114
  His explanation as to why British manufacturers would embark upon such a 
commercially destructive course of action had its origins in the British class 
system.
115
   
 
Like Donald Coleman before him,
116
 Chandler divided those who populated 
British firms into ‘gentlemen’ and ‘players.’
117
  Gentlemen were ‘educated amateurs,’ 
the descendants of a firm’s founding entrepreneurs who lived off the incomes 
generated by an inherited ownership stake in the firm.  Gentlemen demanded nothing 
more of their firms than they supply the income needed to sustain their lifestyles.  
Consequently, gentlemen preferred not to put their wealth at risk by making a large 
investment in some new business venture.  Players, on the other hand, worked as the 
gentlemen’s servants to earn a wage or a salary.  Some players aspired to become 
gentlemen too, but to do that they would usually have to establish a successful 
businesses of their own.  Gentlemen received a classical education at a public school 
and then at Oxford, Cambridge or at one of the provincial universities that taught the 
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Oxbridge curriculum.  Significantly, gentlemen studied the classics.  They did not 
study technical subjects designed to prepare them for their duties within their firms.  
In contrast, players were ‘practical men’ who served apprenticeships and clerkships to 
accumulate the on the job experience they needed to make them indispensable allies 
to the gentlemen.   
 
According to Chandler, the division of responsibilities between gentlemen and 
players in a typical British firm worked well in labour-intensive industries established 
during the Industrial Revolution.  Personal capitalism could compete when the scale 
of operations remained small, when a large capital investment was unnecessary and 
when tried and trusted rules of thumb passed down by one generation to the next 
yielded acceptable results.  The Second Industrial Revolution even offered ambitious 
players new opportunities to elevate their social standing in industries that produced 
packaged consumer products.
118
  After all, the manufacture of biscuits, confectionary, 
soft drinks, cordials, condiments and the like demanded relatively little capital 
investment.  The capacity to realise economies of scale and scope in these industries 
would not be critical to success.  In addition, Britain possessed a mature retail sector 
and a legion of independent wholesalers and shopkeepers who would happily stock 
well-advertised brands subject to high consumer demand.  There was no need to 
invest in marketing and distribution networks when others would distribute and sell 
product on the manufacturer’s behalf.  A personal capitalist could prosper producing 
branded consumer products because the investment in production, marketing and 
distribution was so small that there was no need for an extensive managerial 
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  An ambitious player like William Hesketh Lever (1851-1925) amassed 
a fortune manufacturing and advertising soap and detergents without relinquishing 
control of his business.  Lever was the son of a Bolton grocer who ended his life as a 
gentleman.  Lever became one of Britain’s most enlightened employers and a 
respected philanthropist, he sat in both houses of parliament and he died with the title 
‘First Viscount Leverhulme of the Western Isles in the Counties of Inverness and 
Ross and Cromarty.’
120
   
 
Some business and economic historians questioned Chandler’s contention that 
British firms were smaller than their American and German counterparts were.
121
  
Peter Wardley observed that although Britain lacked some of the exceptionally large 
industrial giants found elsewhere, many of the biggest enterprises in Britain remained 
big enough to qualify as large even by American and German standards.
122
  Wardley 
also suggested that firms engaged in the delivery of services rather than 
manufacturing t ended to dominate the ranks of Britain’s largest firms.
123
  To 
illustrate, the textile manufacturer J. & P. Coates was Britain’s largest manufacturer 
in 1904/05 although it ranked a mere eleventh on the league table of the largest 
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businesses in Britain behind ten railway companies and the Bank of England.  At this 
time, 40 of the country’s 50 the biggest businesses in Britain provided services.
124
   
 
Britain may have lacked the truly colossal manufacturing concerns found 
elsewhere, but it could play host to large firms many of which confined their 
operations to the delivery of services.  The growth in firm size exhibited by the 
English and Welsh banks during the Amalgamation Movement, therefore, was a far 
less unusual development than Chandler would have expected.  The next section will 
examine the Amalgamation Movement in detail to explain how large the biggest 
banks in England and Wales became. 
 
THE AMALGAMATION MOVEMENT 
Table 1.3 depicts an increase in the number of bank amalgamations in England and 
Wales that began during the 1860s.  This increase in the rate of bank amalgamations 
gathered pace and persisted, unlike the outbreak of bank amalgamations recorded 
between 1826 and 1843.  If the Amalgamation Movement appears to have lost 
momentum between 1908 and 1924 that is because there were far fewer banks in 
England and Wales left during the second decade of the twentieth century.  One 
estimate suggests that in 1860, England and Wales played host to 397 banks, 97 of 
which were joint stock companies and the remaining 300 were private banks.  The 
English and Welsh banking industry changed radically over the next 50 years.  The 
industry more than quadrupled in size, expanding from 1,223 branches in total in 
1860 to 5,930 branches by 1910.
125
  The Amalgamation Movement also ensured that 
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the number of banks operating those branches fell dramatically.  By 1910, private 
banks were in danger of total extinction.  Only 34 of them remained open for 
business.  The number of the joint stock banks had also fallen to 50.
126
  The 
relatively small regional banks that once populated the English and Welsh banking 
industry disappeared by means of a merger into the largest banks’ expanding branch 
networks.
127
  The average English and Welsh bank only maintained 3.1 branches in 





Bank Amalgamations in England and Wales, 1826-1924 















1826-1843 23 93 6 0 122 
1844-1861 11 23 10 0 44 
1862-1889 31 66 40 1 138 
1890-1907 37 76 69 1 183 
1908-1924 1 24 40 0 65 
Source: Sykes, The Amalgamation Movement in English Banking, 193-195. 
 
The Amalgamation Movement continued during World War I to intensify the 
Big Five’s dominance over the industry.
129
  By 1918, the biggest five English and 
Welsh banks appeared on the brink of monopolising the banking industry in much 
the same way Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust monopolised oil refining in pre-war 
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  Walter Leaf (1852-1927) (the chair of the London County and 
Westminster Bank) conceded in 1918 that the public now questioned whether bank 
amalgamations promoted “what is vaguely called a ‘Money Trust’ with a consequent 
restriction of competition.”
131
  Leaf had good reason to feel concerned about the 
public mood because the biggest English and Welsh banks would soon become the 
subject of a British version of the ‘trust busting’ undertaken in progressive-era 
America.
132
   
 
On 11 March 1918, Leaf addressed his shareholders to defend an amalgamation 
between the London County and Westminster Bank and Parr’s Bank.
133
  Bank 
amalgamations were nothing new and had been a common occurrence for over 50 
years.
134
  However, the timing of this particular amalgamation made justifying it 
unusually difficult.  On 5 February 1918, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Bonnar 
Law (1858-1923)) declared bank amalgamations a matter of “public importance” in 
parliament before announcing his intention to appoint a committee to inquire into the 
subject.
135
  At first, the banking industry appeared to take little or no notice of Law’s 
announcement.  On 18 February, the London City and Midland Bank’s Edward 
Holden (1848-1919) declared his bank would amalgamate with the London Joint 
Stock Bank to create what would be the “largest bank in the world” according to The 
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  The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not back down.  On 5 March, he 
made it known that Lord Colwyn (Frederick Henry Smith (1859-1946)) would chair 
the Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations.
137
   
 
The amalgamation between the London County and Westminster and Parr’s 
could not have come at a more politically sensitive moment given the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s announcement on 5 March 1918.  To make matters worse, the Union 
of London and Smiths Bank also chose 11 March 1918 to put a proposed 
amalgamation with the National Provincial Bank of England to its shareholders.
138
  
Leaf would have to choose his words carefully when he addressed his shareholders 
because a larger than normal audience was taking an interest in the proceedings.  
Leaf explained that wartime experience taught many in the City and in government 
that large firms constituted a source of economic strength.  Indeed, the need to 
increase the size of Britain’s firms was now shaping official policy.  The Board of 
Trade, Leaf noted, encouraged “combinations ... in various branches of our great 
industries ... in the belief that in such close unions lies the most effective weapon 
against foreign competition.”
139
  Felix Schuster (1854-1936) sang from a similar 
song sheet when he addressed the Union of London and Smiths Bank’s shareholders 
on the same day.  Schuster claimed, “Two separate banks” could not “do as much as 
if they were amalgamated into one.”
140
  Leaf and Schuster’s argument was that 
combinations enhanced rather than stifled competition.  Greater size bestowed 
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advantages that allowed a bank to compete against rivals that were getting bigger 
too.   
 
There was good reason to believe that many firms in Britain remained too 
small by international standards in 1918.  Some manufacturing industries had utilised 
amalgamations to induce an increase in firm size prior to World War I.  Notable 
examples included the textile spinning and finishing industries, some branches of the 
food processing industry, tobacco and cigarettes, soap and detergents, cement and 
brewing.  A similar thing also happened to the insurance industry.  Britain’s largest 
manufacturers and service providers had embraced a separation of ownership and 
control to accommodate this increase in firm size.
141
  Nevertheless, most British 
firms seemed too small in 1918 to sustain an internationally competitive economy.  
Consequently, post-war Britain played host to a Rationalisation Movement led by 
Lyndall Fownes Urwick (1891-1983) who became one of twentieth-century Britain’s 
most prolific managerial thinkers.  According to Urwick, rationalisation would 
improve British firms’ “organisation of production and distribution” through the 
“elimination of waste, simplification and standardisation, [and] horizontal and 
vertical combinations.”
142
  British firms and governments made a concerted effort to 
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foster an increase in average firm size after the war.
143
  The Railways Act of 1921 
typified the effort.
144
  It combined over 120 local railway businesses into the four 
regional giants that became the railway industry’s ‘Big Four.’
145
   
 
The English and Welsh banks were very different organisationally to most 
British firms at the end of the Great War.  These banks had already spent half a 
century engaged in the Amalgamation Movement to produce a significant increase in 
their size.  In 1918, Colywn’s committee on bank amalgamations determined the 
banks had exhausted the advantages bestowed by greater firm size.  The committee 
warned bank amalgamations would soon constitute a threat to competition if they 
continued unabated.  Its report concluded: 
While we believe that there is at present no idea of a Money Trust, it 
appears to us not altogether impossible that circumstances might produce 
something approaching to it at a comparatively early date.  Experience 
shows that, in order to preserve an approximate equality of resources and 
competitive power, the large English [and Welsh] banks consider it 
necessary to meet each important amalgamation, sooner or later, by 
another.  If ... size ... is to prevail, it can only lead, and fairly rapidly, to 
the creation of a very few preponderant combinations; and if those 
combinations amalgamated or entered into a joint agreement as to rates 




The committee recommended legislation that would have required the banks to seek 
official consent before they amalgamated.
147
  The committee’s recommendation even 
yielded a bill to that effect although its wording raised technical issues that delayed 
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its progress through the parliament.
148
  In the end, the Big Five and the government 
bypassed parliament altogether and settled on a gentlemen’s agreement instead.  The 
banks would submit all future proposals to amalgamate to the Treasury and the 
Board of Trade and would only proceed with their consent.
149
  That agreement was 
honoured.  Bank amalgamations continued after 1919, albeit at a diminished rate.  
However, the Big Five assumed the authorities would never permit one of them to 
amalgamate with another member of the Big Five.  The next structurally significant 
development for the banking industry occurred over five decades later.  In 1968, the 
National Provincial Bank merged with the Westminster Bank to create the National 
Westminster Bank (or NatWest) whereupon the Big Five became the Big Four.
150
  
The next section explores the reason why bankers felt a need to increase their banks’ 
size during the Amalgamation Movement. 
 
WHY DID AN ENGLISH AND WELSH BANK GET BIGGER? 
A growing economy like post-Industrial Revolution Britain’s needs an expanding 
money supply to fund its transactions.
151
  Unlike most other businesses, banks 
literally make the money a growing economy needs because banks incur transferable 
debts payable on demand or at relatively short notice that possess all the 
characteristics of money.  These debts are denominated in the prevailing unit of 
account (in the British case, pounds sterling), they provide a means of payment and 
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they constitute a store of value.
152
  During the Industrial Revolution, provincial 
English and Welsh banks put bank notes into circulation to make money.
153
  After 
1844, the money the English and Welsh banks supplied took an increasingly 
intangible form.  Banks offered cheques that made payments by transferring an 
account balance from one bank account to another.
154
  The capacity of bank debts 
like these to act as a store of value was critical to public confidence in the money 
made by the banks.  As Mahatma Ghandi (1869-1948) once observed, no one wants 
to be the payee nominated on a “cheque drawn on a crashing bank.”
155
  Public 
confidence in the banks’ ca pacity to pay their debts when they fell due was vital for 
the utility of Britain’s money supply because much of it relied on bank credit. 
 
This thesis argues the need to put a growing English and Welsh money supply 
on a secure footing motivated the Amalgamation Movement.  No one issued an edict 
to initiate the Amalgamation Movement nor was it the product of a deliberate 
government policy.  Instead, the Amalgamation Movement proceeded as if guided by 
Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) ‘invisible hand’ of the market.
156
  Banks that 
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commanded public confidence possessed the competitive advantage.  These banks 
made their industry safer by taking other banks over.  Banks that could not command 
public confidence disappeared by means of an amalgamation with a safer bank.  
Ultimately, the endeavour proved a success.  The Amalgamation Movement created 
one of the most stable banking industries in the world.  The United Kingdom avoided 
a major bank failure during the twentieth-century’s Great Depression for example.
157
   
 
The following chapters examine how the Amalgamation Movement unfolded.  
Chapter Two explains that the amalgamating English and Welsh banks were 
following a precedent.  Scottish experience suggested that bigger banks were safer 
than smaller ones, although legislative prohibitions in England and Wales limited the 
size of a bank before 1826.  The Scots erected large banks but the English and Welsh 
could have never embarked upon the Amalgamation Movement whilst these 
legislative prohibitions remained in force.  Chapter Three argues that currency 
legislation passed in 1844 delayed the Amalgamation Movement for another two 
decades.  The English and Welsh banks waited until their bank notes lost their 
importance to them before they considered merging with each other.  Chapter Four 
examines the trade in inland bills of exchange that sustained many of the small banks 
found in England and Wales prior to 1870.  This trade went into decline during the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, which made the acquisition of a large 
geographically dispersed branch network a necessity.  Finally, Chapter Five claims 
that the adoption of limited shareholder liability in the 1880s accelerated the rate of 
bank amalgamations.  Limited liability imposed risks upon a bank’s creditors who 
                                                          
157
 Richard S. Grossman, "The shoe that didn't drop: Explaining banking stability during the Great 




could no longer rely on the bank’s proprietors to compensate them if it failed.  These 
creditors reacted by demanding reassurance that their banks would not fail in the first 
place.  Small regional banks could not survive under these circumstances.  They left 
the industry by means of an amalgamation with a larger and much safer rival.   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Amalgamation Movement of 1870 to 1920 occurred at a time when the British 
ranked amongst the wealthiest people in the world.  Some economic historians have 
also argued that the Amalgamation Movement occurred at a time when Britain’s 
economy exhibited the first symptoms of a relative economic decline that would take 
more than a century to run its course.  The competitive advantages early 
industrialisation bestowed upon the British ebbed away as the services sector 
displaced the nation’s manufacturers as the country’s most important source of 
employment growth.  The expansion of the English and Welsh banking industry 
during the Amalgamation Movement was representative of broader developments in 
the British economy at the time.   
 
Alfred Chandler depicted Britain as a land in which family-managed firms 
predominated.  According to him, the British were incapable of fostering a dramatic 
increase in firm size during the Amalgamation Movement although Chandler 
underestimated just how large a British firm could become because he ignored the 
services industries that played host to some of the country’s largest firms.  By 1910, 
the Big Five English and Welsh banks ranked amongst the world’s largest firms of 
their kind.  In 1918, the Colwyn’s Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations 




Big Five’s dominance of the banking industry constituted a threat to competition 
before demanding they should seek official approval before amalgamating with 
another bank.  Banking became one of the first industries in the United Kingdom to 
come under regulation explicitly designed to preserve competition by slowing the 
rate of mergers and acquisitions.   
 
The road to the Colwyn Committee’s restriction on bank amalgamations was a 
long one.  The next chapter explains that the journey began in seventeenth-century 
Scotland where the legal environment fostered banks that were bigger than the 






THE SCOTTISH PRECEDENT:  HOW JOINT STOCK BANKING 
CAME TO ENGLAND AND WALES 
Now, if it had not been for this iniquitous monopoly ... what would ... 
have been the condition of English banking at the present day?  There 
would probably have been thirty or forty great banks in the Metropolis, 
each as great as the present Bank of England, with ... branches all over 
the country.  It would … have been the Scottish system on a much larger 




English and Welsh banking emerged from the Industrial Revolution in far from rude 
health.  The industry came close to collapse during a catastrophic run in 1825.  
Scotland boasted a far more stable banking industry than the English and Welsh did.  
The Scottish banks survived the 1825 financial crisis largely unharmed.  The key 
difference was that Scottish banks were bigger than in England and Wales.  
Consequently, the Scottish public invested more confidence in their banks and chose 
not to orchestrate a run on them in 1825.  Responsibility for this difference in bank 
size lay with a Scotland’s legal system, which gave rise to a regime known as ‘free 
banking.’
2
  Scottish banks faced no legal impediments on their size, which meant 
they adopted the joint-stock principle at a time when banks in England and Wales 
were limited to a maximum of six members.   
 
The English and Welsh banks’ coexisted with the Bank of England, a state-
sponsored corporate body sustained by a symbiotic relationship with the post-
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Glorious Revolution state.  The Bank of England’s purpose was to act as the 
government’s banker and to lend money to the crown.  Ensuring The Bank of 
England’s shareholders remained sufficiently remunerated to fulfil their 
responsibilities to the state entailed bestowing them with privileges.  One of those 
privileges was a legislative guarantee that the Bank of England would be the only 
banking company in the whole of England and Wales.  That guarantee shaped the 
English and Welsh banking industry during the Industrial Revolution. 
 
THE BANK OF ENGLAND MONOPOLY 
William of Orange’s regime erected the Bank of England in 1694 to fund a war with 
France.  The infant Bank of England lent £1,200,000 of its capital at an interest rate 
of eight per cent per annum to the crown.
3
  From its inception, the Bank of England 
was a Whig institution that attracted Tory opposition.
4
  The Bank’s Scottish promoter 
William Paterson considered those who opposed Bank of England “Jacobites” who 
were seeking to promote a deposed king’s cause.
5
  Within a few years, a Tory faction 
nearly succeeded in erecting a rival to the Bank of England.  The legislation needed 
to create the National Land Bank passed into law in 1697.
6
  Strangely, the National 
Land Bank’s Tory origins did not stop King William III supporting it because the 
scheme promised to raise more money for him than the Bank of England had done.
7
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The security of this new bank would rest on mortgaged land rather than a reserve of 
gold and silver as was the case with the Bank of England.
8
  The National Land 
Bank’s Tory promoters expected the aristocrats who were their natural constituency 
to furnish the real estate needed to sustain the bank.  However, the scheme came to 
nothing.  The National Land Bank failed to attract the subscribers it needed to 
commence business.
9
   
 
The National Land Bank proved an embarrassing failure for the Tories, but the 
attempt to establish it influenced the structure of the English and Welsh banking 
industry for years to come.  The prospect of a rival convinced the Bank of England 
and its allies that it needed protection.
10
  The first concession came in 1697 in the 
form of legislation that promised the parliament would never establish or permit a 
rival banking company in England and Wales.
11
  The undertaking was unenforceable 
because Westminster parliaments are sovereign.  The 1697 parliament could not limit 
the legislative powers of its successors.
12
  A subsequent parliament could have 
erected or permitted another banking company in England and Wales had it wished.  
Nevertheless, the Bank of England rendered valuable services to the state, which 
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made breaching the undertaking given in 1697 unthinkable.
13
  Parliament honoured 
the undertaking until 1844 when the Joint Stock Bank Act gave other English and 
Welsh banks a conditional right to incorporate.
14
    
 
The undertaking that parliament would never erect or permit another banking 
company implied the Bank of England should be the only banking company in 
England and Wales.  Two defects in the 1697 legislation prevented the realisation of 
this objective.  First, companies created for purposes other than banking might enter 
the banking industry through the back door without official consent.  Both the 
Hollow Sword Blade Company and the Company of Mine Adventurers issued bank 
notes during the first decade of the eighteenth century.
15
  The Hollow Sword Blade 
Company even advertised an intention to discount bills of exchange and to lend 
funds on security.
16
  The second defect was that rivals might form large banking 
partnerships that could raise a lot of capital from their proprietors.
17
  To close both 
loopholes, parliament passed further legislation.  In 1707, parliament made it 
unlawful for a company other than the Bank of England or for a partnership whose 
proprietorship exceeded six to “borrow, owe or take up any sum or sums of money 
on their bills or notes payable on demand or at any less time than six months from 
the borrowing thereof.”
18
  These prohibitions were to become operative in September 
1708.  In the interim, parliament renewed the Bank of England’s charter.  The 1708 
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Bank Charter Act and every subsequent Bank Charter Act passed until 1833 repeated 
the prohibitions contained in the 1707 act.
19
  Borrowing on bills and notes payable on 
demand or at short notice encompassed the right to issue bank notes, an activity most 
bankers considered the defining feature of a bank.
20
  Parliament appeared to have 
limited every banking partnership in England and Wales to a maximum of just six 
proprietors.   
 
The six-partner limit shaped the English and Welsh banking industry until its 
partial repeal in 1826.  During this period, the Bank of England opened no branches 
in the provinces and confined its operations to London.
21
  The Bank of England 
shared the London market with a number of private banks that limited their 
membership to six even though they no longer issued bank notes.  The West End 
banks serviced London’s urban bourgeoisie and aristocrats who came to town to 
attend parliament.  The City banks accommodated the City of London’s mercantile 
community.
22
  Only a few banks existed in the provinces prior to the Industrial 
Revolution.  In 1750, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) estimated fewer than a dozen 
“banking shops” were open for business in the whole of England.
23
  However, the 
Industrial Revolution increased the provincial demand for credit giving rise to a 
growing number of country banks to service this demand.
24
  By 1797, the merchant 
banker Francis Bearing (1740-1810) could assert that “almost every town and even ... 
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villages” possessed at least one banking establishment.
25
  L. S. Pressnell estimated 
there were 370 English and Welsh country banks open for business in 1800.
26
  The 
six-partner limit applied to every one of these banks.
27
  An average English and 
Welsh bank had only three proprietors in 1822.
28
   
 
In England and Wales, a state-sponsored Bank of England coexisted with many 
private banks limited to a maximum of six members prior to 1826.  In Scotland, the 
banking industry was different because the origins of the Scottish banking industry 
lay with the establishment of the Bank of Scotland, an event that predated the union 
with England and Wales.  Once that union was complete, the authorities in 
Westminster saw no need to protect a Bank of Scotland that had never lent money to 
the crown.  The next section will explain that Westminster would incorporate rivals 
to the Bank of Scotland.  Two additional Scottish banking companies (the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and the British Linen Company) emerged during the eighteenth 
century.   
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SCOTLAND’S THREE PUBLIC BANKS 
The Bank of Scotland was the creation of the Scottish parliament in 1695.
29
  At the 
time, Scotland was a sovereign state albeit one whose independence rested upon 
uncertain foundations because of the union of the crowns.
30
  Scotland even became a 
republic after the English executed Charles I (1600-1649) at the end of the Civil 
War.
31
  In 1695, the Scottish parliament had no desire to fund their neighbour’s war 
with France.  Consequently, the Scottish parliament stipulated the newly established 
Bank of Scotland would not lend money to the crown without its consent and 
subsequently withheld that consent.  Thus, the Bank of Scotland was a very different 
creature to the Bank of England from the outset.  The Bank of Scotland was a 
commercial venture designed to foster Scotland’s economic development not a state 
bank.
32
  Nevertheless, the Act for Erecting a Bank of Scotland did accord the infant 
Bank of Scotland one valuable privilege.  It forbade “Persons to enter into and set up 
a distinct company of bank within this Kingdom, besides these persons ... in whose 
favours this Act is granted.”
33
  The Bank of Scotland had a monopoly on corporate 
banking in Scotland that would expire in 1716.   
 
Defending the banking monopoly granted to the Bank of Scotland proved a 
difficult task at first.  In 1696, the Company of Scotland for Trading with Africa and 
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the Indies (the Darien Company) started to issue bank notes.
34
  The far better 
capitalised Darien Company claimed that it was a trading company and as such, it 
was not a ‘distinct company of bank’ and could issue bank notes without breaching 
the Bank of Scotland’s monopoly.  The Bank of Scotland’s officials determined their 
best course of action would be to wait the Darien Company out rather than settle the 
matter in court.  Their strategy succeeded.  The Darien Company’s preparations for 
its ill-fated expedition to the Isthmus of Panama caused it to lose interest in its bank 
notes and it soon stopped issuing them.  The Bank of Scotland survived the first 
serious threat to its existence.
35
   
 
The Bank of Scotland’s monopoly lapsed in 1716 by which time the Scottish 
parliament no longer existed.  Scotland was now part of the United Kingdom and so 
the Bank of Scotland would have to apply to Westminster to renew its monopoly.  
The Bank of Scotland never made the application.  An oft-repeated legend suggests 
the failure to make the application had its origins in the Jacobite rebellion of 1715.  
George I (1660-1727) and his supporters considered the Bank of Scotland a Jacobite 
institution because its Treasurer sympathised with the Old Pretender’s supporters.  
Consequently, the Bank of Scotland’s officials assumed Westminster would refuse a 
request to have the monopoly renewed.36  However, an anonymous Bank of Scotland 
official writing in 1728 gave another reason for the failure to apply for a renewal of 
the monopoly.  He claimed, “No ... Scotsmen who had the nation’s welfare at heart 
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would ever attempt to disquiet the Bank [of Scotland].”
37
  If the Bank of Scotland 
thought national feeling rendered it immune to competition, it was wrong.  In 1727, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland came into existence.
38
   
 
 The Royal Bank of Scotland was a consequence of the Darien Company’s 
disastrous Central American adventure.
39
  Much of ‘the equivalent’ paid to Scotland 
pursuant to the Acts of Union compensated those who lost money due to the Darien 
Company’s failure.  Not everyone compensated received a cash payment.  Many 
received long-term debt securities known as ‘equivalent debentures.’  By 1724, the 
holders of these equivalent debentures had obtained a royal charter to erect a 
company to represent their interests.  Almost immediately, this company set out to 
break the monopoly held by the Bank of Scotland.  Its associates undermined the 
Bank of Scotland’s reputation, alleging that it had failed Scotland by granting too 
little credit.
40
  For its part, the Bank of Scotland claimed the Equivalent Company 
was orchestrating a smear campaign against it.  A Bank of Scotland official 
complained, “Those of the Bank [of Scotland] do show all due respect to the 
Equivalent [Company’s] proprietors and have said nothing, but what was absolutely 
necessary for their own vindication” before adding they “have not met with the same 
chivalry from the other side.”
41
  The Bank of Scotland’s protest came to nothing.  
The Bank of Scotland remained suspect in London because of its alleged connections 
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to the Jacobite cause.
42
  On 31 May 1727, the Equivalent Company obtained the 




Almost immediately, the Bank of Scotland (the ‘Old Bank’) and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (the ‘New Bank’) embarked on a fight for survival.  Both assumed 
Scotland was too small to sustain two banking companies.
44
  The Royal Bank of 
Scotland held the upper hand initially.  Its rival’s bank notes were in circulation and 
every one of them imposed a contractually binding promise on the Old Bank to make 
a payment on demand.  The New Bank and its associates accumulated Bank of 
Scotland notes in large numbers and presented them en masse for redemption.  The 
tactic seemed to work at first because the Bank of Scotland suspended payments in 
March 1728.
45
  After that, the Royal Bank ramped up the pressure.  It petitioned the 
Court of Session to enforce its claim against the Bank of Scotland and appealed to 
the House of Lords after the Court of Session ruled in the Bank of Scotland’s 
favour.
46
  The Bank of Scotland used the time these court proceedings made 
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available to reorganise its finances.  By September 1728, the Bank of Scotland was 
making cash payments with interest where necessary, once more.  By the time the 
representatives of both banks made their submissions before the House of Lords, the 
Bank of Scotland was discharging its legal obligations, which rendered the Royal 
Bank of Scotland’s complaint against it largely irrelevant.
47
  Two evenly matched 
rivals realised that each of them lacked the resources needed to destroy the other 
outright and came to terms with each other’s ongoing existence.    
 
Two incorporated banking companies should have rendered eighteenth-century 
Scotland overbanked.  In comparison, England and Wales only had one banking 
company and that was the Bank of England.  Surprisingly, another royal charter laid 
the foundations for Scotland’s third banking company in 1746.
48
  The British Linen 
Company’s objective was to facilitate Scotland’s industrial development in the wake 
of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion.  The company received wide-ranging powers 
designed to promote Scottish linen manufacture.
49
  The company’s unusually 
permissive charter gave it the right to extend credit and to issue bank notes to do it.  
The company soon began to exploit this loophole to pursue a lucrative banking 
business.
50
  By 1813, the company’s directors could claim the British Linen 
Company was Scotland’s third banking company in all but name.  In that year, these 
directors told Treasury:  
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It was found ... [the company] ... could be of more service to the 
country, and its trade and manufactures, generally, by employing their 
credit and capital as bankers, granting pecuniary aid to those who 
applied to them, and were deemed worthy of support, issuing their notes 
for that purpose in the usual way, payable upon demand.
 
 It is now 
upwards of sixty years since the company gave up entirely the dealing in 
linen.  From that period they have been universally considered as a third 
public bank....
51
    
 
The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland considered the British Linen 
company an unwanted interloper.  In 1813, the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland complained to the Treasury the British Linen Company’s illicit banking 
business threatened to destabilise what was already an overcrowded banking 
industry.
52
  Continued opposition from the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland denied the British Linen Company the official recognition it craved until 
1849.  In that year, British Linen Company’s charter finally conceded it had been a 
bank for nearly a century.
53
  Even then, the British Linen Company waited until 1906 
for permission to change its name to the British Linen Bank.
54
   
 
The Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen 
Company were corporate bodies erected under special acts or royal charters.  As 
such, they shared important features with other companies like the Bank of 
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  They all possessed a legal personality, which made them competent to 
defend or pursue legal disputes independently of their shareholders.  A corporation 
also incurred its own debts and it was rightful owner of its property.
56
  Consequently, 
a creditor only had recourse against the corporation’s assets to recover any amounts 
owed to them.  A creditor could not sue its proprietors to recover a debt, which 
bestowed the protection of limited liability upon a company’s shareholders.  In 
addition, corporations raised capital by issuing transferable shares upon which the 
corporation paid dividends.  A shareholder could buy and sell these shares without 
disturbing the company’s operations.  Finally, corporations facilitated a separation of 
ownership and control.  Corporations operated under the supervision of directors 
elected by the shareholders.   
 
Incorporation constituted a valuable prize because of the privileges it bestowed 
but it was an expensive business.  The of Bank of England’s shareholders, for 
example, secured their company’s continued existence by lending large sums of 
money to the state every time their charter came up for renewal.
57
  However, one 
could exploit the laws of partnership, agency and trust to create an organisational 
form that replicated some, although not all, of a corporation’s advantages at greatly 
reduced cost.  The next section examines these unincorporated businesses on both 
sides of the Scottish border.  
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UNINCORPORATED JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 
Partnerships were like a company in the sense that they facilitated collective effort.  
A partnership’s proprietors embarked on a business enterprise in common in the 
pursuit of profit.  However, partnerships imposed risks on their proprietors that were 
absent in an incorporated association.  One problem was mutual agency.  Anyone 
who shared in a partnership’s profits could bind their fellow partners to a business 
debt.
58
  Partners had to trust each other implicitly under these circumstances.  In 
addition, partnerships lacked perpetual succession.
59
  Partners terminated the 
partnership whenever they withdrew from the partnership.  The admission of new 
partners needed the existing partners’ consent.  The absence of perpetual succession 
made buying and selling an ownership stake in a partnership difficult.  Matters 
simplified enormously if the partners transferred the partnership’s assets into a trust 
and appointed trustees to run the business as their agents.
60
  The partners became the 
beneficiaries of a trust who lacked the capacity to commit each other to debts.  There 
was also the option of issuing tradeable shares.  The beneficiaries of a trust only 
needed to notify the trustees of the intention to transfer their claim against the trust to 
someone else to sell their shares.  Finally, the trust could provide for the trustees’ 
appointment by means of an election of the partners.  Confusingly, these quasi-
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corporate, share-issuing partnership/trust arrangements called themselves ‘joint stock 
companies’ even though they had not incorporated.  In a court of common law, an 
unincorporated joint stock company remained a partnership whose proprietors were 
liable for the company’s debts.
61
   
 
Unincorporated joint stock companies resolved some of the difficulties 
imposed by a partnership but they suffered from two legal impediments that made it 
impossible to use them to conduct banking business in England and Wales prior to 
1826.  The most obvious obstacle was the six-partner limit.
62
  There was no point in 
erecting a share-issuing joint stock banking company when the law limited it to a 
maximum of six proprietors.  It was easier to enter into a common law partnership 
instead.  However, clause 18 of the Bubble Act of 1720 would have cast doubts over 
the legality of an unincorporated joint stock banking company in England and Wales 
even in the absence of the six-partner limit.  Clause 18 declared:   
All undertakings … presuming to act as a corporate body … raising … 
transferable stock … transferring … shares in such stock … without 
legal authority, either by Act of Parliament, or by any Charter from the 




On its face, clause 18 denied an unincorporated English and Welsh joint stock 
company the right to raise capital by issuing transferable shares.
64
  However, no one 
could agree on what clause 18 actually prohibited.  The Attorney General 
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complained the clause was “unintelligible” when parliament repealed it in 1825.
65
  It 
did not help that the courts got little opportunity to clear up the confusion.  
Prosecutions of an alleged breach of clause 18 were rare.  The 1724 case of Rex v 
Cawood constituted the only time a breach of clause 18 came before an English court 
during the whole of the eighteenth century.
66
  The case determined nothing of any 
real significance.  When an alleged breach of clause 18 came before a court for the 
second time in 1808, legal opinion remained divided as to its true meaning.
67
   
 
A literal reading of clause 18 coupled with an understanding of the 
circumstances under which it passed into law suggested the need for strict 
interpretation.  The South Sea Company asked parliament to insert clause 18 into 
legislation establishing two other companies (the Royal Exchange Assurance 
Corporation and the London Assurance Corporation) to stop other incorporated and 
unincorporated associations issuing shares into the notorious bull market that had 
developed in its shares.
68
  One could argue, therefore, that parliament gave 
corporations like the South Sea Company an exclusive right to issue tradeable shares.  
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Some legal commentators claimed clause 18 rendered it illegal to issue transferable 
shares for a purposes not permitted by a royal charter or a special act of parliament.
69
   
 
The difficulty with a strict interpretation of clause 18 was the penalty imposed 
for its breach.  Anyone found guilty of issuing transferrable shares illegally was 
liable for punishment under the Statute of Præmunire of 1393.
70
  Originally, the 
Statute of Præmunire denied Richard II’s (1367-1400) subjects the right to appeal an 
English court’s judgement to the Pope.  Appeals to Rome were a serious matter for a 
Richard who did not want his courts’ authority undermined by a foreign power.
71
  
Consequently, the Statute of Præmunire asserted a matter of constitutional 
importance and the penalty it imposed rendered offenders liable to incarceration at 
his Majesty’s pleasure.
72
  As William Blackstone (1723-1780) noted, the number of 
offenses liable to punishment under the Statute of Præmunire generally increased 
every time those in power had a matter of constitutional importance to assert.
73
  It 
became a præmunire to sue “to Rome for any license or dispensation; or to obey any 
process from thence” under Henry VIII (1491-1547).
74
  The claim that parliament 
could legislate without the Crown’s assent became a præmunire under a restored 
Charles II (1630-1685).
75
  Maintaining that James II’s (1633-1701) catholic 
descendents had a better claim to the throne than Queen Anne (1665-1714) and the 
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protestant line nominated by parliament to succeed her became a præmunire after the 
Glorious Revolution.
76
  The Bubble Act had invoked a powerful constitutional tool to 
punish the relatively innocuous constitutional crime of challenging the parliament’s 
right to control the nation’s capital markets.  In 1825, the Attorney General expressed 
incredulity that the law could hold a person liable for “the heaviest penalty” under 
these circumstances.
77
  The severity of the penalty imposed suggested the courts 
should adopt a permissive interpretation of clause 18.  Some legal commentators 
maintained the prohibition on issuing transferable shares only applied to 




 Clause 18 was something of a dead letter in England and Wales because of the 
authorities’ reluctance to enforce it.  When it was repealed in 1825, the Attorney 
General observed, “From the year 1720 … down to the present time [unincorporated 
joint stock] companies have been formed for the most useful and laudable 
purposes.”
79
  The authorities took no action against these businesses even though 
many of them issued transferable shares.  However, clause 18 cast a shadow over 
English common law because the courts could hardly recognise an organisational 
form whose legality was open to question.  The common law courts sustained the 
fiction that unincorporated joint stock companies remained mere partnerships and 
they dealt with them accordingly.
80
  The unincorporated joint stock company was a 
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legal outsider in England and Wales, a “step-child” of the law that had “serious legal 
difficulties to surmount.”
81
  Clause 18’s repeal in 1825, for example, did not stop 
some judges finding the common law precedents they needed to declare transferrable 
share-issuing unincorporated joint stock companies illegal in the 1830s.
82
  If an 
unincorporated joint stock company ventured into court, it did so as a partnership and 
litigated in the names of all of its members even though their number could run into 
the hundreds and a single error or omission would invalidate the action.
83
  The only 
way around the absence of a legal personality was to petition parliament for special 
legislation that permitted the company to pursue and defend legal actions in the name 
of nominated company officers.
84
    
 
In Scotland, the courts paid less attention to the Bubble Act than the English 
and Welsh courts did.  Clause 18 should have applied in Scotland.  There was 
nothing in the Bubble Act to suggest it only applied to England and Wales.  This was 
an inconvenience the Scots avoided by ignoring the clause when they went to court.
85
  
One of the few times a party referred to clause 18 in a Scottish court occurred in 
1730 in Masons of the Lodge of Lanark v Hamilton.
86
  The Court of Session made no 
determination on Hamilton’s submission that his lodge had breached the clause 18, 
which left the question of its applicability to Scotland unresolved.  The Court of 
Session finally resolved the issue in 1828, three years after the Bubble Act’s repeal.  
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In MacAndrew v Robertson the Lord President pointed to the Bubble Act’s saving 
clause,
87
 noted that in Scotland unincorporated companies were in the habit of 
issuing transferrable shares and none of them had been declared illegal before 
concluding “by our law such an association is not illegal.”
88
   
 
The refusal to acknowledge the Bubble Act gave the Scottish courts 
opportunities to bestow privileges on the unincorporated joint stock companies 
appearing before them that English and Welsh courts could not.  One was the 
capacity to engage in a legal action without the need to append the names of all their 
partners to it.  In 1841, London, Leith, Edinburgh and Glasgow Shipping Company 
and William Crichton v Archibald M’Corkle resolved beyond all doubt that a 
Scottish unincorporated joint stock company pursued and defended legal actions in 
its descriptive name with the names of three partners appended.
89
  However, an 1828 
appeal taken the House of Lords also made it clear that in Scotland unincorporated 
joint stock companies defended legal actions in their descriptive names with just the 
names of several partners appended and had done so for a considerable period.
90
  In 
truth, the only ambiguity as to how an unincorporated joint stock company litigated 
in Scotland prior to 1841 related to how it pursued legal action.  In London, Leith, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow Shipping Company and William Crichton v Archibald 
M’Corkle, the Court of Session’s Lord Medwyn (1778-1854) explained the Court of 
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Session had always taken a pragmatic approach to the question of an unincorporated 
joint stock company’s legal identity.  He claimed an unincorporated joint stock 
company should know who its shareholders were.  Demanding it initiate legal action 
in all of their names imposed no hardship on an unincorporated joint stock company 
whatsoever.  The position of an outsider was different according to Lord Medwyn.  
An outsider could not know who all the shareholders were and so did not have to 
name them when they sued an unincorporated company.  Consequently, Scotland’ 
unincorporated joint stock companies habitually defended legal actions with the 
names of a few shareholders appended.
91
   
 
Scottish law and English common law differed over the question as to whether 
an unincorporated joint stock company had the right to issue transferable shares and 
whether they possessed a workable legal identity.  However, they did agree on one 
fundamental point.  Both held an unincorporated joint stock companies’ proprietors 
liable for its debts.  In England and Wales, unlimited shareholder liability was the 
inevitable consequence an unincorporated company’s underlying status as a 
partnership.
92
  Scottish law adopted a similar position in the end, although it came 
close to taking a far more radical stance in 1757.  In Stevenson v Macnair, the Court 
of Session expressed the view that the plaintiff entered a contract with an 
unincorporated company knowingly.  He must have expected, the court reasoned, 
that he would have to rely on the company’s resources alone to fulfil its obligations 
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to him.  The court refused to hold the company’s proprietors liable to him.
93
  
Stevenson v Macnair elevated a Scottish unincorporated joint stock company to the 
status of a société en commandite, a partnership form recognised in French law that 
facilitated the separation of ownership and control by according protection to 
proprietors who did not engage in the day-to-day management of the business.
94
  The 
ruling ultimately proved too radical even for Scotland’s Court of Session.  
Eventually, Stevenson v Macnair became a neglected legal aberration that accorded 
shareholders no protection whatsoever.
95
  In the 1770s, the shareholders of the Ayr 
Bank (Douglas, Heron and Company) found themselves liable for all of its debts 
even though most of them exercised no control over the bank’s day-to-day 
management.
96
  A Scottish unincorporated joint stock company was not a société en 
commandite after all.  All of its shareholders were liable to its creditors.     
 
The combined effects of clause 18 and the six-partner rule precluded any 
possibility that English and Welsh bankers might erect unincorporated joint stock 
companies prior to 1826.  English and Welsh bankers formed common law 
partnerships because they could not admit more than six proprietors.  In addition, 
English and Welsh courts demanded English and Welsh banks pursue and defend 
legal actions in the names of all of their proprietors.  Finally, the Bubble Act might 
render the promoters of an English and Welsh joint stock bank liable for severe 
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penalties if they issued transferable shares.  In contrast, Scotland had no six-partner 
limit, its unincorporated joint stock companies possessed a workable legal identity 
and the courts ignored the Bubble Act’s prohibition on issuing transferable shares.  It 
is not surprising that Scotland developed Britain’s first unincorporated joint stock 
banks under these circumstances. 
 
SCOTLAND’S UNINCORPORATED BANKING COMPANIES 
Three incorporated banks might have rendered Scotland overbanked but nothing 
could have been further from the truth.  The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland generally confined their operations to Edinburgh.  Both preferred to enter 
into alliances in places like Glasgow, Perth, Dundee and Aberdeen to conduct 
operations outside Edinburgh.  Only the Bank of Scotland experimented with 
branches outside Edinburgh in the 1690s and again in the 1730s although it soon 
abandoned the experiment on both occasions.  Later, the British Linen Company 
operated an embryonic branch network.  The British Linen Company had putting-out 
agents in the provinces due to its interest in linen manufacture who could issued its 
bank notes to make payments.
97
  However, the public three banks lacked the means 
needed to meet provincial Scotland’s growing demand for banking services.  
Scotland was not overbanked after all. 
 
The first Scottish banks to fill the provincial void were comparatively small-
scale affairs that would not have looked out of place in England and Wales because 
they admitted six partners or less at their inception.
98
  Aberdeen led the way in 1747 
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where Messrs Livingstone, Mowrat, Bremner and Dingwall formed the Banking 
Company at Aberdeen.  This bank had four proprietors when it commenced business.  
Three years later, Glasgow’s Dunlop, Houston & Company began trading as the Ship 
Bank.  The Ship Bank had six partners when it opened its doors.
99
  A third bank soon 
joined them in the shape of Glasgow’s Arms Bank.  This latter bank also began 
operations in 1750, although it was a much larger institution than either the Banking 
Company at Aberdeen or the Ship Bank.  The Arms Bank boasted a proprietorship of 
31 at its inception, which would have rendered it illegal in England and Wales.
100
  
The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland viewed the emergence of their 
new rivals with of alarm.  The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
challenged the right of the Banking Company at Aberdeen, the Ship Bank and the 
Arms Banks to issue bank notes in the courts.  The Bank of Scotland and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland threatened the three provincial rivals’ customers by refusing to do 
business with them.  Finally, the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
adopted the time-honoured tactic of organising runs utilising their provincial rivals’ 
bank notes.  The Banking Company at Aberdeen succumbed to the pressure and 




The survival of Glasgow’s Ship Bank and Arms Bank set a precedent for those 
who aspired to enter the banking industry but knew the authorities in Westminster 
were unlikely to grant them a special act or a royal charter to do it.  More than 40 
unincorporated banking institutions opened their doors in the Scottish provinces 
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between 1747 and 1836.
102
  Some were no bigger than their English and Welsh 
counterparts were.  Charles Munn argued that these smaller banks hardly deserved 
the title ‘company’ because most were nothing more than mere partnerships.
103
  
Other Scottish banks possessed far larger proprietorships, which made them too big 
to operate as partnerships.  Most of these larger unincorporated Scottish banks 
identified themselves as ‘banking companies’ even though they had not 
incorporated.
104
  The Aberdeen Banking Company, for example, had 109 partners at 
its inception in 1767.
105
  Its constitution permitted its shareholders to transfer their 
“Share or Shares of Stock to any person he shall think proper.”
106
  This bank and 
others like it did something their contemporaries in England and Wales could have 
never done.  They issued transferable shares to a large proprietorship to raise capital.   
 
Scotland’s unincorporated banks acquired a reputation for stability.  Only 14 
banks erected in Scotland between 1747 and 1836 failed and nearly half of them did 
so without any loss to the public.
107
  The collapse of Douglas, Heron and Company 
(better known as the Ayr Bank) in 1772 was the most notorious Scottish bank failure 
during this period.
108
  However, the Ayr Bank’s failure demonstrated that Scotland’s 
unincorporated joint stock banks were comparatively safe.  The bank had a large 
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proprietorship many of whom were wealthy landowners.
109
  When the Ayr Bank 
failed, its proprietorship proved wealthy enough to meet all of the bank’s debts.  Half 
of the bank’s shareholders became insolvent; and yet, its creditors recovered 
everything owed to them.
110
  Robert Burns (1759-1796) called the Ayr Bank as a 
“villainous bubble” for good reason.
111
  This bank ruined many of its shareholders 
but its large proprietorship ensured the Ayr Bank imposed no loss on the public.  
 
In 1810, Scotland’s preference for large banking companies reached its natural 
conclusion with the establishment of the Commercial Banking Company of Scotland.  
This was a new kind of banking institution.  The promoters’ intention from the outset 
was to erect a bank that would have a national presence.
112
  The Commercial Bank’s 
headquarters would be in Edinburgh, but its operations were to embrace the whole of 
Scotland.
113
  To achieve this objective, the bank possessed an authorised capital of 
£3,000,000 divided into 6,000 transferable shares of £500 each, an unprecedented 
amount that reflected the scale of the promoters’ ambitions.
114
  The Bank of Scotland 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland only had an authorised capital of £1,500,000 each at 
the time.
115
  The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland recognised the 
threat this new entrant posed and attempted to destroy it before it gained a foothold 
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in the industry.  The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland failed.  The 
Commercial Bank of Scotland prospered after a difficult start.
116
   
 
One should exercise caution before ascribing the stability of Scotland’s 
unincorporated banks to their large proprietorships alone.  Scottish bankers were 
adept at avoiding their obligations when they fell due.  Scottish banks added option 
clauses to their bank notes until legislation banned the practice in the 1760s.
117
  
These option clauses reserved the right to redeem a bank note on demand or after a 
delay of six months at the cost of an interest payment.  The option was exercisable at 
the bank’s discretion.
118
  The Scottish banks used other ways to avoid their 
obligations by employing what one banking historian called “petty tricks” to delay 
payment.
119
  A Scottish bank might hint a creditor’s relationship with it would suffer 
if he or she pressed a claim unreasonably.  When a Scottish bank did pay, it might do 
so in partial amounts, with a bill of exchange drawn on London or inconvenience the 
creditor by paying in small denomination coins.
120
  In 1826, an Englishman noted 
“any southern fool who had the temerity to ask for a hundred sovereigns [at a 
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Scottish bank], might, if his nerves supported him through the cross examination … 
think himself in luck to be hunted only to the border.”
121
   
 
Avoiding their obligations must have contributed something to a Scottish 
bank’s stability.  However, a large proprietorship made a decisive difference to a 
Scottish bank’s chances of survival too.  The Scottish banks that failed with a loss to 
their creditors were the smallest.
122
  They averaged a mere 3.7 proprietors per bank.  
This compared to an average of 67.7 proprietors for the Scottish banks that failed 
with no loss to public (a figure inflated artificially by the Ayr Bank’s failure) and 
48.7 proprietors for the banking companies that did not fail.
123
  Lord Liverpool 
(1770-1828) noted in 1826 that Scotland’s bigger banks were less likely to fail than 
the smaller banks found in England and Wales.  He argued the Scots felt little 
inclination to orchestrate runs on their bigger banks because they knew their banks’ 




No one could have erected a bank as large as the Commercial Bank of Scotland 
in England and Wales prior to 1826.  The Bubble Act and the six-partner limit 
precluded such a development.  In England and Wales, the banking industry grew 
rapidly because of the Industrial Revolution but it remained dependent on private 
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banks limited to six members at most.  The next section explains that in 1825, the 
English and Welsh banking industry came perilously close to collapse.  That 
experience convinced Lord Liverpool and his government to undertake a 
fundamental reform of the English and Welsh banking industry. 
 
THE COUNTRY BANKERS ACT 
The financial crisis of 1825 was the product of a turnaround in the fortunes of an 
economy recovering from the Napoleonic Wars.
125
  London became the focus of 
investment schemes that included opportunities in the newly independent states of 
South and Central America.  One could even invest in a fictional Central American 
principality called Poyais.
126
  By December, the inevitable collapse of the investment 
bubble created resulted in a run on the banks in which over a tenth of the private 
banks in England and Wales failed.
127
  The loss of so many banks sparked a lively 
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  One could argue the banks were the authors of their own misfortune.  
They issued bank notes to excess during a period of excitement only to run short of 
the means needed to redeem them during the run.  However, Scottish banks issued 
bank notes too and none of them succumbed to the run.
129
  Lord Liverpool and his 
administration were convinced the Scottish banks’ larger proprietorships calmed the 
Scottish public.  Liverpool’s conclusion put the desirability of the six-partner limit in 
doubt. 
 
The charter granted to the Bank of England in 1800 contained the usual 
promise that the six-partner limit would apply to every other English and Welsh 
bank.  That charter was not due to expire until 1833.
130
  Consequently, abolishing the 
six-partner rule would breach a customary undertaking renewed only a quarter of a 
century earlier, which threatened to damage the government’s relationship with the 
Bank of England.  Liverpool and his Chancellor of the Exchequer had a delicate 
problem on their hands and wrote to the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank 
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of England to explain their reasons for wanting to abandon the six-partner limit.
131
  
Liverpool and his Chancellor of the Exchequer argued: 
The failures which have occurred in England, unaccompanied as they 
have been by the same occurrences in Scotland, tend to prove, that there 
must have been an unsolid and delusive system of Banking in one part 
of Great Britain, and a solid and substantial one in the other.
132
 
   
Liverpool and the Chancellor of the Exchequer claimed the government had two 
courses of action available to them to rectify the banking industry’s problems.  The 
Bank of England might open branches in the provinces to drive provincial banks’ 
notes out of circulation, although it seemed doubtful that the Bank of England 
possessed the resources to do this.  Alternatively, Liverpool’s government could 
abolish the six-partner limit in the provinces where the Bank of England maintained 
no branches.  The Prime Minister and his Chancellor of the Exchequer assured the 
Bank of England that a six-partner limit would continue to apply in London. 
 
The proposal to abolish the six-partner rule in the provinces was not a new 
idea.  The Newcastle-born timber merchant and banker Thomas Joplin (1790-1847) 
had championed unincorporated joint stock banking in provincial England and 
Wales.
133
  He even attempted to circumvent the six-partner rule in 1824 by proposing 
to erect an unincorporated joint stock bank of deposit arguing that such a bank would 
be legal because it would not issue bank notes.
134
  Developments in Ireland 
suggested Joplin’s campaign would eventually meet with success.  The legal 
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framework in Ireland prior to 1821 resembled that of England and Wales.  The Bank 
of Ireland was the only incorporated bank and a six-partner limit applied to every 
other Irish bank of issue.  However, legislation passed in 1824 and 1825 abolished 
the six-partner limit in the Irish provinces.  By 1825, there was nothing to prevent a 
provincial Irish bank of issue admitting as many partners as it wished.  The six-
partner limit only applied within a 50-Irish mile radius of Dublin.
135
   
 
The Bank of England drew upon the Irish precedent when it responded to the 
government’s proposal to abolish the six-partner limit.  The Bank agreed that the six-
partner limit could no longer apply in the provinces but insisted it should remain in 
force within 65 miles of London.
136 
 Liverpool acquiesced to the Bank of England’s 
suggestion and the “Act for the better regulating of Copartnerships of certain 
Bankers in England” (or the Country Bankers Act) passed into law in 1826.
137
  The 
Country Bankers Act permitted unincorporated joint stock banking companies of 
issue in the English and Welsh provinces although a 65-mile radius drawn around 
London would continue to exclude them from the Metropolis.  The Country Bankers 
Act also gave the Bank of England permission to open provincial branches. 
 
JOINT STOCK BANKING COMES TO ENGLAND AND WALES 
The Country Bankers Act became law a year after the Bubble Act’s repeal, which 
removed the last impediment that excluded unincorporated joint stock banking 
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companies from provincial England and Wales.  After a slow start, the English and 
Welsh took to joint stock banking with some enthusiasm as 38 of these banks opened 
for business between 1826 and 1833.
138
  However, the recently repealed Bubble Act 
continued to exert an influence.  English common law would have impeded the 
banks erected under the Country Bankers Act by treating them as partnerships.  
Fortunately, the parliament anticipated the most significant legal impediment of them 
all.  Parliament knew that the English and Welsh courts would deny these banks a 
legal identity and took steps to avert that inconvenience.
139
  Every bank erected 
under the Country Bankers Act possessed the power to litigate in the name of 
designated company officers.
140
   
 
The Country Bankers Act resolved one of the legal problems the newly formed 
joint stock banks would encounter but other unforeseen problems awaited resolution.  
The common law prohibited individuals suing themselves.  The same person could 
not appear as both a defendant and a plaintiff to a legal action.
141
  Unfortunately, 
every bank formed under the Country Bankers Act remained a partnership at law and 
its shareholders were parties to a legal action even though the bank conducted the 
action in the name of a company official.  This meant an unincorporated joint stock 
bank could not sue its shareholders, shareholders could not sue their bank and two 
banks could not sue each other if they had just one shareholder in common.  The 
potential for mischief only became apparent in 1838, when the courts refused to 
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entertain the Northern and Central Bank of England’s attempt to recover loans worth 
more than £440,000 from some of its shareholders.
142
   
 
Seemingly innocuous legislation passed in 1817 set another trap for the first 
English and Welsh joint stock banks.  This act denied clergymen the right to profit 
from a trade.
143
  English common law treated a clergyman who owned just one share 
in an incorporated joint stock bank as if he was a partner in a banking partnership.  
The clergyman became a banker under these circumstances, which rendered the bank 
illegal and all of its contracts void.  Unincorporated English and Welsh joint stock 
banks remained blissfully unaware of the implications of the 1817 act until Hall v 
Franklin in 1838.
144 
 The court dismissed a claim over a debt owed to the Northern 
and Central Bank of England because the bank’s shareholding constituency included 
just two Anglican clergymen.
145
  According to the Legal Observer, the case “excited 
much alarm in persons interested in these and other similar companies.”
146
   
 
The Northern and Central Bank of England’s legal difficulties in 1838 were 
symptomatic of a legal environment unprepared for the emergence of joint stock 
banks.  Parliament intervened in 1838 and 1841 to resolve the difficulties imposed by 
share-owning clergymen and to permit litigation between unincorporated joint stock 
companies and their shareholders.
147
  The English and Welsh were new to 
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unincorporated joint stock banking and it is not surprising that the emerging banks 
encountered teething problems.
148
  Large banks like Edinburgh’s National Bank of 
Scotland and Glasgow’s Glasgow Union Bank (later the Union Bank of Scotland), 
the Western Bank of Scotland, the Clydesdale Bank and the City of Glasgow Bank 
all emerged after 1825.  These new Scottish banks harboured ambitions that matched 
the Commercial Bank of Scotland’s desire to create a national presence.
149
  
Scotland’s provincial joint stock banking companies had served their purpose.  They 
would eventually disappear from the Scottish banking industry.
150
  However, English 
and Welsh joint stock banking companies of the time remained committed to a scale 
of operations that resembled an increasingly defunct generation of Scottish 
provincial banking companies.  A typical first generation English and Welsh joint 
stock bank company opened few branches and limited its operations to a small 
geographical area.
151
  There was one notable exception to this preference for small 
regional banks.  The National Provincial Bank of England was the most ‘Scottish’ of 
the first generation of English and Welsh joint stock banks. 
 
Established in 1833, the National Provincial Bank of England was unique 
because its promoters were unapologetically Scottish in their outlook and ambitions.  
Thomas Joplin was the industry’s leading advocate of Scottish joint stock banking 
prior to the Country Bankers Act and he involved himself in the National Provincial 
Bank of England’s creation from the outset.
152
  Joplin’s cousin, George Fife Angas 
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(1789-1879), lent his support to the project and joined Joplin on the National 
Provincial Bank of England’s board of directors in the early years.
153
  The bank’s 
first general manager was a Scotsman who learned his trade in Scotland.  Daniel 
Robertson (1805-1865) trained with the Commercial Bank of Scotland before 
moving on to the Glasgow Union Bank.
154
  The promoters’ intention was to create a 
federation of semi-autonomous regional banks that would span the whole of England 
and Wales.  The initial structure proved unworkable whereupon the National 
Provincial’s head office acquired greater power than its promoters anticipated.
155
  
The National Provincial Bank of England also made a concession to what remained 
of the six-partner rule.  The London head office only performed an administrative 
function.  All of this bank’s banking offices were located outside the 65-mile 
radius.
156
  The arrangement ensured that the National Provincial Bank of England 
retained its all-important right to issue bank notes. 
 
The National Provincial Bank of England’s unwillingness to open banking 
offices in London symbolised the extent to which the world’s largest financial centre 
remained out of bounds to unincorporated English and Welsh joint-stock banks.  The 
next section will explain how that this situation changed in 1833. 
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JOINT STOCK BANKING IN LONDON 
Joplin’s aborted attempt to erect a provincial joint stock bank of deposit in 1824 
raised a tantalising prospect.
157
  The combined effect of Bank of England’s charter 
and the 65-mile radius imposed by the Country Bankers Act of 1826 would not 
permit an unincorporated joint stock bank of issue in London.  However, no London 
private bank had issued bank notes for over a century.  London’s private banks 
facilitated their customers’ payments by offering them cheque accounts instead.
158
  
These banks even maintained a clearinghouse on Lombard Street to streamline this 
aspect of their operations.
159
  If banks of deposit always had been exempt from the 
six-partner rule as Joplin supposed, then there was no reason why a London bank that 
issued no bank notes should have limited itself to six members.  However, there was 
a potential flaw in Joplin’s reasoning.  Legal opinion divided as to whether the Bank 
of England’s charter imposed a six-partner limit on banks of issue alone or whether 
the prohibition encompassed banks of deposit too.
160
  Ultimately, parliament had to 
resolve the ambiguity because a court of law never got the opportunity to resolve it.   
 
The Bank of England’s charter was due for renewal in 1833, which gave 
parliament the opportunity to clarify whether joint stock banks of deposit were legal 
in London.  The 1833 Bank Charter Act declared banks always had the right to admit 
more than six proprietors if they refrained from issuing bank notes.
161
  Almost 
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immediately, a prospectus appeared calling for subscriptions to a scheme to erect the 
London and Westminster Bank.  The intention behind the London and Westminster 
Bank was to create a bank that would unite the separate realms of West End and City 
banking by opening branches in both parts of London.
162
  From the outset, the 
London and Westminster Bank’s competitors in London treated it like an 
interloper.
163
  The Committee of Private Bankers refused the London and 
Westminster Bank’s application to join the clearinghouse.  The Bank of England 
turned down the London and Westminster Bank’s request for a drawing account.  
However, the newly established London and Westminster Bank faced a more serious 
problem.  The declaratory clause inserted into the Bank Charter Act in 1833 only 
declared that the London and Westminster Bank had a right to exist if it refrained 
from issuing bank notes.  That clause did not bestow the right to litigate in the names 
of designated company officers provided for in the Country Bankers Act.  The 
London and Westminster Bank would have to litigate in the names of all of its 
shareholders.   
 
The London and Westminster Bank’s officials assumed parliament’s failure to 
give it a legal personality amounted to a legislative oversight.  They sought a remedy 
by the most expedient means available to resolve that oversight and petitioned 
parliament for special legislation that would give the bank the right to pursue and 
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defend legal actions in the name of a company officer.
164
  The London and 
Westminster Bank soon discovered the government promised the Bank of England 
that London’s joint stock banks would receive no further privileges beyond the 
recognition of their right to exist.  The Bank of England was determined to hold the 
government to this undertaking.  The London and Westminster Bank’s supporters in 
parliament were dismayed at the development.  William Clay (1791-1869) could not 
believe that the common law expected an unincorporated joint stock company like 
the London and Westminster Bank to undertake legal action in the name of its 
shareholders.  Clay pointed out that parliament regularly passed special legislation to 
rectify this defect in other industries and noted that parliament did the same for the 
country banks erected under the Country Bankers Act.
165
  Nevertheless, the London 
and Westminster Bank’s attempt to acquire a legal personality did not meet with 
success.  The requisite bill passed through the House of Commons with a 
considerable majority before the government ensured its defeat in the House of 
Lords.
166
  The bank had to wait until 1844 before the parliament finally gave it the 
legal personality it craved.
167
   
 
The London and Westminster Bank’s legal difficulties failed to discourage the 
establishment of other unincorporated joint stock banking companies in London.  In 
1836, the London Joint Stock Bank doubled the number of unincorporated joint stock 
banking companies in the Metropolis.  The number of unincorporated joint stock 
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banks in London reached four in 1839 after the emergence of the Union Bank of 
London and the London and County Bank.  The Commercial Bank of London 
became the fifth unincorporated joint stock bank in London when it opened its doors 
in 1840.
168
  Unincorporated joint stock banks of deposit became a permanent feature 
of London’s financial services economy. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Country Bankers Act expressed Lord Liverpool’s desire to follow the Scottish 
precedent to improve the country bank note issue by making the banks that issued it 
less vulnerable to a run.  The reforms introduced in 1826 expressed the 
government’s hope that an increase in bank size would stabilise the English and 
Welsh banking system.  The next chapter explains that these reforms yielded 
disappointing results.  Some of the banking industry’s critics known as the ‘Currency 
School’ argued that the country needed stricter controls on the number of bank notes 
issued to correct the banking industry’s problems.  In 1844, the Currency School got 
the monetary controls they wanted whereupon Liverpool’s desire to foster an 
increase in bank size in England and Wales became a secondary consideration.  The 
Bank of England charter of 1844 delayed the banking industry’s Amalgamation 
Movement for another two decades.  
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THE AMALGAMATION MOVEMENT  
AND THE BANK ACT OF 1844 
When the measure of 1826 for extending the Scotch system of banking to 
England and Wales was brought forward by the government, they seemed 
so much surprised and delighted with the discovery that the sagacity and 
experience of our neighbours beyond the Tweed had furnished them with 
an infallible remedy for all the alleged evils of our English banking 





Chapter One explained that banks literally make money.  Their transferable debts are 
a means of payment and a store of value.  However, the money a bank makes is 
different to coins fashioned out of precious metals.  Discs made from gold and silver 
have some intrinsic worth, which makes them an effective store of value whereas 
banks erect the money they create on a foundation of credit.  Debts like these only 
retain their value if the bank incurring them remains equal to the task of redeeming 
them.  The British embarked upon the Industrial Revolution at a time when the 
money available to them was in a precarious state.  Prior to 1816, Britain ran short of 
small change often because good silver coins disappeared from circulation.  Between 
1797 and 1821, one could not redeem the Bank of England’s bank notes at its office 
in Threadneedle Street.  As the last chapter explained, a run on the English and 
Welsh banks in 1825 decimated the English and Welsh banks of issue.   
 
Monetary stability became an important consideration in Britain during the first 
half of the nineteenth century and Lord Liverpool’s administration was particularly 
keen to promote it.  Liverpool put the country on the gold standard in 1816, 
legislated to restore the Bank of England’s bank notes to convertibility in 1819 and 
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attempted to secure the bank note issue by permitting joint stock banks in the English 
and Welsh provinces in 1826.  Nevertheless, the most significant monetary reform 
undertaken prior to the Amalgamation Movement was the product of a later 
government.   
 
This chapter argues the Bank Charter Act of 1844 delayed the Amalgamation 
Movement for over two decades by imposing disincentives to bank amalgamations.  
In addition, the currency reforms introduced in 1844 ensured that the Scottish banks 
could never cross the border to compete with the English and Welsh banks in the 
provinces.  The Scottish banks did not participate in the Amalgamation Movement.  
The Chapter begins with the adoption of the gold standard in 1816, an event that laid 
the foundations for the conduct of British monetary policy until the outbreak of 
World War I.  The Chapter then examines the origins and nature of the British bank 
note before explaining that a measure adopted in wartime to protect the Bank of 
England from a run gave rise to Britain’s first debate on the subject of monetary 
policy.  In 1797, the Bank of England stropped redeeming its bank notes with gold, 
which raised a question as to just how many bank notes the Bank of England could 
put into circulation before it provoked an economically destructive outbreak of 
inflation.  Normality resumed in 1821 when the Bank of England began to redeem its 
bank notes once more.  Nevertheless, the question as to how many bank notes the 
banks should issue remained unanswered until the currency reforms introduced in 
1844 dictated that the national bank note issue should fluctuate in direct proportion to 
the amount of gold held in reserve to redeem it.   This chapter claims the reforms 
introduced in 1844 were futile.  There was not enough gold available to sustain 




supply on a foundation of credit and they overcame the restrictions imposed on their 
bank notes in 1844 by utilising cheques to make payments instead.  The task of 
supplying the deposits needed to sustain this growing reliance on cheques fell to the 
amalgamating banks.  The Amalgamation Movement began in the 1870s because 
bank notes lost their central importance to English and Welsh banking practice. 
 
THE GOLD STANDARD  
The British maintained a de jure policy of bimetallism prior to 1816.  Officially, 
gold and silver coins ranked equally as the means of payment although Britain had 
effectively adopted a de facto gold standard long before 1816.   Under the terms of 
the Act for Encouraging Coinage of 1666, the Mint turned a pound of gold into 44½ 
guineas, a pound of silver into 62 shillings and an edict issued on Sir Isaac 
Newtown’s (1643-1772) advice fixed the value of a guinea at 21 shillings.
2
  The 
problem with this arrangement was that gold and silver traded on global markets.  
Often, the prices on offer at the Mint undervalued silver relative to gold.
3
  Those 
who wanted to convert their silver into coins preferred to sell it abroad where silver 
commanded better prices than the Mint offered.  One could even make a profit 
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melting silver coins down and exporting the output.
4
  Naturally, the heaviest silver 
coins went into the melting pot first because they yielded the most silver.  Badly 
worn or clipped coins stayed in circulation because they were underweight.
5
  
Gresham’s Law took effect as bad money drove good money out of circulation.
6
   
Poor quality silver coins circulated.  Good silver coins were either hoarded or melted 
down because their intrinsic worth exceeded the monetary value.  
 
The only way Britain would keep its best silver coins in circulation was to 
create an incentive to spend them rather than hoard or destroy them.  In 1776, Adam 
Smith suggested the reintroduction seigniorage, a fee charged by the Mint for 
minting coins.  Seigniorage would reduce a silver coin’s metallic content by 
allowing the Mint to retain a fraction of the silver handed over to produce them.
7
  A 
similar proposal appeared in 1805 from Lord Liverpool who had served as Master of 
the Mint between 1799 and 1801.
8
  Liverpool’s long-standing interest in the nation’s 
coins ensured that he and his government were sufficiently motivated to pass the Act 
for Encouraging Coinage in 1816.
9
   Gold retained its old Mint value of £3/17/10½ 
per ounce although now the Mint would now turn a pound of gold into 46¾ 
sovereigns rather than 44½ guineas.  The arrangement gave sovereigns an 
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arithmetically convenient monetary value of £1 or 20 shillings.
10
  The 1816 act also 
authorised the Mint to make silver coins at the new rate of 66 shillings per pound but 
the Mint would retain four shillings as seigniorage and put the remaining 62 shillings 
into circulation.  The global price of a pound of silver would now have to exceed the 
66 shillings it now took to yield a pound of it before anyone would contemplate 
melting a silver coin down.  Such a high price for silver seemed unlikely.
11
   
 
Liverpool’s measures put Britain on an official gold standard by demonetising 
silver in most cases.  The public was entitled to use silver coins for payments up to 
£2 but a payee could demand sovereigns for amounts greater than this.
12
  In addition, 
Liverpool’s newly minted silver coins were nothing more than mere tokens whose 
monetary worth exceeded their intrinsic value.  The post-1816 arrangements so 
overvalued a silver coin’s metallic content that Britain risked being flooded with 
freshly minted silver coins that were liable to remain in circulation whenever the 
global price of silver fall below 62 shillings a pound.   The 1816 act included 
measures that stopped the public attending at the Mint to turn silver into coins.
13
   
 
An artificial equivalence between 20 shillings and a golden sovereign kept 
silver coins in circulation after 1816. The idea that an overvalued token like this 
might stay in circulation if gold imbued it with its monetary value was not new.  
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Under normal circumstances, inherently worthless pieces of paper known as bank 
notes maintained their monetary value in much the same way.   
 
THE BRITISH BANK NOTE 
London’s goldsmiths issued the first British bank notes.
14
  The goldsmiths’ premises 
were safe havens for bullion and the public adopted the habit of depositing precious 
metals with them for safe-keeping.  The more enterprising goldsmiths used the 
bullion deposited with them to finance a lending business.  Initially, goldsmiths 
issued promissory notes made payable to their depositors on demand whenever they 
took a deposit.  Depositors took their promissory notes back to the goldsmith to 
reclaim the gold and silver they needed it to make a payment.  London’s goldsmiths 
made two discoveries during the seventeenth century that revolutionised British 
finance.  First, depositors did not need to reclaim their bullion if the goldsmith issued 
promissory notes made payable to the bearer on demand on demand instead.  
Promissory notes like these could change hands to make payments whilst the gold 
and silver needed to imbue them with value remained in the goldsmith’s vault.   
Second, goldsmiths realised they no longer had to relinquish bullion to make a loan.  
A borrower would accept promissory notes made payable to the bearer on demand 
because they knew they could spend them.  There was a point of dependency on gold 
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that London’s goldsmith-bankers never eradicated.  Goldsmiths held bullion in 
reserve to act as a buffer against any imbalance in the rate at which precious metals 
flowed into their vaults and the rate at which they needed it to meet their obligations 
on their bank notes.  Goldsmith-bankers learned how to sustain this fractional-
reserve banking model through trial and error.  Those who issued too few 
promissory notes constrained their lending to do it and lost opportunities to make a 
profit.  Those who lacked the reserves needed to meet their obligations arranged to 
obtain bullion at short notice from somewhere else or they fell by the wayside.   
 
Both the Bank of England and the Bank of Scotland adopted the goldsmith-
bankers’ fractional-reserve banking model to issue bank notes of their own soon 
after their establishment in 1694 and 1695 respectively.
15
  The other Scottish banks 
followed suit, as did most of the English and Welsh country banks during the 
Industrial Revolution.
16
  A fractional-reserve banking model usually worked well, 
give or take the occasional run.  The infant Bank of England instituted a partial 
suspension of payments in 1696 and did so again during the Jacobite rebellion of 
1745.
17
  The Bank of Scotland suspended payments in 1728.
18
  However, fractional-
reserve banking had a point of vulnerability that proved particularly troublesome.  
The bullion held in reserve would prove insufficient to meet the demands for 
repayment if the public lost confidence in their bank notes.  Even the best-managed 
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banks would not survive a catastrophic run.  In 1797, the prospect of such a run 
threatened the survival of the Bank of England. 
 
THE RESTRICTION ON PAYMENTS 
Britain went to war with revolutionary France in 1793, which put the Bank of 
England’s gold reserves under strain.  The government called upon the Bank to 
supply it with bullion to make payments to its allies abroad.
19
  Another drain on the 
Bank’s gold reserves came from those who feared a French invasion.  As one 
contemporary noted, these people were “subject to weak and extravagant alarms” 
that could render obsolete a banker’s estimate as to what constituted an adequate 
reserve at a moment’s notice.
20
   Newcastle’s banks were the first to succumb to a 
run in February 1797 after local farmers sold their cattle and descended on the city’s 
banks to exchange the bank notes they had received for gold.
21
  The run soon 
encompassed the neighbouring cities of Sunderland and Durham.
22
  Then on 22 
February 1797, 1,400 Frenchmen disembarked near Fishguard in Southern Wales.  
The invasion turned into a humiliating farce for the invaders.
23
  The French alienated 
the locals by looting the surrounding countryside.  In addition, the region’s female 
populace wore red shawls and black hats, which gave them a disconcerting 
resemblance to British infantry from a distance.  The invaders convinced themselves 
the British had them surrounded and soon surrendered.   
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News of the French landing reached London on Saturday 25 February, giving 
the government less than a weekend to prepare for the run on the Bank of England 
that would begin once it opened its doors on Monday morning.  The solution chosen 
was an order to suspend cash payments issued on Sunday night.
24
  On Monday 
morning, the Privy Council announced:  
It … is ... necessary ... that the directors of the Bank of England should 
forbear issuing any cash in payment until the sense of parliament can be 
taken on that subject and the proper measures adopted thereupon for 
maintaining the means of circulation and supporting the public and 




A suspension freeing the Bank of England from the obligation to redeem its bank 
notes had begun.
26
  Parliament passed the legislation needed to formalise this new 
monetary arrangement on 3 May 1797.
27
  The government hoped that the suspension 




The suspension of cash payments gave Britain its first experience of a fiat 
currency.  The capacity of a Bank of England note to act as a means of payment and 
a store of value under these circumstances now relied upon custom, the public’s faith 
that the Bank of England would have to redeem its notes eventually and legislation 
designed to make refusing a Bank of England note difficult.  In 1811, for example, 
Lord Peter King (1776–1833) demanded his tenants pay their rent in gold coin or in 
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bank notes “of a sum sufficient to purchase the weight of ... gold requisite to 
discharge the rent.”
29
  If others followed King’s example, every commodity in 
Britain might have commanded a gold price and a higher paper price.
30
  Parliament 
responded by passing legislation in 1811 and 1812 rendering it illegal to accept bank 
notes and gold coins at anything other than their respective face values.
31
   
 
King’s preference for gold as a means of payment was evidence that the time-
honoured relationship between the value of the Bank of England’s bank notes and 
the gold it used to hold in reserve to redeem them was breaking down.  The 
breakdown in this relationship gave rise to Britain’s first meaningful debate on the 
subject of monetary policy.  That debate was the bullionist controversy. 
 
THE BULLIONIST CONTROVERSY 
Prior to the suspension, bankers adjusted their bank note issue to accord with their 
reserves.  The suspension changed everything as far as the Bank of England was 
concerned.  Liberated from the need to redeem, the Bank of England could put as 
many bank notes into circulation as it wished without having to worry about its 
reserves.  Every other English and Welsh bank and the Scottish banks remained 
contractually obliged to redeem their bank notes but now gold was unobtainable at 
the Bank of England.  The other banks had no choice but to use the Bank of 
England’s fiat currency to meet their obligations.
32
  By 1810, David Ricardo (1772-
1823) could claim that the discretion of the Bank of England’s directors as to how 
                                                          
29
 Lord King, "Speech of the Rt. Hon. Lord King, in the House of Lords," The Belfast Monthly 
Magazine 8, no. 47 (1812): 490. 
30
 Parliament of the United Kingdom, The Parliamentary Debates Dating from the Year 1803 to the 
Present Time, vol. XX (London: T. C. Hansard, 1812), 945-72. 
31
 51 George III c. 127 and 52 George III c. 50. 
32




many bank notes they put into circulation was determining the bank note circulation 
of every other bank of issue in the country.
33
 The Bank of England’s irredeemable 
bank notes displaced gold as the banking system’s primary means by which it 
discharged its obligations.   
 
The Bank of England made every effort to exercise its freedom from the need 
to redeem its bank notes responsibly.  The Bank adopted a policy known as ‘the real 
bills doctrine.’  The Bank of England furnished its fiat currency to discount any 
short-term bill of exchange presented to it that arose from a genuine commercial 
transaction and imposed little risk of default.  The Bank’s directors believed their 
policy met the needs of trade.  They reasoned, bills like these only came to them for 
discount because their holders needed the bank notes issued to make a payment.  In 
addition, the directors thought the policy could never result in an excessive bank 
note issue.  The bank notes issued would soon return with interest to the Bank of 
England when the bills matured.
34
  The Bank of England also had good authority to 
justify its reasoning on this second point.  Adam Smith argued that if a bank 
discounted short-term bills that were sound, then its coffers would resemble “a pond, 
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from which … a stream is continually running out, yet another is continually running 
in, … so that ... the pond keeps always equally, or very nearly equally full.”
35
   
 
The problem with the real bills doctrine was that its utility rested on a 
commercial consideration.  A bank could economise on its reserves if it limited its 
activities to short-term lending on good security.  Whether the real bills the doctrine 
represented a useful guide for the conduct of monetary policy undertaken by a 
central bank issuing a fiat currency was a different question entirely.
36
  A key issue 
was that the price mechanism that should have moderated the demand for 
commercial credit could not operate.  The usury law set the maximum rate of interest 
the Bank of England could charge at five per cent per annum.
37
 The monetary 
economist, bullionist and parliamentarian Henry Thornton (1770-1815) opposed the 
real bills doctrine for this reason.  Thornton lamented: 
To ascertain how far the desire for of obtaining loans at the Bank may 
be expected at any time to be carried out, we must enquire into the 
subject of the quantum of profit likely to be derived from borrowing 
there under the existing circumstances.  This is to be judged by 
considering two points:  The amount, first of interest to be paid on the 
sum borrowed; and secondly, of the … gain to be obtained by the 
employment of the borrowed capital....  We may ... consider this 
question as turning principally on a comparison of the rate of interest 
taken at the Bank with the current rate of mercantile profit. 
 
The Bank is prohibited, by the state of the law, from demanding even 
in time of war, an interest of more than five per cent, which is the same 
rate at which it discounts in a period of profound peace.  It might, 
undoubtedly, at all seasons, sufficiently limit its paper by means of the 
prices at which it lends, if the legislation did not impose an obstacle to 
the constant adoption of this principle.... 
 
Any supposition that it would be safe to permit the bank paper to limit 
itself because this would be to take the more natural course, is 
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therefore, altogether erroneous.  It implies that there is no occasion to 
advert to the rate of interest in consideration of which the bank paper is 





Thornton’s belief was that those who obtained bank notes at the Bank of England 
would have felt less inclination to do so if the cost imposed on them could rise above 
five per cent.  To make matter worse, the suspension prevented the public removing 
any bank notes issued by exchanging them for gold.  Thornton’s argued the stream 
of bank notes running out of the Bank of England under these circumstances seemed 
likely to exceed the amount of bank notes removed from circulation by the stream 
running in.   
 
Thornton argued adherence to the real bills doctrine resulted in an excessive 
Bank of England issue.  That excess, he claimed, induced other banks to over issue 
too because they depended on the Bank of England’s irredeemable bank notes to 
meet their obligations.  If Thornton was right, then the result would be domestic 
inflation.    Unfortunately for Thornton and his bullionist allies, early nineteenth-
century Britain possessed no universally accepted metric of the rate of inflation.
39
  
Thornton had a limited number of indicators available to them to prove their point.
40
  
One was the market price of gold, an indicator of the rate at which one could convert 
bank notes into bullion through market exchanges.  An increase in the price of gold 
would imply the purchasing power of the Bank of England’s bank notes was 
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  Another was the value of the pound relative to other currencies that 
remained on a metallic standard.  A decline in the pound’s value should have shown 
up as depreciation on the foreign exchanges.
42
  The problem the bullionists faced 
was that committed anti-bullionists could always find non-monetary cause to 
undermine any attempt to prove the nation was not suffering from monetarily 
induced inflation.  An anti-bullionist like Colonel Robert Torrens (1780-1864) could 
blame taxation, wartime expenditures, bad harvests and disturbances in the balance 
of trade for any apparent decline in the value of Britain’s paper currency.
43
      
 
The real bills doctrine exercised under the constraints imposed by the usury 
laws made cheap credit readily available to a wartime economy undergoing the 
Industrial Revolution.  Consequently, the real bills doctrine became a valued part of 
Britain’s economic landscape.
44
  Witnesses called by the Select Committee on the 
High Price of Gold Bullion in 1811 defended the Bank’s policy to the hilt.
45
  The 
Select Committee’s recommendation that the Bank of England begin redeeming its 
notes at the earliest possible opportunity garnished little support in parliament.
46
  The 
bullionists had to wait until Napoleon’s (1769-1821) defeat at Waterloo to put an end 
to the suspension on cash payments.  Parliament passed the Resumption of Cash 
Payments Act in 1819.
47
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Preparing for the resumption of cash payments demanded that the Bank of 
England curtail its lending so that its bank note issue would accord with its reserves 
once more.  Inevitably, the result was a contraction in credit and a recession, which 
shook some people’s confidence in the virtues of a convertible currency.
48
  A 
Birmingham banker like Thomas Attwood (1783-1856), supplied credit to the Black 
Country’s manufacturing economy.  Attwood drew on an intellectual legacy 
inherited from David Hume (1711-1776),
49
 to argue a monetary base constrained by 
the amount of gold and silver available could never keep the nation’s resources fully 
employed.
50
  John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) accused Attwood of trying to inflate 
Birmingham’s manufacturing economy artificially at the expense of the monetary 
stability of the rest of the nation.
51
  Attwood’s claim that monetary expansion 
constituted a viable defence against unemployment remained an economic heresy 
until the Keynesian revolution of the twentieth century.
52
  The Bank of England 
resumed cash payments in 1821.
53
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The resumption of cash payments complemented Liverpool’s reform of the 
nation’s coins undertaken in 1816.  Silver coins now stayed in circulation and the 
nation’s bank notes were redeemable again.  Gold sovereigns held the new gold 
standard together by imbuing silver coins and bank notes with their respective 
monetary values.  However, one aspect of the post-1821 arrangements continued to 
threaten Britain’s financial stability.  The failure of a large number of English and 
Welsh banks during financial panic of 1825 alluded to in the last chapter 
demonstrated fractional reserve banking remained vulnerable to a run.  The Country 
Bankers Act of 1826 represented yet another incremental change designed to put the 
nation’s currency on a secure foundation by making the English and Welsh banks 
more stable.   
 
Liverpool’s government introduced one more measure in 1826 to foster greater 
reliance of gold and silver coins to make payments.  Legislation in that year 
prohibited the issue of small bank notes.
54
  No English or Welsh bank notes with a 
face value less than £5 circulated after 1826 until the outbreak of World War I when 
the Treasury issued £1 and 10-shilling notes to economise on the amount of gold and 
silver in circulation.
55
  Liverpool’s government attempted to ban small notes in 
Scotland too, but abandoned the idea once Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) mounted a 
defence the £1 bank notes in three letters written to the Edinburgh Weekly Journal.
56
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Scott may have signed those letters in the nom de plume Malachi Malagrowther, but 
anyone who knew his work understood Malachi Malagrowther was the alleged 
descendant of a character in his 1822 novel The Fortunes of Nigel.
57
    
 
The bank notes issued by the English and Welsh country banks and the 
Scottish banks were instruments of credit.  Their worth depended upon the solvency 
of the banks that issued them.  Dissatisfaction with the first generation of English 
and Welsh joint stock banks soon gave rise to a renewed monetary debate in which 
two opposing schools known as the ‘banking school’ and the ‘currency school’ 
argued over the future direction of British monetary policy.   
 
THE BACKGROUND TO THE BANKING-CURRENCY DEBATE 
Four developments during the 1830’s had profound implications for the banking 
industry.  The previous chapter dealt with the first.  In 1833, the Bank Charter Act 
declared that joint stock banks could operate in London if they issued no bank notes.  
The second was the same act’s abolition of the usury laws for bills of exchange with 
less than ninety days to maturity.
58
  The third was the elevation of the Bank of 
England’s bank notes to the status of legal tender in England and Wales.
59
  The 
English and Welsh public became obliged to accept Bank of England notes to settle 
debts denominated in multiples of £5.  The only exception was at an office of the 
Bank of England where the Bank continued to redeem its bank notes in specie to 
maintain their convertibility.  The Bank of England became the official repository of 
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the nation’s bullion reserve because it was the only institution in England and Wales 
obliged to make payments in specie after 1833.  The last development was the spread 
of joint stock banking following the passage of the Country Bankers Act in 1826. 
 
Joint stock banks were slow to emerge in England and Wales at first.  By the 
end of 1829, only 13 of them were open for business.  Then the trickle turned into a 
flood as 116 joint stock institutions entered the industry between 1830 and 1839.
60
  
By 1837, the Edinburgh Review could boast the English and Welsh were in the grip 
of a joint stock banking “mania.”
61
  The Circular to Bankers was in no doubt as to 
where the epicentre of the joint stock banking mania lay.  Most of the new joint 
stock banks were located in industrial counties like Lancashire, Yorkshire and the 
Midlands.
62
  This joint-stock banking mania was symptomatic of a buoyant economy 
enjoying a cyclical upswing.  Harvests were good and credit plentiful because the 
new joint stock banks lent generously to establish themselves.
63
  Banking was one of 
many industries undergoing expansion.  In May 1836, William Clay delivered a 
speech to the House of Commons in which he claimed to hold in his hand “a list of 
seventy contemplated companies for every species of undertaking, which have 
appeared in the Liverpool and Manchester papers within the last three months.”
64
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Unfortunately, the economy was heading towards a downturn by the time Clay 
delivered his speech.   
 
Concerns over the Bank of England’s reserves saw its directors raise their rate 
of discount twice in 1836 to constrain their bank note issue in the face of an outflow 
of bullion.
65
  Unusually, some of the gold taken from the Bank of England went to 
the United States where President Andrew Jackson’s (1767-1845) preference for a 
metallic currency increased the demand for it.
66
  Americans obtained the gold they 
needed by discounting bills of exchange with a country bank to obtain Bank of 
England notes and presented them for redemption at one of the Bank of England’s 
branches.  The Bank of England took radical action to discourage this practice.  It 
declared that henceforth it would not rediscount a bill of exchange carrying the 
endorsement of a joint stock bank of issue.
67
  The banks that discounted these bills 
could no longer present them at the Bank of England to obtain legal tender if they 
became subject to a run.   
 
The first that sign that events were moving towards crisis occurred in Ireland 
where a run on the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland saw it suspend 
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payments on 14 November 1836.
68
  Then on 28 November 1836, representatives of 
the Northern and Central Bank of England, one of the largest joint stock institutions 
in England and Wales, arrived at the Bank of England’s offices seeking assistance.
69
  
They explained that the Northern and Central had sent an officer to London with a 
bag containing more than £100,000 in bank notes and bills of exchange to meet the 
bank’s commitments in the Metropolis.  Unfortunately, the officer left the bag in a 
hansom cab and failed to recover it.  The Northern and Central Bank of England’s 
representatives feared their bank would become the subject of a run if news of the 
misfortune became public knowledge.  At first, the Bank of England refused to help.  
However, the Bank’s officers changed their minds once they realised a stoppage at a 
bank as big as the Northern and Central would spread to the rest of the country.  The 
Northern and Central recovered the lost bag by the time the Bank of England made a 
conditional offer of assistance but by then news of the lost bag was in the public 
domain.  A run on the Northern and Central Bank seemed inevitable and it accepted 
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the Bank of England’s offer of assistance.  A subsequent analysis of the Northern and 
Central’s affairs undertaken at the Bank of England’s insistence revealed undisclosed 
deficiencies in the Northern and Central’s financial position.  By February 1837, the 
Bank of England’s patience with the Northern and Central reached its limit.  The 
Bank of England wound the Northern and Central Bank wound up with no loss to 
either itself or the Northern and Central Bank’s creditors.   
 
The failure of the Northern and Central Bank could not have come at a more 
inauspicious moment for the joint stock banks.  In May 1836, William Clay used the 
tenth anniversary of the passage of the Country Bankers Act to call for a 
parliamentary enquiry into the joint stock banks.
70
  The result was the House of 
Commons Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks that delivered its first report in 
August 1836.  That report contained no recommendations, but noted that the burden 
for supervising the joint stock banks currently fell upon their shareholders.  The 
committee hoped those shareholders would remain equal to their responsibilities 
whilst it completed its investigations during the next parliamentary session.
71
  When 
the committee reconvened in February 1837, it seemed imperative to find out why 
the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland and the Northern and Central Bank 
of England failed.
72
  Joint stock banks were not a cure-all for the banking industry’s 
ills that Lord Liverpool had hoped they would be.
73
  Another committee investigated 
the banking industry in 1840 and 1841 although this time the committee’s focus was 
                                                          
70
 Clay, Speech of William Clay, Esq. M.P. on Moving for the Appointment of a Committee to Inquire 
into the Operation of the Act Permitting the Establishment of Joint-Stock Banks. 
71
 Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks, Report of the Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks; 
Together With Minutes of Evidence and Appendix  (London: Parliament of the United Kingdom 
(House of Commons), 1836), x. 
72
 The first witnesses called in 1837 gave evidence on the operations and failure of these banks.  
Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks, Report of the Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks; 
Together With Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index: 1-199. 
73




on the industry’s bank notes.
74
  The advocates of the ‘currency school’ used the 
Select Committee on Banks of Issue to mount their attack on the existing 
arrangements in 1840.  Advocates of the ‘banking school’ responded to the attack by 
giving defending the status quo in 1841.   
 
THE CURRENCY SCHOOL AND THE BANKING SCHOOL 
The most prominent members of the currency school were cohesive, well connected 
and influential.  Their ranks included a Bank of England director, George Warde 
Norman (1793-1882).
75
  The currency school also had a presence in parliament 
where William Clay, Samuel Jones Loyd (1796-1883) and the reformed anti-
bullionist Colonel Robert Torrens were keen advocates.
76
  All four were members of 
the Political Economy Club, a debating society founded by James Mill (1773-1836) 
that discussed the economic issues of the day.  At various times, its membership 
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included Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill.
77
  
Malthus, Ricardo and the younger Mill all contributed to the emergence of the 
modern economics discipline.
78
  The economic statistician Thomas Tooke (1774-
1858) was one of few recognised members of the banking school to gain admission 
to the Political Economy Club, although John Stuart Mill did express some sympathy 
for Tooke’s views on monetary questions, which annoyed Torrens profoundly.
79
   
 
The currency school advocated a ‘currency principle’ that owed its origins to 
the bullionists’ critique of the real bills doctrine during the suspension on cash 
payments.
80
  The currency principle held that bank notes were nothing more than 
cheap substitutes for gold coins.  The public only used bank notes, the currency 
school argued, because it was more convenient to carry pieces of paper around than 
precious metals.  In all other respects, gold coins were preferable to paper money 
because they constituted a better store of value.  It followed, therefore, that the 
number of bank notes put into in circulation should match exactly the amount of 
precious metal held in reserve to redeem them.  In 1840, George Warde Norman 
explained the currency principle in the following terms: 
I consider a metallic currency to be the most perfect currency, except so 
far as respects inconvenience in some respects, and cost. In everything 
else a metallic currency is the most perfect, and should be looked upon as 
the type of all other currencies; and as from their superior convenience 
and greater cheapness, bank notes are introduced to supply the place of a 
certain portion of metallic currency, I think that bank notes should be so 
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managed, that they should possess all the other attributes of a metallic 
currency, and among those attributes, I conceive the most important to be 
that they should increase and decrease in the same way that a metallic 
currency would increase and decrease. I do not think it is possible to 





Samuel Jones Loyd was another critic of the existing monetary arrangements.
82
   He 
was even more precise in his definition of the currency principle than George Warde 
Norman had been.  Loyd claimed the bank note circulation “should be made to 





The currency school claimed the currency principle would stabilise the banking 
system, eliminate trade imbalances, ensure the convertibility of Britain’s bank notes 
and smooth the business cycle.  Drawing on David Hume’s price-specie flow 
mechanism,
84
 the currency school wanted to keep the bank note issue at what they 
considered its appropriate level at all times.
85
  The process would work as follows.  
When Britain exported gold to make payments abroad, the number of bank notes 
circulating in Britain would fall in direct proportion to the amount of gold exported.  
The reduction in bank note circulation would have a deflationary effect, suppressing 
the price of British goods relative to foreign goods.  Exports would rise and imports 
fall until the drain of gold stopped.  At that point, the bank note circulation and prices 
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would stabilise.  The opposite would occur when Britain received an inflow of gold 
from abroad.  The bank note circulation would increase provoking an outbreak of 
inflation to make British goods more expensive at home and abroad.  The result 
would be an increase in imports and fewer exports until finally the inflow of gold 
stopped.  The bank note circulation and prices would then stabilise.   
 
The currency school’s attack in 1840 before the Secret Committee on Banks of 
Issue caught their opponents in the banking school by surprise.
86
  The evidence taken 
in 1840 focused on the Bank of England, which gave George Warde Norman and 
Samuel Jones Loyd an opportunity to dissect the prevailing state of affairs in 
forensic detail.  Thomas Tooke was the only member of the banking school called 
upon to give evidence in 1840.
87
  The evidence taken by Secret Committee on Banks 
of Issue in 1841 focussed on the country banks, which gave the banking school its 
opportunity to rebut evidence given a year earlier.  The London and Westminster’s 
general manager James William Gilbart (1794-1863) used the occasion to defend his 
country correspondents’ right to issue bank notes tenaciously.
88
  Representatives of 
the Bank of Scotland, the Ayrshire Bank and the Glasgow Union Banking Company 
did the same for the Scottish banks.
89
  When the committee’s deliberations ended in 
1841, the weight of contradictory testimony put before it over two years so 
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overwhelmed its members that they could only agree on one thing.  It would be 
prudent if Britain’s banks disclosed the state of their circulation and their reserves 
more openly and more frequently.
90
     
 
The Bank of England historian A. Andréadès observed that many people 
wrongly assume the banking school were free market ideologues opposed to any 
regulation of the bank note issue.
91
  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Thomas 
Tooke ranked alongside John Fullarton (1780-1849) (a retired banker) and James 
Wilson (1805-1860) (the founding editor of The Economist) as one of the banking 
school’s most eloquent advocates.
92
  Yet, Tooke argued that, “free trade in banking is 
synonymous with free trade in swindling.”
93
  The banking school had no objection to 
measures designed to improve the quality of Britain’s bank notes.  What they 
opposed were interventions designed to restrict their aggregate quantity.  Advocates 
of the banking principle agreed with Adam Smith’s assertion that: 
If bankers are … subjected to the obligation of immediate and 
unconditional payment of … [their] bank notes as soon as presented, 
their trade may, with safety to the public, be rendered in all other 
respects perfectly free.
94
     
 
The banking school believed in a ‘banking principle’ that asserted a law of 
reflux.  The banking school argued banks could not force the public to hold more 
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redeemable bank notes then it needed because any excess would return to the banks 
that issued it for redemption.
95
  In 1841, for example, Gilbart (the London and 
Westminster Bank’s general manager), asserted the right to redeem a bank note 
constituted a necessary check on the Bank of England’s issuing powers because the 
Bank supplied its bank notes to governments for purposes unrelated to the needs of 
trade.  The Bank of England’s bank notes had to be capable of reflux to remove any 
excess issued.
96
  According to the banking school, the right to redeem bank notes 
turned the real bills doctrine into a sound foundation for the conduct of monetary 
policy once more.  All banks should be free to issue to expand and contract their 
bank note issue in accordance with the needs of trade.  The banking school argued 





Advocates of the banking principle regarded the currency school’s currency 
principle with incredulity.
98
  For one thing, the currency school’s reliance on the 
price-specie flow mechanism seemed misguided.  Tooke undertook an extensive 
analysis of prices and concluded non-monetary causes exerted a far greater influence 
over inflation than the money supply did.
99
  Similarly, Gilbart told the Select 
Committee on Banks of Issue that prices did not necessarily rise to accommodate a 
growing bank note circulation.  Sometimes, the number of bank notes in circulation 
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had to increase because prices were rising.
100
  In addition, the banking school 
asserted that a bank note was nothing more than a form of credit and fundamentally 
no different to other credit instruments like bills of exchange and cheques.  It was 
futile, the banking school argued, to single bank notes out for regulation whilst 
leaving bills of exchange and cheques at the mercy of the needs of trade.  Tooke 
expressed this view as follows: 
…neither is it in the power of the banks of issue … to diminish the total 
amount of circulation; particular banks may  … refuse …  to issue their 
own notes; but their notes so withdrawn will be replaced by notes of 





The banking school argued the only thing the currency principle could achieve 
would be greater reliance on cheques rather than bills of exchange to make 
payments.  Bills of exchange drawn in amounts of less than £50 and £20 attracted 




The currency school took the banking school by surprise in 1840 by preparing 
its attack first.  Consequently, the banking school only released its most insightful 
critique of the currency principle after 1844 by which time parliament had enshrined 
the currency principle into law.
103
  Robert Peel (1788-1850) was a member of the 
Select Committee on Bank of Issue and a committed bullionist who chaired the 
parliamentary committee that recommended a resumption of cash payments in 
                                                          
100
 Select Committee on Banks of Issue, Second Report From the Secret Committee on Banks of Issue: 
99. 
101
 Tooke, An Inquiry into the Currency Principle: 122.  Italics added. 
102
 "To our subscribers.”  See also: David K. Sheppard, The Growth and Role of UK Financial 
Institutions, 1880-1962  (London: Methuen & Co., 1971), 5. 
103
 Torrens, The Principles and Practical Operation of Sir Robert Peel's Act; Tooke, An Inquiry into 






  Peel recalled the days when the Bank of England’s inconvertible bank notes 
appeared to depreciate in value with horror.
105
  Bank notes were “fictitious credit” as 
far as Peel was concerned that would yield “severe commercial distress” when issued 
to excess.
106
  Peel put his faith in bullion, having declared in 1819 that a pound was 
nothing more than “a definite quantity of gold … with an impression on it denoting it 
to be of a certain weight and … fineness.”
107
  By 1844, Peel was Prime Minister once 
more and the Bank of England’s charter came up for renewal.  Peel took the 
opportunity to impose the currency principle upon the banking industry.
108
   
 
THE BANK OF ENGLAND CHARTER OF 1844 
The Bank of England charter of 1844 introduced strict limits on the bank note issue 
of England and Wales.
109
  This particular Bank Charter Act resurrected an idea first 
put forward by David Ricardo, who wanted a government agency called the 
‘National Bank’ to take over the supply of bank notes.  His plan would have forced 
every other bank (the Bank of England included) to use the National Bank’s bank 
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notes to conduct a deposit-taking business.
110 
 However, Peel’s Bank Charter Act 
differed from Ricardo’s proposal in one respect.  Peel divided the Bank of England 
into two departments.  One department was an Issue Department that would play the 
role of Ricardo’s National Bank.  It would issue bank notes leaving the Banking 
Department to undertake what remained of the Bank of England’s operations.  The 
Bank Charter Act then imposed the currency principle upon the Issue Department. 
 
The Bank Charter Act dictated that the Bank of England’s Issue Department 
should issue and redeem the Bank of England’s bank notes at the rate of £3/17/9 per 
ounce of gold, which was less than the £3/17/10½ per ounce on offer at the Mint.  
However, the Mint had a backlog of orders to deal with.  One could have invested 
the £3/17/9 on offer at the Issue Department and ended up with more than £3/17/10½ 
by the time the Mint turned gold into sovereigns.
111
  The Issue Department had a 
fiduciary issue of £14,000,000, an amount the act’s framers chose carefully.  Their 
analysis of the Bank of England’s returns suggested its bank note issue could never 
fall below this level.
112
  The Issue Department could maintain a reserve of 
government securities to back its fiduciary issue but had to maintain a specie reserve 
capable of redeeming every single bank note issued beyond £14,000,000 at the rate 
of £3/17/9 per ounce of gold.  In addition, the Issue Department would keep its 
reserves separate from the Banking Department’s reserves.  If the Banking 
Department needed more Bank of England notes to conduct its business, it would 
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have to buy from the Issue Department at the official rate.  If the Banking 
Department possessed more Bank of England notes than it needed, it would sell them 
back to the Issue Department at the same price.  Any change in the bank notes put 
into circulation by the Banking Department would match the change in the Issue 
Department’s bullion reserve exactly under these arrangements.   
 
Peel knew that Tooke was right on one point.  Other banks would put bank 
notes into circulation to fill any demand for them the Bank of England failed to 
meet.
113
  Peel needed to constrain the bank note issue of every country bank in 
England and Wales to impose the currency principle.  Peel adopted a carrot and stick 
approach to placate a banking community that would resist any threat to its 
profitability.  The carrot transformed country banks into local monopolies.  The Bank 
Charter Act dictated that only the banks issuing bank notes on 6 May 1844 could 
continue to issue them after that date.  Peel’s Bank Charter Act demanded a 
concession in return.  Every bank of issue would report its average bank note 
circulation during the twelve weeks leading up to 27 April 1844.  No bank could 
exceed the average circulation reported in 1844 once the Bank Charter Act became 
operative.  A relieved Gilbart approved of the deal.  He told his country 
correspondents:   
Upon the whole, then, in balancing our account with Sir Robert Peel, we 
find we owe him a debt of gratitude.  This debt may have been enlarged, 
but still the amount is considerable.  Our rights are acknowledged–our 
privileges are extended–our circulation guaranteed, and we are saved 
from conflicts with reckless competitors.  The principle of currency, if 
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Peel’s Bank Charter Act made the metallic reserve held by the Issue Department of 
the Bank of England the ultimate determinant of an expanding English and Welsh 
bank note issue.  The Issue Department was the only bank in England and Wales 
granted a conditional right to increase its bank note circulation beyond the levels 
recorded in 1844. 
 
Peel’s concession over country banks note issue meant the Bank Charter Act 
had not turned the Bank of England’s Issue Department into Ricardo’s National Bank 
overnight.  Other English and Welsh banks possessed limited rights to issue bank 
notes.  Consequently, the Bank Charter Act contained provisions designed to contract 
the country bank note issue over time.  A provincial bank would forfeit its right to 
issue bank notes if it became bankrupt, ceased to carry on the business of banking or 
stopped issuing bank notes.  A banking partnership would also lose the right to issue 
once its membership exceeded six, which meant two amalgamating private banks 
could only aggregate their rights to issue if the post-amalgamation whole remained a 
private banking partnership with less than six proprietors.
115
  Joint-stock banks 
acquired restrictions of their own.  When a joint-stock bank absorbed a private bank, 
the private bank forfeited its right to issue bank notes.  Amalgamations between two 
joint stock banks destroyed the bank note issuing privileges of the target.  No joint 
stock bank could acquire a branch within the 65-miles radius of London and retain the 
right to issue.  In addition, the act gave the Bank of England authority to enter into a 
compounding arrangement whereby a bank surrendered its right to issue in return for 
an annual payment.  Finally, the act ensured the number of Bank of England notes in 
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circulation would increase over time to replace any rights to issue bank notes 
forfeited by the country banks.  The Bank of England could apply to have its 
fiduciary issue expanded by two-thirds
 
of all the rights to issue bank notes forfeited.  
It took 75 years for the Bank Charter Act to achieve its objective and turn the Bank of 
England’s Issue Department into Ricardo’s National Bank.  In 1921, Somerset’s Fox, 
Fowler and Company amalgamated with Lloyds Bank whereupon the Bank of 




Peel turned his attention to Scotland and Ireland in 1845.  Adopting the same 
carrot and stick approach that worked so well in England and Wales, Peel placated 
existing banks by removing the threat a new entrant might compete with them.  The 
Bank Notes (Scotland) Act forbade new banks of issue north of the River Tweed.
117
  
The measure erected such a barrier to entry that no banks emerged in Scotland after 
the prohibition came into force.
118
  The Bank Notes (Scotland) Act also demanded 
established banks report their average bank note circulation.  These banks could issue 
bank notes up to the averages recorded in 1845 without consequence but had to 
maintain a specie reserve equal in value to every additional bank note issued.  
Naturally, acquiring the reserves demanded by the Bank Notes (Scotland) Act 
imposed costs on Scotland’s banks.  Nevertheless, the Scottish banks avoided the 
inconvenience of being split into issue departments and banking departments like the 
Bank of England.  The reserves demanded by the Bank Notes (Scotland) Act could 
serve more than one purpose under these circumstances.  These reserves would meet 
the requirements of the Bank Notes (Scotland) Act whilst remaining available to 
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cover the bank’s deposits and putting coins in the banks tills.  The Clydesdale Bank’s 
general manager (George Readman (1818-1894)) told the Select Committee on 
Banks of Issue in 1875 that the Scottish public trusted their £1 bank notes implicitly.  
They rarely attended at their banks to withdraw sovereigns.
119
  A Scottish bank could 
rely on the specie reserves demanded by the Bank Notes (Scotland) Act alone without 
putting its operations at risk.  The restrictions imposed the Irish banks mirrored the 
Scottish regulations in every respect but one.
120
  The Irish legislation abolished the 
only remaining protection accorded to the Bank of Ireland.  An established Irish joint 
stock bank of issue could now issue bank notes within 50 Irish-miles of Dublin.  
 
In theory, the currency principle made Britain’s paper money more secure than 
ever.  A Bank of England bank note was redeemable at a branch of the Bank of 
England.  Every other English and Welsh bank note was redeemable in Bank of 
England bank notes that were now legal tender.  In addition, the Bank of England 
maintained a specie reserve equal to the task of redeeming every single bank note 
liable to reflux in a run.  A similar situation would eventually pertain in Scotland and 
Ireland where banks maintained a specie reserve capable of redeeming every note 
issued beyond the levels recorded in 1845.  Finally, the English and Welsh country 
bank note issue could not grow beyond the levels established in 1844 and would only 
contract to be replaced by Bank of England notes as banks left the industry.  
However, the currency school’s apparent victory in 1844/45 proved illusory.  The 
British did find a substitute for their highly regulated bank note issue and began to 
utilise cheques in increasing numbers to make payment.  There were no legislative 
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guarantees the banks would maintain the reserves needed to secure the growth in 
deposits generated by this increasing reliance on cheques.  Furthermore, the Bank 
Charter Act put strict limits on the amount of legal tender the Bank of England could 
supply during a financial crisis.  The government had to suspend the Bank Charter 
Act in 1847, 1857 and 1866 to stave off an impending financial meltdown.
121
   
 
The Bank Charter Act influenced the structure of the English and Welsh 
banking industry by keeping banks granted a right to issue bank notes in 1844 in 
business.  The Bank Charter Act achieved this outcome by creating a disincentive to 
bank amalgamations that delayed the Amalgamation Movement. 
 
BANK AMALGAMATIONS AND THE BANK CHARTER ACT 
Bank amalgamations are an indicator of the growth in bank size following the 
introduction of joint stock banking into England and Wales in 1826.  Joseph Sykes 
estimated that 124 English and Welsh banks disappeared in amalgamations between 
1826 and 1844.
122
  Most of the banks that left the industry during this period were 
private banks that either converted to the joint stock form or merged with a joint 
stock bank.  In 1826, Somerset’s Vincent Stuckey (1771-1845), for example, 
consolidated the five private banks in which he had a proprietary interest into a 
single joint-stock institution.
123
  By 1844, the joint stock banks had taken over 94 
English and Welsh private banks.
124
  This tentative process of consolidation was 
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unprecedented given the limits on bank size imposed by the six-partner limit prior to 
1826.  Nevertheless, most joint stock banks in England and Wales remained small-
scale affairs.
125
  The rights to issue bank notes assigned in 1844 suggest that at the 
time, private banks outnumbered their joint stock rivals by a ratio of 2.8:1.
126
  The 
English and Welsh had a lot of ground to make up to replicate Scotland’s larger 
banks. 
 
The Bank Charter Act of 1844 induced a decline in the rate of bank 
amalgamations in England and Wales.  Only 48 English and Welsh banks 
disappeared in amalgamation between 1845 and 1863.  Mergers between private 
banks fell from 23 between 1826 and 1844 to just 12 between 1845 and 1863.  
Amalgamations between private banks and joint stock banks plummeted from 94 
between 1826 and 1844 to only 24 between 1845 and 1863.
127
  This slowdown in the 
rate of consolidation was a uniquely English and Welsh phenomenon.  Inevitably, 
bank amalgamations now occurred less frequently in Scotland than in England and 
Wales because Scotland contained fewer banks to begin with.  However, Scottish 
banks were bigger than the English and Welsh banks.  The concentrating effect of a 
Scottish bank amalgamation was more dramatic than in England and Wales.  Five of 
the 17 Scottish banks open for business in 1850 had exited the banking industry by 
1865.  One of those five left the industry due to failure.  The other four banks 
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disappeared in an amalgamation.
128
  The Bank Notes (Scotland) Act had no 
discernible effect on the Scottish banks’ propensity to amalgamate. 
 
The Bank Charter Act’s amalgamation provisions account for the reduction in 
the rate of bank amalgamations after 1844.  Only two private banks could aggregate 
their rights to issue in England and Wales if and only if the post-amalgamation whole 
had six members or less.  In every other case, bank amalgamation between two 
English and Welsh banks either extinguished the target’s right to issue bank notes or 
destroyed both banks’ right to issue.  The rules imposed by the Bank Notes 
(Scotland) Act were far more lenient because the Scottish legislation did not express 
an intention to replace Scotland’s bank notes with the Bank of England’s notes.  The 
Bank Notes (Scotland) Act preserved Scotland’s native capacity to issue bank notes 
by allowing two amalgamating banks to aggregate their rights to issue in every case.  
This difference did not escape the attention of the English and Welsh banking 
community.  In 1849, the Bankers’ Magazine  lamented: 
In Scotland ... joint stock banks may unite together and retain their 
aggregate fixed issue; while in England and Wales, the union of two 
such banks, or of a private bank of issue with a joint stock bank is to be 
followed by the loss of circulation by one or both of them….  In the 
course of the ten years from 1826 to 1836, no less than one hundred 
and fifty-four private banks were merged into joint stock banks.  Since 
the passing of the Bank Act of 1844, not one private bank of issue has 
united with a joint stock bank; and only four private firms have availed 
themselves of the permission to unite into two firms, retaining their 
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The Bankers’ Magazine warned that the Bank Charter Act undermined the Country 
Bankers Act’s objective by keeping English and Welsh banks unnecessarily small.  
The Bank Charter Act denied an English and Welsh bank the prospect of being 
taken-over on fair terms by a larger rival because “no other company of greater 
strength and means had any inducement to come forward and assist them.”
130
  A 
month later, an anonymous country banker complained to the Bankers’ Magazine: 
Had the Act of 1844 allowed the union of all banks on equal terms, it is 
impossible to say how many comparatively small and weak banks might 
have been saved during the panic of 1847 by the timely union with 
larger and more influential companies, and this too, on terms securing 





The Bank Charter Act of 1844 therefore a created disincentive to amalgamation that 
fell most heavily on the private banks because their bank notes constituted a 
significant proportion of their business.  Private bank disappearances by means of an 
amalgamation (with either a private bank or a joint stock bank) fell from 116 
between 1826 and 1843 to just 34 between 1844 and 1861.  In contrast, six joint 
stock banks disappeared in an amalgamation with another joint stock bank between 
1826 and 1843 whereas ten joint stock banks amalgamated with another joint stock 
bank between 1844 and 1861.
132
  Amalgamations between joint stock banks actually 
increased following the passage of the Bank Charter Act.   
  
By 1865, William Gladstone (1809-1898) was the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
His patience with the relatively small size of the English and Welsh banks coupled 
with the slow rate at which the English and Welsh country bank note was 
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disappearing was reaching its limit.  In that year, Gladstone contemplated the 
possibility that Peel should have adopted a different approach to the question of bank 
amalgamations in 1844 and proposed legislation giving English and Welsh banks 
conditional rights to aggregate their bank note issue when they merged.  The 
proposed legislation never passed into law.
133
  Gladstone’s proposal proved 
unnecessary anyway.  Unbeknownst to him, the English and Welsh banks would 
soon embark on their Amalgamation Movement.  Something was changing to make 
bank amalgamations a more attractive proposition than over the previous 21 years.  
The next section explains that deposit taking and cheques became increasingly 
important to the English and Welsh banks.  Greater reliance on deposits and cheques 
diminished the importance of the right to issue bank notes, which overcame the 
disincentives to amalgamations imposed by the Bank Charter Act.  
 
THE DEMISE OF THE COUNTRY BANK NOTE ISSUE 
Table 3.1 suggests the English and Welsh country banks held onto their rights to 
issue bank notes tenaciously at first.  The Bank Charter Act allocated a country bank 
note issue of £8,631,647.  However, the country banks issued less than their full 
allocation of bank notes to avoid running fowl of the Bank Charter Act’s penalty 
provisions.
134
  Michael Collins’ estimates suggest the annual country bank note issue 
averaged £6,400,000 between 1846 and 1850 before increasing slightly to average  
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£6,500,000 between 1850 and 1859.
135
  The country bank note issue began to fall in 
the 1860s and it continued to fall as the century progressed.  Its value averaged 
£5,700,000 between 1860 and 1869 before declining to average £4,700,000 between 
1870 and 1879.
136
  At the same time, bank notes issued by the Bank of England 
began to replace the country English and Welsh bank note issue just as Peel’s 
government hoped they would.  The Bank of England’s share of all the bank notes 
issued in England and Wales grew from 74.1 per cent between 1846 and 1850 to 88.5 
per cent between 1877 and 1880.
137
   
 
Table 3.1 
Bank Notes Issued and Deposits Collected by Banks 
Other Than the Bank of England in England and Wales, 1846-1879 
  
Bank Notes 
Issued                  
(Average £) 
Deposits 








1846-1850 6,400,000 94,400,000 - - 
1850-1859 6,500,000 142,300,000 +2% +51% 
1860-1869 5,700,000 229,400,000 -11% +143% 
1870-1879 4,700,000 338,800,000 -27% +259% 
Bank Notes Issued and Deposits Collected 
by the Bank of England in England and Wales, 1846-1880 
  
Bank Notes 
Issued         
(Average £) 
Deposits 








1846-1850 18,300,000 8,300,000 - - 
1856-1860 19,700,000 8,800,000 +8% +6% 
1866-1870 23,000,000 12,800,000 +26% +54% 
1877-1880 28,500,000 14,700,000 +56% +77% 
Sources: Collins, "Long-term growth in the English banking sector and the money stock," 384; 
Collins, "The business of banking: English bank balance sheets," 45. 
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Table 3.1 also indicates the English and Welsh banks became increasingly 
reliant on deposits as their bank note issue declined.  Deposits at English and Welsh 
banks other than the Bank of England averaged £94,400,000 between 1846 and 
1850.  These deposits rose to average £338,800,000 between 1870 and 1879.
138
  This 
growth in deposits was a consequence of growing reliance on cheques that 
mobilising funds deposited in an account to make a payment.  In 1845, the London 
and Westminster’s James Gilbart had no doubt that banks other then the Bank of 
England would take most of the deposits created by this growing reliance on 
cheques.  Depositors needed local banks with branches in close proximity to them 
and the Bank of England lacked the resources needed open enough branches to 
service the whole country.
139
  In addition, Gilbart knew the Bank of England had a 
disproportionately large number of dead accounts on its books on which it would 
also have to pay interest.  The Bank of England would struggle to pay the interest 
needed to attract depositors.
140
  Gilbart knew the Bank of England would not be the 
currency principle’s primarily beneficiary in the long run.  The Bank Charter Act 
may have imposed a short-term cost on the country banks by restricting their bank 
note issue, but Table 3.1 suggests the Banks of England’s deposits grew far more 
slowly than the non-Bank of England sector’s deposits.  The Bank of England’s bank 
notes and deposits accounted for 20.9 per cent of the English and Welsh banking 
system’s indebtedness to the public between 1846 and 1850.  By 1877-80, the Bank 
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of England’s total share of the English and Welsh banking industry had almost 
halved and stood at 10.6 per cent.
141
   
 
The country banks defended their right to issue bank notes tenaciously before 
the Select Committee on Banks of Issue in 1841.
142
  They did do because obtaining 
bank notes issued by the Bank of England to sustain their operations would have 
been prohibitively expensive.  However, banks had less need for bank notes of any 
kind once their clients opened a deposit account and acquired a chequebook.  The 
bank could simply acknowledge any amount the client borrowed in their bank 
account and the client could spend the funds borrowed by writing a cheque.
143
  A 
bank only needed bank notes on those increasingly rare occasions when its 
customers demanded paper to make a payment to a third party.  By 1875, Walter 
Bagehot (1826-1877) could tell the last Select Committee on Banks of Issue that 
Stuckey’s Banking Company only issued its bank notes to convenience “small 
persons” such as “small farmers, stock dealers and butchers” who wanted to cash the 
cheques they received as payment.
144
  Stuckey’s Banking Company provided this 
facility at no charge, he said, because its right to issue bank notes avoided the cost of 
acquiring Bank of England paper to meet the same purpose.   
 
The diminishing importance of the country bank note issue removed the 
impediment to bank amalgamations imposed by the Bank Charter Act.  An early 
indicator that country banks were reassessing the value of their rights to issue bank 
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notes came as early as 1865.  In that year, a merger between Lloyds and Company 
and Moillet and Sons put Lloyds on an expansionary path that would eventually see 
it emerge as one of the five biggest banks England and Wales.  Both banks involved 
were banking private banks and Lloyds turned the amalgamation into an opportunity 
to expand its proprietorship by incorporating on a limited liability basis.  
Consequently, the amalgamation invoked the provisions of the Bank Charter Act and 
turned a private bank that could issue bank notes into a joint stock banking company 
that could not.  Lloyds would forfeit the right to issue £38,816 in Britain’s industrial 
heartland, but its proprietors proceeded with the amalgamation anyway.
145
  Then in 
1866, the largest country bank of issue in England and Wales opened its first branch 
in London.   
  
The National Provincial possessed the largest country bank note issue allocated 
by the Bank Charter Act in 1844.
146
  Only the Bank of England had a bigger bank 
note circulation.  The National Provincial Bank maintained its status as a bank of 
issue carefully since its establishment in 1833.  This bank had an administrative 
office in the Metropolis but avoided the acquisition of any banking offices within 65-
miles of London.  A proposal to open a London branch in 1866, therefore, would 
cost the National Provincial the right to issue £422,371 in the provinces.
147
  The 
Times defended the National Provincial proposal arguing there was no reason why 
the bank should not accept deposits in London if it confined its bank notes to the 
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  However, the Bank Charter Act continued to exclude English and 
Welsh joint stock banks of issue from the Metropolis.  The National Provincial tried 
to salvage what it could from the situation.  It approached the Bank of England to 
negotiate a compounding arrangement that would have furnished an annual payment 
to compensate for the loss of its right to issue bank notes.  The Bank of England 
informed the National Provincial that Treasury’s firm policy was that no bank should 
receive such a payment once it took a step that forfeited its right to issue granted by 
the Bank Charter Act.
149
  Consequently, the National Provincial’s London branch 
entailed the loss of the right to issue bank notes without any compensation 
whatsoever.  The National Provincial’s directors argued a London office made sound 
business sense nonetheless.  They believed taking deposits in London would generate 
more wealth than the largest country bank note issue in England and Wales ever 
could.
150
   
 
Lloyds and Company and the National Provincial Bank of England were not 
the only banks to surrender their rights to issue bank notes as the Amalgamation 
Movement got underway.  Between 1881 and 1897, 13 banks did what the National 
Provincial failed to do and surrendered their bank note issue in exchange for an 
annual payment from the Bank of England.  These 13 banks were the first to 
compound their bank note issue since 1852.
151
  However, the Bank of England’s 
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internal records suggest the most common cause of the loss of the right issue bank 
notes was a bank amalgamation.   
 
Table 3.2 
Number of Banks of Issue Absorbed by  
Another Bank in England and Wales, 1845-1929 
  Private Banks Joint Stock Banks  
1844-1849 4 0 
1850-1859 5 1 
1860-1869 13 4 
1870-1879 16 3 
1880-1889 18 9 
1890-1899 45 10 
1900-1909 32 14 
1910-1919 8 12 
1920-1929 4 1 
Source: Bank of England, “A list of the banks of issue 12 October 1844 showing the devolution of 
the rights to issue.”   
 
Table 3.2 draws upon an internal Bank of England memorandum that explains 
what happened to the rights to issue bank notes assigned under the Bank Charter Act 
in 1844.
152
  Table 3.2 suggests the rate at which banks of issue disappeared in an 
amalgamation increased significantly after 1860.  Only nine private banks and one 
joint stock bank surrendered their right to issue bank notes in an amalgamation 
between 1844 and 1859.  The equivalent numbers in the 1860s were 13 private banks 
and four joint stock banks.  After that, the number of banks of issue absorbed in both 
categories increased further as the Amalgamation Movement gathered pace.  Over a 
third of the banks assigned rights to issue bank notes surrendered them in an 
amalgamation between 1890 and 1909.  In 1896 alone, 20 private banks, many of 
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them banks of issue, joined forces to form Barclay & Company (Limited).
153
  
Liberation from Bank Charter Act put Barclays on an expansionary path that would 
see it join Lloyds Bank, the National Provincial Bank of England and the Midland 
Bank (all of them former banks of issue) as one the Big Five.  The prospect of losing 
the right to issue bank notes was no longer sufficient reason to refuse the opportunity 
to amalgamate with a rival or to move into London.    
 
Unlike the English and Welsh banks, Scottish banks retained the right to 
expand their bank note issue beyond the levels recorded in 1845.  Thus, bank notes 
remained important to Scottish banking practice.  The next section explains how 
prospect of losing their all-important rights to issue stopped the Scottish banks 
crossing the border to participate in the English and Welsh Amalgamation 
Movement.  
 
A SCOTTISH INVASION REPELLED  
A Scottish banking invasion of England and Wales began in the mid-1860s when the 
Scottish joint stock banks opened their first offices in London.  The National Bank of 
Scotland was first in 1864 followed by the Bank of Scotland in 1867 and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland in 1873.
154
  The presence of these Scottish banks in London caused 
disquiet in England and Wales because the Scottish banks enjoyed a degree of 
preferential treatment.  The National Provincial Bank of England discovered to its 
cost that no English or Welsh bank of issue could conduct banking operations in 
London and retain its right to issue bank notes; and yet, none of the Scottish banks 
                                                          
153
 P. W. Mathews and Anthony W. Tooke, History of Barclays Bank Limited  (London: Blades, 
1926), 1-29. 
154
 M. Gaskin, "Anglo-Scottish banking conflicts, 1874-1881," The Economic History Review New 




forfeited their right to issue once they opened their branches in London.
155
  In 1875, 
the North and South Wales Bank’s George Rae (1817-1902) complained about the 
discrepancy to the Select Committee of Banks of Issue of that year.  He thought the 
Scottish banks “ought to be put on the same footing” as their English and Welsh 
counterparts and should sacrifice their right to issue bank notes in Scotland when 
they came to London.
156
   
 
The reason for the inconsistent treatment between the English and Welsh banks 
and the Scottish banks when they opened branch in London was that English and 
Welsh banking law treated Scotland as if it were a foreign country.  The only banks 
of issue excluded from London were those that issued bank notes in provincial 
England and Wales.  What a Scottish bank did outside England and Wales had no 
bearing on its right to maintain an office in London.
157
  The Scottish banks also had a 
precedent to justify their presence in London.  The National Bank of Ireland already 
possessed an office in London and few seemed overly concerned that it retained its 
right to issue bank notes in Ireland.  Why, the Scots wondered, should their banks be 
any different?
158
  The Scottish presence in England and Wales took on a far more 
menacing significance in 1874 when the Clydesdale Bank opened branches in 
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Sandwiched between the Scottish border and the Lake District, Cumberland 
had always displayed a propensity to orientate its commercial life in a northerly 
direction towards Scotland.  The county’s haematite ore field supplied raw materials 
to the iron and steel industries of the Clyde and Western Scotland for example.
160
  It 
was natural that a Glaswegian bank like the Clydesdale would select Cumberland as 
a viable point of entry into England.
161
  The Clydesdale’s administrators knew the 
Bank Charter Act denied new entrants to England and Wales the right to issue bank 
notes.  Consequently, the Clydesdale’s English branches conducted a deposit-taking 
business and did not issue bank notes.  The only times these branches dealt in 
Scottish bank notes was when called upon to exchange a sovereign for a Scottish £1 




The Clydesdale’s border raid threatened the English and Welsh banking 
community.  Scottish banks remained bigger than most English and Welsh banks at 
this time and the Scots had far more experience of branch banking than the English 
and Welsh did.
163
  The Scottish banks would have been formidable rivals had they 
started to take over English and Welsh banks to expand their branch networks in a 
southerly direction.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Goschen (1831-1907), 
proposed legislation that would have forced the Scottish banks into making an 
unpalatable choice.  Either they confined their operations to Scotland or they opened 
branches in England and Wales and lost the right to issue bank notes at home.
164
  The 
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proposed legislation went into limbo pending a recommendation from the 1875 
Select Committee on Banks of Issue.  The English and Welsh banks told the 
committee they objected to a Scottish presence on their territory because the 
currency legislation gave the Scottish banks two unfair advantages.
165
  First, the 
English and Welsh banks could not retaliate.  They could not open branches in 
Scotland because banking undertaken in the absence of a right to issue in Scotland 
was impossible and the Bank Notes (Scotland) Act forbade new banks of issue there.  
Second, the Scottish banks issued bank notes denominated in amounts as low as £1 
against their bullion reserves, a privilege denied to any English and Welsh bank of 
issue.  The English and Welsh feared the Scots would use their bank notes to raise 
cheap finance at home and deploy it to gain competitive advantages in England and 
Wales.  
 
The 1875 Select Committee on Banks of Issue took evidence but failed to 
deliver a recommendation in that year.  The committee did not reconvene in the next 
parliamentary session.  Consequently, Goshen’s proposed legislation never passed 
into law.  On the surface, the Select Committee on Banks of Issue of 1875 changed 
nothing.  The Scottish banks remained legally entitled to maintain banking offices in 
any part of England and Wales as long as they confined their bank note issue to 
Scotland.  A defiant Clydesdale Bank even kept its branches in Cumberland.  
Nevertheless, the English and Welsh banking community sent a message to their 
Scottish counterparts in 1875.
166
  The English and Welsh banking industry would 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Times, 18 March 1875; "Banking and Mr Goschen's Bill," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, June 
1875. 
165
 Select Committee on Banks of Issue, Report of the Select Committee on Banks of Issue: 121-22, 
252-53, 424-25. 
166




tolerate Scottish banking offices in London.  The British Linen Company, the Union 
Bank of Scotland and the Clydesdale all opened Metropolitan branches in 1877 for 
example.  However, the English and Welsh banking industry would use its influence 
in Westminster to threaten the Scottish banks’ right to issue bank notes at home if 
they encroached on provincial England and Wales.  The Scottish banks headed the 
warning and became marginal participants in the Amalgamation Movement. 
 
Britain’s currency legislation gave the English and Welsh banking industry a 
degree of invulnerability from outside competition it ultimately denied to their 
Scottish counterparts.  By 1919, the Amalgamation Movement had produced English 
and Welsh banks that were now far bigger than even the largest Scottish banks.
167
  In 
1919, two of the biggest banks in England and Wales looked northwards for 
opportunities for growth and mounted a successful counter invasion of Scotland.  
Barclays took over the British Linen Bank although the currency arrangements put in 
place in 1844/45 continued to exert an influence.  An amalgamation would have 
resulted in the British Linen Bank’s liquidation and the subsequent loss of its right to 
issue Scottish bank notes.  Consequently, Barclays ran the British Linen Bank as an 
affiliate, which meant the British Linen Bank remained a bank of issue.
168
  Within 
weeks, the London City and Midland Bank announced a similar arrangement with 
the Clydesdale Bank, the very same bank that attempted to invade Cumberland in 
1874.
169
  Takeovers like these set a precedent the British banks continued to follow 
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during the twentieth century.  British banks generally do not amalgamate with banks 
domiciled on the other side of the Anglo-Scottish border.  They acquire subsidiaries 
on the other side of the River Tweed instead.  When the Royal Bank of Scotland took 
the National Westminster Bank (NatWest Bank) over in 2000, NatWest became a 
subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group.
170
  The arrangement meant the 






The currency legislation of 1844/45 was the last in a series of reforms designed to 
put Britain’s money supply on a secure footing.  These reforms included the 
recoinage of 1816, which put Britain on a gold standard and the restoration of cash 
payments in 1821 that made the Bank of England’s notes redeemable once more.  
Like the Bank Charter Act of 1844, these reforms were the product of a conviction 
that only a money supply based on gold could function as a viable means of payment 
because gold constituted an ideal store of value because of its inherent worth.  In the 
end, these reforms proved futile because the British became increasingly dependent 
on bank account balances mobilised by cheques to make payments.  The banking 
school were right all along.  Bank notes were just one of several transferable 
financial assets that could furnish a means of payment and ultimately the needs of 
trade would prevail.  The post-Industrial Revolution British economy needed a 
means of payment erected on the foundations of bank credit to sustain itself.  The 
gold standard may have made Britain’s bank notes unassailably secure, but the 
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security of the money supply as a whole largely depended upon the safety of the 
banking system. 
 
The currency reforms introduced in 1844/45 failed to limit the British money 
supply to the amount of bullion available but they had an impact on the banking 
industry nonetheless.  They turned the Bank of England into the only bank of issue in 
England and Wales and allowed the other banks to take most of the growing deposit-
taking business on offer.  In addition, these reforms ensured that native banks would 
continue to meet Scotland’s demand for bank notes.  The result was a barrier erected 
along the border that ensured Scotland remained a separate banking jurisdiction to 
that of England and Wales.  Scottish banks and English and Welsh banks did not 
amalgamate with each other even when they came under common ownership.  
Finally, these currency reforms introduced in 1844 created a disincentive to bank 
amalgamations that delayed the Amalgamation Movement by more than two 
decades.  The Amalgamation Movement had to wait until the right to issue bank 
notes lost its value to the English and Welsh banking industry. 
 
The growing reliance on cheques did more than undermine bank note’s 
importance to the banking industry.  The next Chapter explains how he increased use 
of cheques changed the English and Welsh banks’ lending practices to send a 
financial instrument known as the inland bill of exchange into terminal decline.  The 
trade in these inland bills of exchange sustained many of the small regional banks 
found in England in Wales prior to 1870.  Banks located in industrial districts raised 
the funds by rediscounting bills of exchange in London.  Banks located in 




generated by sending their excess funds to London.  The demise of the inland bill put 
an end to this system of market exchanges, which turned participation in the 





CHANGING HANDS:  THE DEMISE OF THE  
INLAND BILL OF EXCHANGE 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-
ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.  
Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in [their] 




In many sectors of the economy, the visible hand of managerial 
coordination replaced what Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand 
of market forces.
2
   
  
Firms are command economies in miniature in which administrative fiat directs 
resources to their final use.  A firm puts human, capital and/or natural resources 
under administrative control to achieve economic objectives.
3
  As such, a firm’s 
existence challenges the tenets of neoclassical economics because price signals are 
supposed to allocate resources to their best use.
4
  A market economy should require 
no more human agency than homo economicus’ instinctive response to changing 
prices to allocate resources efficiently.
5
  Markets ought to regulate themselves.  They 
have no need for administrators to coordinate them.
6
  Neoclassical economics cannot 
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explain why people commit resources to firms.  Nevertheless, people do establish 
firms and they have done so for a long time.  When a firm grows in size, it takes 
control of resources previously allocated by the market.  This is what happened in 
England and Wales during the Amalgamation Movement.    
 
Prior to the Amalgamation Movement, regional banks transacted with each 
other at through market exchanges.  Banks in industrial regions where the demand 
for credit was high sustained their lending by rediscounting bills of exchange in 
London.  Agricultural banks subject to low demand for credit earned a return on their 
excess funds by supplying London with finance it needed to rediscount the bills of 
exchange sent there by the industrial banks.  This system of market exchanges 
depended on price signals (in this case rates of interest) to allocate the nation’s 
savings away from areas where the demand for credit was low and towards areas 
where the demand for credit was high.  Banking in post-Amalgamation Movement 
England and Wales was very different.  Now the largest banks possessed branches in 
every part of England and Wales.  Branches located in agricultural districts raised 
finance for the bank and its industrial branches lent the funds raised to the banks’ 
industrial clients.  What Alfred Chandler referred to as the ‘visible hand’ of 
managerial coordination replaced Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ of market 
exchange.  
 
This Chapter argues the demise of the market for inland bills of exchange made 
participation in the Amalgamation Movement a necessity for many English and 
Welsh banks.  The intention is not to resurrect what some banking historians have 




by now discredited claim that the Amalgamation Movement caused the demise of the 
inland bill of exchange.  Instead, the Chapter claims the market for inland bills 
declined first, which forced banks to seek amalgamation partners because continued 
reliance on market exchanges to sustain their operations became prohibitively 
expensive.  In short, the Amalgamation Movement compensated for the loss of 
inland bills of exchange.  This chapter begins by examining the reasons why firms 
grow in size. 
 
WHY DO LARGE FIRMS EXIST? 
Alfred Chandler argued firms grew in size because capital-intensiveness imposed 
fixed costs, which meant a small number of large firms had to account for a capital-
intensive industry’s output.  According to Chandler, oligopolies fostered the 
concentration of production needed to realise economies of scale and scope.
7
  This 
meant rivals merged with each other to minimise average unit costs through the 
rationalisation of production.
8
  Manufacturing firms could concentrate production in 
a small number of production facilities because they could distribute the output they 
produced over a wide geographical area.  The only inhibitors to rationalisation 
Chandler recognised were impediments to the free movement of goods such as 
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shipping costs, tariffs, import quotas and the administrative complexity associated 
with distribution over long distances.
9
   
 
Banks in nineteenth-century England and Wales faced a different reality to the 
manufacturing firms Chandler studied.  Banks supplied intangible services that they 
could not ship across large distances because their production and consumption often 
occurred simultaneously.
10
  As the London and Westminster Bank’s James Gilbart 
noted in 1845, a bank’s customers had to attend at its branches to transact business 
with it.
11
  The Amalgamation Movement could not centralise production in the way 
Standard Oil rationalised the American oil refining industry.
12
  A bank could not 
service the whole of Lancashire from a super branch located in Manchester.  
Customers domiciled outside Manchester would have deemed the travelling times 
imposed excessive.  Consequently, the predator banks left most of the branches they 
took over during the Amalgamation Movement open for business.  The number of 
bank branches in England and Wales actually increased between 1870 and 1920.
13
   
 
 Rendering explicit the economies needed to justify the Amalgamation 
Movement presented a problem for those in the banking industry who set out to 
justify the process at the time.  In 1896, an article in The Economic Journal claimed 
bank amalgamations yielded “a large reduction in working expenses” because “many 
economies are … possible in large concerns which are out of the question in small 
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  Its author’s attempt to identify the economies realised by bank 
amalgamations yielded just two examples, which related to an elimination of 
duplicated effort.  The first was that after the amalgamation a bank rarely found 
places on its board of directors for all of the amalgamating banks’ directors.  The 
second was that an amalgamated bank needed fewer messengers than its constituent 
parts had done to collect cheques from its neighbours.  No doubt, these cost savings 
existed although the release of a few directors and the elimination of some 
messengers would be too small a cost saving to justify a process of concentration that 
directed 80 per cent of all deposits taken in England and Wales into the coffers of 
just five banks.
15
  The economic historian Richard Grossman maintained the 
Amalgamation Movement was no exercise in cost minimisation.
16
  Similarly, Joseph 
Sykes concluded in 1926 that bank expenses increased during the Amalgamation 
Movement.  Sykes argued: 
In the case of expenses, it is apparent that the expected economies so 
often stressed in chairman’s speeches have not materialised, and 
consequently what was a strong argument in favour is actually a strong 
argument against [bank amalgamations]….  Most bankers still seem to 
consider that more economies than diseconomies have resulted, and 
consequently do not seem alive to the results of their actions.
17
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Recent studies suggest banks struggle to realise economies of scale or scope when 
they grow their branch networks.
18
  The administrative burden a large branch 
network imposes appears to make it inherently expensive to operate. 
 
The absence of apparent economies realised by the Amalgamation Movement 
raises an important question.  Why did a small number of banks administer large 
branch networks in England and Wales if a larger number of smaller banks could 
have provided the same geographical coverage at less cost?  Chapter Two supplied a 
partial answer to that question.  Scottish experience suggested that bigger banks were 
safer than smaller ones because they were less vulnerable to a run.  Consequently, 
bigger banks had competitive advantages that motivated the Amalgamation 
Movement.  However, there is another reason why the banks might have 
amalgamated.  An economist by the name of Ronald Coase developed a theory of the 
firm in the 1930s that offers insights into the advantages bestowed by an increase in 
firm size.  This theory helped to secure the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics for 
Coase.
19
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Coase was an unusual economist who studied business subjects alongside the 
economics he learned at the London School of Economics.  In 1932, Coase graduated 
with a Bachelor of Commerce rather than the Bachelor of Economics usually 
awarded to an aspiring professional economist.  Before he graduated, Coase spent 
time in the United States studying some large American manufacturing concerns; 
many of them the same firms Chandler’s would study later in the century.
20
  Coase 
also graduated at a time when the Soviet Union had embarked upon its experiment in 
economic planning.
21
  At the time, Coase was convinced that administering an 
enterprise as large as the Soviet economy would exhaust the competence of Stalin’s 
economic planners.  He thought economic planning undertaken on such a scale must 
result in economic inefficiency.  However, this not particularly insightful conclusion 
troubled Coase because of his encounters with real-world business practice.  Coase 
knew capitalist market economies utilised economic planning too.  The difference 
was merely a question of scale.  Economic planners administered an entire economy 
in the Soviet Union whereas planning occurred at the level of a firm in a capitalist 
economy.  The paradox of a capitalist market economy reliant on economic planning 
to allocate some of its resources prompted Coase to ask questions no other economist 
asked before.
22
  Questions like, ‘Why do firms exist?  And what stops them growing 
until they take over an entire economy?’  In 1937, Coase published his answers to 
those questions. 
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Coase argued market exchanges impose expenses called ‘transaction costs.’  A 
buyer and seller must negotiate the terms under which a market exchange will occur, 
for example, a process that takes time and requires insight into the alternatives on 
offer elsewhere.  Coase reasoned that firms avoid these transaction costs when their 
administrators allocate resources entrusted to their control.  Coase explained:
23
 
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to 
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.  The most obvious 
cost of ‘organising’ production through the price mechanism is that of 
discovering what the relevant prices are....  The costs of negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange ... must also be taken 
into account....  A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not 
have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-
operating within the firm, as would be necessary ... if this co-operation 
were a direct result of the working of the price mechanism.... 
 
Coase realised administering a firm is no cost-free exercise.  A firm has to invest in a 
managerial hierarchy that is expensive, prone to error and as much subject to the law 
of diminishing return as any other factor of production.
24
  The cost of achieving 
outcomes administratively will exceed the transaction costs avoided eventually.  
According to Coase, a rationally managed firm will grow when the transaction cost 
imposed by one more market exchange exceeds the cost of achieving the same 
outcomes administratively.  It will stop growing once the marginal transaction cost 
avoided equals the marginal cost of administration.   
  
This chapter argues the Amalgamation Movement was an exercise in the 
avoidance of transaction costs.  Banks amalgamated because the transaction costs 
imposed by the market exchanges increased because of the demise of the inland bill 
of exchange.  Banks evaded these escalating transaction costs, and so never incurred 
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them, by amalgamating.  The next section will explain how the market for inland 
bills allocated English and Welsh savings prior to 1870.  As Coase would have 
predicted, these market exchanges sustained the comparatively small banks found in 
England and Wales.  
 
BANK LENDING ON INLAND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
The Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 defined a bill of exchange as:   
...an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, 
signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is 
addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a 





A bill of exchange is a written order issued by a drawer directing the drawee to pay 
an amount either on demand or at some future date to a payee, to that payee’s order 
or to the bearer.  The drawee becomes the bill’s acceptor by indicating a willingness 
to obey the order.
26
  In addition, a bill becomes a negotiable (transferable) instrument 
if the acceptor agrees to make payment either to the payee’s order or to the bearer.  
Anyone holding a bill made payable to the bearer only has to relinquish possession 
of it to transfer the right to payment to someone else.  However, the payee of a bill 
made payable to a payee’s order has to endorse it to transfer the right to payment to 
an endorsee.  That endorsee can endorse the bill again in favour of another endorsee 
and this process can continue until the bill finally matures.
27
  A bill made payable to 
the payee’s order becomes more secure every time someone endorses it.  The drawer 
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and every subsequent endorser are liable to the holder in due course if the acceptor 
defaults.
28
  Section 4(2) of the 1882 Bills of Exchange Act made an important 
distinction. 
An inland bill is a bill which is or on the face of it purports to be (a) 
both drawn and payable within the British Islands, or (b) drawn within 





Inland bills generally owed their origins in domestic commercial transactions.  
Manufacturers and merchants drew and endorsed bills of exchange to acquire raw 
materials and finished goods on credit.
30
  Thus, inland bills of exchange offered a 
growing manufacturing economy both a source of short-term credit and a means of 
payment during the Industrial Revolution.  Lancashire’s cotton industry used bills of 





The holder of a bill of exchange could do more than hold it to maturity or 
endorse it to make a payment.  One could also obtain bank notes and coins for it by 
endorsing the bill in favour of someone who wanted to purchase it.  Anyone 
purchasing bill of exchange would expect a return on his or her outlay.  
Consequently, discounting (exchanging a bill for less than its value at maturity) 
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became standard practice because the discount generated interest.
32
  In theory, the 
size of the discount depended on the risk of default, prevailing rates of interest and 
the time it would take the bill to mature.  In practice, the usury laws limited the rate 
of discount to the equivalent of five per cent per annum until 1833 whereupon bills 
with less than three months to maturity gained an exemption.  Parliament extended 
that exemption to include bills with less than twelve months to maturity in 1837.
33
  
Anyone with money to spare could earn interest by discounting bills of exchange but 
banks discounted them more often than most.  According to the London and 
Westminster Bank’s general manager, James Gilbart, inland bills were “admirably 
adapted to the purposes of the bankers.”
34
   
 
One of a discounted bill’s great advantages to a bank was that it matured on a 
pre-determined date to offer certainty as to when the bank would receive payment.
35
  
In addition, bills offered security.  The identity of the bill’s acceptor, its drawer and 
its endorsers mattered because some were more liable to default than others were.  
However, inland bills arose from commercial transactions undertaken by business 
people who depended on each other’s solvency to stay in business.  That reality 
offered safeguards.  Reneging on a bill amounted to a public declaration of 
insolvency that most preferred not to make.  In addition, those who drew or endorsed 
the bill generally often did so to purchase inventories.  One could expect, but never 
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demand, that someone liable for the bill would sell their inventories eventually to 
generate the funds needed to pay the holder in due course.
36
  Finally, the number of 
parties liable for a bill increased every time it someone endorsed it.  As Adam Smith 
noted, the probability that every one of them would become bankrupt before the bill 
matured was slight.
37
   
 
A bank could do one of three things with the inland bills it discounted.  The 
first was to realise the interest provided by the discount and hold it to maturity.  
Alternatively, the bank could forgo that interest by endorsing a bill in one of two 
ways.  First, it could endorse the bill to make a payment to a customer, which put a 
bill carrying the bank’s endorsement back into circulation.  Reissuing a bill of 
exchange like this turned a substandard bill into a good one if the bank’s credit was 
good.
38
  Second, the bank could discount the bill again, a practice known as 
rediscounting, to generate funds.  Rediscounting became an indispensable feature of 
English and Welsh banking practice.  
 
Inland bills were not available to every bank in equal numbers.  Industrial 
districts like Lancashire and Yorkshire’s West Riding produced a large number of 
bills.  Banks in these places faced heavy demand from local businesspeople to 
discount bills for them.  Agriculture’s need for credit was seasonal and agriculture 
districts tended not to produce bills in large numbers.  A typical agricultural bank 
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confronted the relative absence of bills to discount.  The result was an imbalance in 
the demand for and supply of credit.  Industrial banks lacked the capacity to discount 
all the bills available to them.  Agricultural banks could not discount enough bills to 
keep their resources fully employed.
39
  What the banking industry needed was an 
intermediary that could utilise funds raised in agricultural districts to rediscount bills 
for the industrial banks.  That intermediary emerged in the form of the London bill 
market. 
 
Prior to 1825, English and Welsh industrial banks rediscounted their bills with 
its correspondent in London.  These London banks funded their rediscounting by 
rediscounting the bills again with their agricultural correspondents or by accepting 
deposits from them at call.  In addition, London’s native bill brokers traded in inland 
bills.  Bill brokers earned an interest return by rediscounting bills for industrial banks 
and financed their lending by rediscounting some of the bills acquired with the 
agricultural banks.
40
  By 1825, London was a conduit through which funds collected 
in agricultural districts flowed into the industrial districts playing host to the 
Industrial Revolution.  The nature and scale of the rediscounting undertaken in 
London changed dramatically after 1826.  The 1825 financial crisis showed 
London’s banking community that it could not rely on the Bank of England to 
rediscount bills for it in an emergency.
41
  London’s bankers decided inland bills of 
exchange made poor reserve assets under these circumstances and got out of the 
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  Furthermore, the Country Bankers Act of 1826 gave rise to 
a new generation of country joint stock banks whose shareholders demanded their 
banks deploy their capital profitably.  The volume of bills sent to London for 
rediscount increased as did the amount of funds sent there to rediscount them.
43
  
London’s bill brokers responded by scaling-up their rediscounting activities, which 
they now financed by offering interest to any bank willing to lend at call to them.
44
  
Gilbart explained the process as follows: 
A bank in an agricultural district, say at Norwich, has a superabundance 
of money.  A manufacturing town, say Manchester, has a demand for 
money.  The bank at Norwich will send is money to a bill broker in 
London.  The bank at Manchester will send its bills to the same broker ... 




The post-1826 bill market contained the risks associated with default on a bill.  
The bills rediscounted in London were comparatively safe to begin with, but the 
City’s bill brokers made them safer by becoming adept at distinguishing a good bill 
from a bad one.
46
  The result was a system of market exchanges that used funds 
raised in agricultural districts to sustain industrial lending at relatively low cost 
because the risk of default was low.
  
As Coase would have predicted, the relatively 
low transaction costs imposed by these market exchanges ensured English and Welsh 
banks remained small.
47
  In comparison, large banks were common in Scotland 
because the Scottish banks had a different relationship with their bills of exchange.  
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Scottish banks generally held the bills of exchange they discounted to maturity.
48
  In 
1838, an officer of the Western Bank of Scotland expressed his horror at the English 
and Welsh reliance on rediscounting in the following manner: 
It is hardly possible to imagine a system better calculated ... to bring 
joint stock banking into discredit with the public.  In this way banks ... 
are made dependent on the Jews and bill brokers of London; and the fate 
of the Northern and Central Bank of England is a notable and instructive 
example of the slender reliance which can be placed on such resources, 




Scottish banks did not did not need to rediscount because they possessed large 
branch networks that encompassed agricultural and industrial districts.  Scottish 
banks allocated Scotland’s savings administratively. 
 
SCOTLAND’S ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVE 
One problem with rediscounted bills of exchange as far as the Scots were concerned 
was that every bill rediscounted in London carried the bank’s endorsement.  
Rediscounting exposed a bank to risk because its endorsement added the bank to list 
of parties liable for the bill if the acceptor defaulted.
50
  More importantly, a financial 
crisis usually put London’s bill market under stress because industrial banks would 
send bills to London in greater numbers to raise the funds needed to stay afloat at 
precisely the same moment the agricultural banks withdrew the funds they sent to 
London to meet their obligations.
51
  Overreliance on rediscounting during a financial 
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crisis was something the Scottish banks preferred to avoid.  In 1838, the Bank of 
Scotland and the British Linen Company told the Board of Trade: 
The safeguard of the Scotch system has been the uniform practice 
adopted of retaining a large proportion of capital and deposits invested in 
government securities, capable of being converted into money, at all 
times and under all circumstances.  This requires sacrifice, because the 
rate of interest is small, and, in times of difficulty, the sale involves a loss, 
but it has given the Scotch banks absolute security, and enabled them to 




Scottish banks sustained their reluctance to rediscount bills of exchange 
because they maintained branches at far greater distances from their head offices 
than the English Welsh banks did.  As Gilbart noted, a Scottish branch network 
encompassed agricultural and industrial districts, which alleviated the need to 
rediscount.  He observed: 
The system of numerous branches enables the banks of Scotland to 
transfer the surplus capital of the agricultural districts to the 
manufacturing and commercial districts, without going through the 
process of rediscounting their bills.  ...A bank at Edinburgh will have 
branches in both the agricultural and the manufacturing districts….  [A] 
bank whose head office is in a manufacturing town, will have branches in 
the agricultural districts.  Thus, the surplus funds of Perth, Ayr, and 
Dumfries are speedily transferred to ... Glasgow, Paisley, and Dundee.  
Were a bank to be established at Glasgow without branches, it would 





Vincent Stuckey, made a similar point in 1841 before the Select Committee on banks 
of Issue.  Stuckey’s Bank was one of the few in England and Wales to possess a 
agricultural and industrial branches.  Stuckey’s Bank did not have to send funds to 
London because it took “as many bills of exchange as we wish to have … in our 
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  The Scottish reluctance to rediscount and the large branch 
networks that sustained it gave Scottish banks a degree of independence from London 
that facilitated another practice that was unique to Scotland.  The Scottish banks 
offered what they called ‘cash credits’ to their clients generously. 
 
First introduced by the Royal Bank of Scotland in 1728, a cash credit allowed 
the applicant to borrow up to a predetermined amount whenever he or she wished.  In 
return, the applicant supplied two or more guarantors who would repay the debt 
incurred if the applicant defaulted.  The Royal Bank of Scotland made a return on the 
funds lent by charging interest on any outstanding balance.
55
  The Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s initiative proved so effective at attracting business that the Bank of 
Scotland responded by offering them too in 1729.
56
  After that, cash credits became a 
universal feature of the Scottish banking system.
57
  David Hume praised cash credits 
as “one of the most ingenious ideas that has been executed in commerce.”
58
  Cash 
credits alleviated a Scottish business’ need to invest in unproductive cash balances by 
allowing it to draw on its cash credit to make a payment, which put more of its 
resources to productive use.
59
  Cash credits also offered the borrower flexibility.  The 
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borrower determined when he or she repaid the debt whereas the acceptor of a bill of 
exchange had to make the payment on a predetermined date.
60
   
 
Cash credits were less well adapted to a bank’s needs than inland bills of 
exchange because the former imposed uncertainties onto the banks granting them.  
The bank could not predict with accuracy when the borrower would make a 
withdrawal or a repayment on a cash credit.  For that reason, Adam Smith speculated 
the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Bank of Scotland only resorted to cash credits in 
the first place because Scotland’s pre-industrial economy failed to produce enough 
bills of exchange to keep their capital fully employed.
61
  English and Welsh bankers 
distrusted overdrafts (the closest equivalent they offered to a cash credit) because the 
bank granting them relinquished control over its lending.  In addition, overdrafts were 
not negotiable, which meant a bank could not sell them to generate cash when it 
needed to.  In 1848, the North and South Wales Bank’s George Rae compared 
lending on discounted bills to lending on overdrafts in the following terms: 
The safety of one particular account is one thing, the safety of the bank is 
quite another....  An ordinary drain upon a bank whose business was 
chiefly confined to the discount of legitimate business bills, could be met 
by simply contracting the volume of its discounts; but you do not 
necessarily diminish your existing overdrafts a single pound by refusing 
to grant fresh ones, or if the drain were too sudden and heavy to be met 
by the mere contraction of the discounts of the bank, a portion of its bills 
on hand might conceivably be converted into cash.  In the worst times ... 
good bills could be rediscounted at a price.
62
   
 
Mainland Britain played host to two alternative banking philosophies prior to 
1870.  In Scotland, large banks used their branch networks to allocated funds 
administratively, held onto their bills of exchange until maturity, maintained reserves 
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of liquid assets capable of conversion into cash at short notice to see them through a 
financial crisis and offered cash credits generously.  In England and Wales, smaller 
banks operated amidst a market-based system that depended upon rediscounting to 
sustain them.  Consequently, the English and Welsh banks offered overdrafts 
sparingly.  The English and Welsh banks paid a heavy price for their dependency on a 
bill market that was liable to run short of cash during a financial crisis.  The English 
and Welsh predilection for rediscounting contributed to financial crises in 1837-39, 
1847 and 1857 by putting the banks that engaged in it at greater risk.
63
  The 
fundamental problem was that someone or something other than the banks had to 
make good any shortfall of funds available in London during a financial crisis or a 
system based on market exchanges would collapse.
64
  The bill market needed a lender 
of last resort.  A reluctant Bank of England accepted that responsibility between 1830 
and 1858. 
 
REDISCOUNTING, FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND 
The Bank of England maintained a bill discounting business of its own although it 
preferred to discount the safest bills with the shortest terms to maturity and only 
accommodated those who met with its approval.  Banks surrendering their right to 
issue bank notes received generous discounting privileges from the Bank of England 
in the 1830s.
65
  The Bank of England refused to discount a bill bearing a joint stock 
bank of issue’s endorsement in 1836.
66
  However, London’s bill market received a 
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boost in 1830 when the Bank of England added a number of the City’s bill brokers to 
the list of those who could discount with it.
67
  By 1841, Thomas Tooke was telling 
the Select Committee on Banks of Issue, “The Bank [of England] are looked to as a 
constant resource by the great discount brokers” and added “it would have a 
prodigious effect if there were to be any forcible narrowing of discounts [by the Bank 
of England].”
68
  The London bill market now depended upon the Bank of England to 
carry it through a crisis. 
 
The government suspended the Bank Charter Act during financial crises in 1847 
and 1857, which gave the Bank of England the freedom to put as many bank notes 
into circulation as were needed to accommodate the banks’ and the bill market’s 
demand for liquidity.
69
  These experiences convinced the Bank of England that the 
London bill market and the banks that depended on it had become overly reliant on 
its facilities.  In 1858, the Bank of England announced that it would no longer 
discount bills for London’s bill brokers.  The intention was to promote financial 
stability.  The Bank of England hoped London’s bill brokers would commit more of 
their resources to liquid assets so they could weather the next financial storm without 
its help.
70
  The Bank of England soon discovered it had fired the first shot in a war 
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with London’s bill market.
71
  An exchange of pamphlets occurred in 1860 debating 
the relative merits of the Bank of England’s new policy.
72
  The war of words 
escalated in April 1860 when the largest bill broker in London took retaliatory action 
against the Bank of England.
73
  Overend and Gurney and its associates withdrew 
£1,650,000 in bank notes from the Bank of England in a single day.  Overend and 
Gurney timed the action to perfection.  The Bank had to curtail its lending to keep its 
bank note issue within the limits imposed on it by the Bank Charter Act.  Having 
made a point, Overend and Gurney returned the bank notes withdrawn.  Six years 
later, the Bank of England took its revenge upon Overend and Gurney. 
 
Overend and Gurney failed in 1866 after coming under the control of a new 
generation of proprietors who breached one of the cardinal rules of the bill 
discounting business.
74
  The new owners invested in railway securities and other 
long-term investments that would generate returns slowly and prove difficult to sell in 
an emergency even though most of their liabilities were payable at call.  Eventually, 
the new policy demanded an injection of cash to sustain it.  In July 1865, Overend 
and Gurney’s proprietors took the radical step of incorporating their business as a 
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limited liability company and sold shares to the public.  Unfortunately, the move 
proved inadequate to stave off disaster.  In May 1866, Overend and Gurney’s share 
price collapsed after word of its unresolved cash flow problems reached the public, 
which prompted a run against Overend and Gurney.  Overend and Gurney appealed to 
the Bank of England for assistance but to no avail.  On 10 May 1866, Overend and 
Gurney suspended payments.  The impending collapse of what The Times called “the 
greatest instrument for credit in kingdom” provoked a widespread financial panic.
75
  
On Black Friday (11 May 1866), a crowd besieged Lombard Street whilst a run on 
the country banks developed in the provinces.  The Bank of England stepped into the 
breach by meeting demands for accommodation from those who offered good 
security although doing so induced a rise in the rates of interest charged.  The 
government suspended the Bank Charter Act for the third and final time.   
 
The failure of Overend and Gurney on Black Friday was a watershed event for 
the English and Welsh trade in inland bills of exchange.  The number of inland bills 
sent to London for rediscount went into decline soon afterwards, as did the number of 
bills drawn and discounted in the provinces.  The small banks of provincial England 
and Wales were about to lose the market exchanges that sustained their operations.   
 
THE DECLINING MARKET FOR INLAND BILLS 
The financial crises of 1857 and 1866 put any bank deemed over reliant on London’s 
bill market into disrepute.  Rediscounting became a practice utilised by what one 
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banking historian called a “second-rate bank.”
76
  William Fowler (1828-1905), a 
financier and parliamentarian, told the Institute of Bankers in 1891: 
After the panic of 1857 was over, I remember particularly well there was 
a great change in the management of the banks all over England, and I 
know it in this way:  The great business of our house
 
about 1857 was re-
discounting for country banks.  That business rapidly reduced after 1857 
because banks felt the imprudence of having such a mass of bills that they 
could not hold themselves, and therefore they kept more money in 
London than they previously had....  But the process went on far more 
rapidly after 1866....  Those lessons have never been forgotten and the 





The industrial banks’ did not stop rediscounting overnight.  They were too reliant on 
the practice to do that.  Instead, industrial bank sent fewer bills to London as time 
progressed although the dependency on rediscounting persisted in some places.  As 
late as 1885, George Rae’s The Country Banker continued to express its author’s 
conviction that rediscounting remained a legitimate practice for banks “placed in 
districts of great industrial activity where deposit money is scarce and the demand 
for loan capital is great.”
78
  However, rediscounting entailed risks that many banks 
now preferred to avoid.  Black Friday demonstrated that inland bills of exchange 
could be unreliable reserve assets in times of crisis.
79
   
 
London’s bill brokers traded in other securities to keep their resources occupied 
as the number of inland bills of exchange sent to them for rediscount declined.  The 
number of foreign bills available in London for discount increased because of an 
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expansion in global trade.
80
  In addition, the Treasury Bills Act of 1877 introduced a 
new short-term government security known as the Treasury Bill.
81
  Treasury Bills 
resembled bills of exchange by changing hands at a discount to generate interest.
82
  
An increase in deposits (see Chapter Three) also contributed to the decline in number 
of inland bills sent to London by making industrial banks less reliant on rediscounting 
to fund their operations.  By the 1870s, an average Lancashire bank could finance its 
lending out of its own resources for the first time because it collected more on 
deposits than it lent.
83
  In 1875, Rae boasted that Liverpool’s banks now possessed “a 
great deal more [money] than we can employ at home,” which made them “very large 
lenders in the London market.”
84
  Inland bills of exchange became so scarce in 
London that the City’s bill brokers had to appoint provincial agents to chase them 
down on their home turf.
85
   
 
We will never know the number bills of exchange drawn in the provinces or 
discounted by industrial banks during the last decades of the nineteenth century.  
Those involved in these activities generally did not record these quantities with the 
intention of communicating them to the outside world.  However, estimates based on 
the amount of stamp duty paid for them suggest that the stock of inland bills drawn 
and hence available to the industrial banks for discount also went into decline after 
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  Significantly, a change in the English and Welsh banks’ lending practices 
contributed to that decline.  English and Welsh banks overcame their reluctance to 
offer overdrafts.   
 
English and Welsh overdrafts were similar to Scottish cash credits in most 
respects but one.  Those who borrowed on overdraft offered the bank security but did 
not rely on guarantors to do it.
87
  Overdrafts accorded an English or Welsh borrower 
all the advantages of Scottish cash credits because the borrower could draw on it and 
repay it at their convenience.  In addition, an overdraft gave the borrower access to 
coins, bank notes, cheques and telegraphic transfers to make a payment.  The capacity 
to make immediate payment gave borrowers bargaining power when they made a 
purchase.  The borrower did not have to offer the seller compensation for a delay in 
payment as would have been the case if they had utilised a bill of exchange.  
Consequently, overdrafts bestowed the capacity to negotiate cash discounts that offset 
some of the interest expense incurred on the funds borrowed.
88
  English and Welsh 
borrowers had good reasons to prefer overdrafts to bills of exchange as a source of 
credit.  The problem they faced was persuading their banks to give up their 
preference for lending on bills of exchange.  However, the English and Welsh banks’ 
attitude towards overdrafts softened during the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century.  The result was an increase in the proportion of cash payments made with a 
consequent decline in the number of bills of exchange drawn.  A text originally 
published in 1891 carrying the endorsement of the Institute of Bankers observed:  
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The conditions under which business is carried out … is gradually 
changing.  There is reason to believe that each year more and more 
transactions are conducted on a cash-basis, and that the number of bills 
created now bears a steadily diminishing ratio of the volume of 
commerce.  Instead of settling by bill, a growing preference appears to 
be shown for payment by cheque or cable-transfer….  Scarcity of bills 
… is substantiated by the fact that bankers now hold fewer bills in 
proportion to other assets
 




The increase in cash payments sent the number of inland bills of exchange drawn into 
decline after 1870.
90
  The result was a decline in the number of bills of exchange 
available to the English and Welsh banks. 
  
The move away from bills of exchange towards overdraft lending and cash 
payments coincided with the English and Welsh Amalgamation Movement.  Both 
events began around 1870.  It is tempting to impute a causal relationship between the 
two events given their temporal proximity.  In the 1930s, W. T. C. King did precisely 
that when he argued: 
By far the most important of these new influences [on the increase in cash 
payments] was the bank amalgamation movement, bringing with it a great 
expansion of branch banking, and enabling many banks each to perform 
within its own organisation the ‘equalising’ function for which the bill 
market had previously been indispensable….  This development, by 
enabling the bigger banks to finance from the deposits of their 
‘agricultural’ branches the demands of their ‘industrial’ branches 
removed one of the principle reasons for the use of the bill as the standard 
instrument of accommodation.  From many points of view, it became a 
matter of indifference to the banks whether they financed their customers 
by discounting bills for them or by granting loans and advances, and to 
the customers the flexibility of the overdraft system had definite 
attractions.  Thus, the spread of branch banks was accompanied in many 
trades by a gradual displacement of the internal bill by the ‘open credit’ 




Similarly, W. M. Scammell asserted in 1968: 
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The main reason for this decline [in inland bills of exchange] lay in the 
changes taking place ... in the structure of the banking system.  The old 
unitary [single office] banking system of the first part of the nineteenth 
century was giving way to a concentrated banking system working 
through a branch network.  This made easy the transference of ... funds 
from district to district and enabled the old ‘equalising function’ 
performed by ... the practice of rediscounting, to be superseded.  The 
overdraft loan became common as means of financing short-term trade 




King’s hypothesis was that the Amalgamation Movement created the branch 
networks needed to link industrial regions with agricultural ones.  Bank 
amalgamations fostered an internal transfer of funds that changed the English and 
Welsh banks’ lending practices.  English and Welsh banks could now offer overdrafts 
liberally just as the Scottish banks offered cash credits because like the Scottish 
banks, the English and Welsh banks no longer needed to rediscount their bills of 
exchange to fund their operations.  According to King, the Amalgamation Movement 
facilitated a growth in overdraft lending, which increased the number of cash 
payments made to force the number of inland bills drawn into terminal decline. 
 
King’s claim the Amalgamation Movement caused the demise of the inland bill 
became an often-repeated conventional wisdom until 1971 when Shizuya Nishimura 
identified two significant weaknesses that undermined its credibility.
93
  First, bills 
were a far more convenient lending option than overdrafts for the banks.  Both 
Gilbart and Rae asserted that a bank could constrict to lending on bills at will by 
simply refusing to discount them.
94
  In addition, bills of exchange matured relatively 
quickly and a bank could rediscount them if the need arose.  According to Nishimura, 
no bank would have been indifferent as to whether it lent on bills of exchange or 
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offered overdrafts.  A change in the relative bargaining power of borrowers vis-a-vis 
the banks must have compelled the change in lending practices because the English 
and Welsh banks would not have welcomed the demise of the inland bill of exchange.  
The second weakness in the King hypothesis Nishimura identified related to a 
question of timing.  The number of inland bills drawn in England and Wales started 
to decline in the 1870s; and yet, the Amalgamation Movement failed to produce the 
truly national branch networks needed to connect agricultural and industrial districts 
until the 1890s.  Nishimura argued the demise of the inland bill could not have 
preceded its alleged cause by two decades.  Nishimura cited the following example to 
make this point: 
Banks in Lancashire and Yorkshire kept comparatively aloof from the 
bank amalgamation movement.  Since it was from Lancashire and the 
West Riding of Yorkshire that the greater part of inland bills were sent to 
London…, the linking of Lancashire and West Riding banks with those in 
‘agricultural’ areas would have been necessary for the use of inland bills 
as a means of the transfer of money to have effectively discontinued.  
Nothing of the sort happened save in one case, that of the amalgamation 
of Parr’s Bank, originally of Warrington in Lancashire, with Stuckey’s 
Banking Company in Somerset.  This fusion is an ideal case for King’s 





According to Nishimura, the Amalgamation Movement had not caused the increase in 
overdraft lending and cash payments.  The Amalgamation Movement may have 
proceeded in parallel with the demise of the inland bill but the two developments 
were unrelated.   
 
This thesis argues Nishimura was right to claim the decline in the inland bill 
preceded the national branch networks needed to account for it.  However, Nishimura 
was wrong to dismiss the notion that a causal relationship linked the Amalgamation 
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Movement and the inland bill’s decline.  The intention is not to resurrect King’s 
hypothesis.  The Amalgamation Movement did not cause the decline of the inland 
bill.  Instead, the decline of the inland bill turned participation in the Amalgamation 
Movement into a necessity.  As Coase would have predicted, the loss of a means of 
market exchanges that imposed low transaction costs created the need for an 
administrative alternative to allocate the English and Welsh banking system’s 
resources.  The demise of the inland bill of exchange was a cause of the 
Amalgamation Movement because it necessitated an increase in average English and 
Welsh bank size to access the reserves needed to survive a financial crisis. 
 
BANK RESERVES AND THE AMALGAMATION MOVEMENT 
Nishimura ascribed the demise of the inland bill to two causes.
96
  The first was the 
increase in deposits alluded to earlier that put an end to the industrial banks’ 
dependency on rediscounting.  This first cause was a necessary precondition for the 
rise in cash payments because without it, industrial banks would have continued to 
rediscount and could not have funded the overdrafts they offered.  The second was 
suppressed demand for industrial credit brought about by the late nineteenth-century 
Great Depression and improvements in transport and communications that reduced 
the need to hold inventories to act as a buffer against uncertainty.  This second 
development forced the banks to offer overdrafts to stimulate their lending, which set 
up a vicious circle.  More overdrafts increased the number of cash payments made, 
which reduced the number of bills drawn, which forced banks to offer more 
overdrafts to compensate until finally cash payments predominated and the number of 
bills of exchange drawn and made available for discount became insignificant.   
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If Nishimura was right to ascribe the demise of the inland bill to an increase in 
deposits coupled with suppressed demand for industrial credit, then one might ask 
why industrial banks bothered to participate in the Amalgamation Movement.  
Industrial banks had no need to join forces with banks in agricultural districts if their 
growing deposits financed their lending.  Nishimura based his analysis on the ratio of 
reported bank lending to deposits, which provided him with an indicator of a region’s 
capacity to sustain its lending from local sources.
97
  As one would expect, the ratios 
of lending to deposits were highest in the industrial districts and lowest in agricultural 
districts and in London where most of the banking system’s reserves resided.  In 
1870, London’s joint stock banks and their agricultural counterparts maintained 
lending to deposit ratios below 80 per cent whereas the ratios in Lancashire, 
Yorkshire, Northumberland, Country Durham, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Staffordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire all exceeded 100 per cent.  These 
ratios fell across the whole of England and Wales after 1870.  By 1895, London and 
the agricultural districts reported lending to deposit ratios below 60 per cent whilst 
the ratios in the industrial regions ranged from a low of 64.9 per cent for Derbyshire, 
Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire to a high of 82.1 
per cent in Yorkshire’s woollen and worsted districts.  The industrial banks of 
England and Wales did not need amalgamation partners to fund their lending under 
these circumstances.  Industrial banks funded own their lending out of their deposits 
at the height of the Amalgamation Movement.    
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Nishimura’s analysis failed to explore how the banks responded to an ever-
decreasing proportion of discounted bills of exchange held as their overdraft lending 
grew.  The ratio of lending to deposits fell across the board, which forced some banks 
to reassess their attitude to risky lending opportunities that bankers traditionally 
avoided.  Banks preferred not to invest in or lend against stocks as shares, for 
example, because finding buyers for them in times of financial distress would incur a 
significant loss.
98
  In 1879, a work carrying the title Banking Reform:  An Essay on 
Prominent Banking Dangers and the Remedies they Demand observed that the 
English and Welsh banks’ exposure to securities listed on the stock exchanges was 
rising.  The author attributed this development to the declining availability of inland 
bills of exchange and the growth in deposits taken.
99
  The text’s author argued: 
It is not … prudent banking to lock up in ... stock exchange securities any 
portion of money which is liable to be called up by its owners.  That 
money ought to be in bills, in securities which represent commodities 
continually changing hands and undergoing realisation, securities which 
are therefore continually bringing the money back again into the banker’s 
hands.  If through a dearth of these, or from any other cause, a banker 
buys interest-bearing stock to large amounts, or lends money on such 
stock pawned with him as security, he at once places himself in a position 
of having to face indefinite losses in the event of a forced realisation.
100
    
 
Cashed-up banks were struggling to find suitable outlets to keep their funds fully 
employed because of the decline in the number of bills of exchange drawn and 
discounted. 
 
Some banks may have started to invest imprudently to compensate for the 
decline in the inland bill of exchange but others faced problems of a different kind.  
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Banks no longer sent bills of exchange to London as frequency as they had done in 
the past, but sending them there in an emergency remained an option when the need 
arose.  In addition, bills matured comparatively quickly to furnish funds at relatively 
short notice.
101
  Inland bills of exchange remained an inherently liquid form of 
lending that could generate cash at short notice.  However, the proportion of bills of 
exchange discounted relative to the amounts lent on overdrafts declined after 1870.  
An examination of two banks’ balance sheets (one urban the other rural) presented in 
Banking Reform:  An Essay on Prominent Banking Dangers and the Remedies they 
Demand formed the basis of a startling observation: 
In 1873, the cash and bills of these two banks amounted to 73 per cent of 
the liabilities to the public, but at the end of ... [1877], they were equal to 
about 43½ per cent.  These banks have therefore locked up their capital 
and available assets to an enormous extent in advances … [and 




The essay’s author warned these two banks typified many in England and Wales that 
would struggle to raise the liquidity needed to survive the next financial crisis if the 
proportion of cash and bills relative to advances and overdrafts continued to fall.  He 
concluded his depiction of a banking industry struggling to adapt to the early stages 
of the inland bill’s demise as follows: 
The supplies of real cash kept in hand by bankers have been dwindling ... 
at the same time the floating balance available for discount purposes has 
been almost valueless.  Banks are drifting towards catastrophe, one may 
almost say without being aware of it.  They have striven to make high 
profits in dull times and in channels not safe for bankers, and they have 
succeeded, but at a cost which only those who survive the next credit 
storm will be able to estimate.   
 
The warning that the banking system was heading for a liquidity-induced 
catastrophe because of the loss of the inland bill of exchange mirrored concerns 
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expressed elsewhere by those who recalled Black Friday with horror.  In 1873, 
Walter Bagehot’s Lombard Street called upon the Bank of England to embrace the 
role of lender of last resort wholeheartedly and without hesitation.
103
  Bagehot argued 
the Bank of England should step into the breach at the first sign of financial distress 
and follow two rules.   
First ... loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest.  This 
will operate as a heavy fine ... and will prevent the greatest number of 
applications by persons who do not require it.  The rate should be raised 
early in the panic, so that ... no one may borrow out of idle precaution 
without paying well for it.... 
 
Secondly ... these advances should be made on all good banking 
securities....  The reason is plain.  The object is to stay alarm, and nothing 
therefore should be done to cause alarm.  But the way to cause alarm is to 
refuse someone who has good security to offer....  If it is known that the 
Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary times is 
reckoned a good security ... the alarm of the solvent ... will be stayed.  
But if securities, really good and usually convertible, are refused by the 





Bagehot’s prescription constituted no act of charity on the Bank of England’s behalf.  
Bagehot’s recommendation would deny assistance to the opportunistic and the 
insolvent by charging them high rates of interest and demanding they furnish good 
security for the amounts they borrowed.
105
  Nevertheless, his advice would make the 
Bank of England the ultimate guarantor of the banking system’s liquidity in an 
emergency.  Whether the Bank of England could or even should follow Bagehot’s 
advice remained open to question.
106
  In 1881, The Times warned Bagehot asked too 
much the Bank of England:  
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For many years the necessity of a cash reserve somewhere has been 
acknowledged by bankers, and especially by the leading bank in this 
country, the Bank of England; and since Mr Bagehot’s ‘Lombard Street’ 
the recognition of this necessity has become an accepted part of banking 
theory....  But there is a peculiarity in our market and in this lies both the 
secret of the actual weakness of our reserve and the unwillingness of the 
leading … banks to accept their responsibility … [because] … our 
leading banks make themselves virtually dependant on the Bank of 
England….  The Bank of England ... cannot keep a sufficient reserve for 
the wants of our banking system....  Let the leading banks meet together, 
agree how to keep a cash reserve for themselves and put an end to their 





English and Welsh banks were under pressure to maintain greater reserves of 
liquidity.  The loss of an inherently liquid asset like the inland bill of exchange 
would have exasperated the need for greater liquidity. 
 
The scale of the banking industry’s latent liquidity problem became apparent 
in 1878/79 after the City of Glasgow Bank collapsed in October in 1878 and the 
West of England and South Wales District Bank failed in December of the same 
year.  Michael Collins indicated that banks located in industrial districts, where the 
difference between the amounts they collected on deposits and the amounts they lent 
left the smallest margins for error, proved most vulnerable.
108
  In Leeds, the 
Yorkshire Banking Company lost 28 per cent of its deposits and its bank note issue 
contracted by 16 per cent between June 1878 and June 1879.  The bank only 
survived the run by curtailing its lending, rediscounting bills of exchange and 
borrowing from its London correspondent and the Bank of England.  Similarly, the 
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North and South Wales Bank reduced its lending by 29 per cent between June 1878 
and June 1879 and borrowed from its London correspondent to accommodate the 
contraction in its deposits.
109
  Many banks in the industrial North and the Midlands 
suffered because they lacked the cash reserves needed to absorb the shock to the 
banking system.
110
  These banks survived by reducing their lending and/or 
borrowing the funds they needed to meet their obligations at a time when the 
banking system as a whole came perilously close to succumbing to another general 
panic.
111
   
 
What the English and Welsh banking system needed was a substitute for the 
inland bill of exchange, one that made the liquidity accumulated in agricultural 
districts subject to low demand for credit available to those in the industrial districts 
where the demand for credit was high it to meet their obligations in an emergency.  
Achieving that outcome entailed taking one of two courses of action.  Either the 
English and Welsh banks created another system of market exchanges to replace the 
trade in inland bills of exchange or they adopted the Scottish administrate solution 
and erected geographically dispersed branch networks instead.  Creating a market-
based alternative to the market for inland bills of exchange would have presented 
insurmountable problems.  Inland bills of exchange were essentially other people’s 
debts.  Banks only became liable for the bills of exchange they rediscounted if the 
bills’ acceptors, drawers and other endorsers defaulted.
112
  A poorly managed bank 
might collapse under these circumstances and the bills of exchange it rediscounted in 
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London would still mature if the bills were good.  The loss of the bill of exchange 
meant that banks would now have to lend to each other directly to engage in market 
exchanges.  A poorly managed bank could impose significant loss on those who lent 
to it if it failed, which meant those lending to it would have to protect their interests 
somehow.  Lenders could demand high rates of interest to compensate for the risks 
involved, impose contractual clauses designed to protect the lender’s interests and 
monitor the compliance with them or demand the borrower furnish collateral the 
lender could sell if the borrower defaulted.
113
  Consequently, a system of market 
exchanges based on inter-bank lending would have imposed transaction costs that 
the trade in inland bills avoided.  An active market based on direct inter-bank 
lending never emerged even though one banker identified a need for one to avoid the 
commissions charged by London’s bill brokers as early as 1840.
114
   
 
The English and Welsh banks did lend funds to each other on occasion.  
Country banks maintained deposits with their London correspondents for example.  
These London banks even allowed their country correspondents to run up overdrafts 
with them although the London banks generally frowned upon those who failed to 
furnish adequate security to cover their debts.
115
  Nevertheless, the scale of the inter-
bank lending involved ultimately proved insufficient to resolve the industry’s 
liquidity problems.  The English and Welsh banks adopted an administrative solution 
to compensate for the demise of the inland bill of exchange. 
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THE ENGLISH AND WELSH ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION 
The Spectator noted in 1918 that the English and Welsh Amalgamation Movement 
proceeded geographically.  Banks sought amalgamation partners to obtain a foothold 
in neighbouring districts until finally the largest of them occupied the whole of 
England and Wales.
116
  The Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations made a 
similar observation in the same year.
117
  Banks located in agricultural and industrial 
districts joined forces with each other and with banks domiciled in London until they 
created the national branch networks needed to mobilise liquidity administratively.  
This development put the industry’s private banks at a distinct disadvantage.  The 
Joint Stock Bank Companies Act of 1857 may have permitted a private bank to 
expand its membership from of six to ten proprietors,
118
 but most remained too small 
to pursue a strategy based on geographical expansion.  Consequently, private banks 
ranked amongst the first banks taken over during the Amalgamation Movement.
119
  
The number of private banks in England and Wales fell from 248 in 1870 to just 81 
by 1900.  In contrast, the number of English and Welsh joint stock banks in the same 
years was 117 and 83 respectively.
120
   
 
Bank amalgamations yielded a convergence in lending to deposit ratios across 
England and Wales as administration displaced market exchanges as the primary 
means of transferring funds.  In 1880, banks in London and the agricultural districts 
of England and Wales lent less than 70 per cent of their deposits whilst the average 
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for the banking system as a whole stood at 72.9 per cent.  Banks domiciled in 
industrial districts lent more than this average.  Lancashire’s banks reported lending 
to deposit ratios of 85.9 per cent.  The ratio in Yorkshire was as high as 112.8 per 
cent.
121
  These regional differences narrowed considerably as the lending to deposit 
ratio fell across England and Wales.  In 1913, an average English and Welsh bank 
only lent 65.4 per cent its deposits.  Lancashire’s banks exceeded this average 
slightly by lending 68.9 per cent of their deposits.  The ratio in Derbyshire, 
Nottinghamshire, the Black Country, Yorkshire and Newcastle-upon-Tyne was 71.1 
per cent.  At the same time, banks in London and the other English and Welsh 
districts reported ratios of 64.6 per cent and 64.1 per cent respectively.
122
  The 
Amalgamation Movement was yielding a banking system in which regional 
differences in bank lending rates disappeared as the banks took on an increasingly 
national character.  The proportion of deposits retained by the banks to accumulate 
their reserves now varied far less than it had done in the past. 
 
Banks located in those places where the inland bills remained available for 
discount in sufficiently high quantities to function as a viable reserve asset retained 
their independence longer than most.  As Nishimura asserted, banks located “in 
Lancashire and Yorkshire” did indeed keep “comparatively aloof” from the 
Amalgamation Movement for longer than banks located in other districts.
123
  
Lancashire and Yorkshire were textile districts, the traditional stronghold of the 
inland bill of exchange.  Banks in these counties ranked amongst the last in England 
and Wales to fall prey to the Amalgamation Movement because they retained the 
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option of lending on bills of exchange, and rediscounting them when needed, longer 
than most.  At first, banks in these regions only merged with each other, usually to 
deny outsiders an amalgamation target needed to access the lending opportunities on 
offer in their districts.
124
  In 1904, a proposed merger between the Manchester and 
Liverpool District Bank and Lloyds Bank, for example, collapsed due to opposition 
from the Manchester and Liverpool District’s shareholders, the local business 
community and the public.
125
  However, the northern banks succumbed to the 
realities imposed by the decline in the inland bill of exchange in the end.   
 
In 1900, Lloyds acquired the Liverpool Union Bank in an amalgamation that 
became a necessity according to Liverpool Union’s chair because “the growth in our 
deposits has not kept anything like pace with ... [our] ... lending opportunities.”
126
  
The imbalance between deposits and the amounts lent presented no problem in the 
past.  The Liverpool Union Bank had a long history of lending more than it 
collected.
127
  However, the proportion lent on bills of exchange was declining, which 
meant the Liverpool Union now needed a larger deposit base to sustain its lending 
whilst maintaining an adequate reserve.  Similarly, Parr’s Bank expanded from 
Lancashire in 1909 to absorb Stuckey’s Banking Company in the deposit-rich county 
of Somerset.
128
  In 1914, the Vice President of the Institute of Bankers declared, 
“There would be no reason for surprise if some predominantly northern bank were to 
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amalgamate with some prominently southern bank.”
129
  He was right.  In 1918, 
Parr’s Bank merged with the London County and Westminster Bank in an 
amalgamation that benefited both parties.  The chair of Parr’s board of directors 
declared, “We gain access to a very large area in the Home Counties.  They gain a 
first-class introduction to Lancashire and to such leading towns in the Midlands as 
Leicester and Derby and a very valuable connection in the West of England.”
130
  
Barclays Bank acquired the Union Bank of Manchester one year later, although 
Barclays stopped short of an amalgamation.  This time, Barclays Bank was unsure 
whether the authorities would approve an amalgamation so soon after Treasury 
Committee on Bank Amalgamations.  Barclays took a cautious approach to the 
proposed merger with the Union Bank of Manchester in 1919.  It only asked for 
permission to acquire the Union Bank of Manchester Bank as its affiliate.  Treasury 
acquiesced to the request, which ensured a the Union Bank of Manchester remained 
Barclays’ affiliate until 1939 when Barclays finally obtained the permission it had 
always wanted to absorb it in an amalgamation.
131
   
 
Industrial banks participated in the Amalgamation Movement to accumulate 
reserves.  They did not need a bigger deposit base to fund their lending because their 
lending to deposit ratios had already fallen below 100 per cent.  The industrial 
banks’ problem was accumulating the liquid assets needed to survive a crisis.  These 
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banks could have built those reserves by restricting their lending or they could 
amalgamate with a bank that lent a smaller proportion of its deposits and had 
liquidity to spare.  King was right to claim large branch networks substituted for bills 
of exchange by performing the ‘equalising’ function undertaken previously by 
London’s bill brokers.
132
  However, King was wrong to argue the Amalgamation 
Movement caused the decline of the inland bill of exchange.  The opposite 
happened.  The inland bill of exchange went into decline whereupon the banking 
industry turned to an increase in firm size to compensate for the loss of a valuable 
reserve asset.  The ‘visible hand’ of administrative coordination compensated for the 
loss of the inland bill of exchange to effect a rational distribution of the banking 
industry’s reserves.  Administration made the industry’s reserves of liquid assets 
available to every part of England and Wales.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Amalgamation Movement resolved the problems created by the demise of the 
inland bill of exchange.  Agricultural banks lost the market exchanges that used to 
keep their deposits gainfully employed.  These banks had funds to spare and needed 
access to the lending opportunities on offer in industrial districts.  Industrial banks 
lost an inherently liquid debt instrument.  They needed access to the deposits raised 
by in agricultural districts to maintain an adequate reserve.  The agricultural and 
industrial banks merged because amalgamations accorded with their mutual interest 
at a time when both lost the option of engaging in market exchanges with each other.  
The Amalgamation Movement supplied an administrative solution to the liquidity 
problems created by the decline of the inland bill of exchange.  
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A reserve of liquid assets capable of conversion into a means of payment at 
short notice became increasingly important as the Amalgamation Movement 
progressed.  In 1913, the Midland Bank’s Sir Edward Holden explained that one 
should conceive of a bank as an isosceles triangle.  The left side of the triangle 
represented “balances … repayable on demand or at short notice.”
133
  The bank owed 
these amounts to its depositors, its bank note holders and its other creditors.  The right 
hand side of the triangle represented the amounts lent on discounted bills, overdrafts, 
advances and other loans that generated interest.  In theory, Holden argued, a bank 
might increase its lending “ad libitum” to extend the right hand side of its triangle 
“indefinitely” if it were not for the fact that doing so undermined the creditors’ 
confidence in the bank’s capacity to pay its debts to them when they fell due.
134
  A 
bank had to invest in a reserve of liquidity to act as a buffer against uncertainty.  
Liquid assets at “the base of the triangle” were necessary, Holden said, to meeting 
“any want of confidence that might arise” amongst a bank’s creditors.
135
   
 
The next chapter will explain that the banking industry underwent a widespread 
conversion to a regime of limited shareholder liability during the 1880s, which meant 
the industry’s creditors could no longer rely on its shareholders to compensate them 
when a bank failed.  An adequate reserve of liquid assets became increasingly 
important because it offered creditors an assurance that the bank could not fail.  The 
adoption of limited liability delivered the final blow to the small regional banks that 
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populated English and Welsh banking prior to the Amalgamation Movement.  
Limited liability ensured competitive advantage swung even further towards large 
banks imbued with the reserves of liquid assets needed to assure the public that they 






THE AMALGAMATION MOVEMENT AND THE 
CONVERSION TO LIMITED LIABILITY 
The directors of … companies … being the managers ... of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 




The Amalgamation Movement reached its peak in the 1890s.  This chapter argues the 
banking industry’s conversion to a regime of limited liability in the 1880s 
contributed to that peak by accelerating the rate at which bank amalgamations 
occurred.  Limited liability imposed greater risk onto those who had the power to 
break a bank.  A bank would exhaust its reserves very quickly if its depositors 
panicked and demanded it redeem its obligations to them.  In theory, limited liability 
should have made a bank even more vulnerable to this kind of run because the banks’ 
creditors could no longer rely on the proprietors to compensate them if their bank 
failed.  A bank of limited liability had two courses of action open to it to reduce the 
risks it imposed on their creditors.  The first was to reduce the creditors’ exposure to 
loss by demanding their proprietors contribute more paid-up and uncalled capital.  
Paid-up capital reduced a bank’s reliance on debt making it less likely to fail.  
Uncalled capital created a resource that creditors could draw upon if the bank did 
fail.  The alternative was to invest in liquid asset reserves to offer creditors the 
reassurance that the bank would always meet its obligations in the first place.  
Reliance on paid-up and uncalled capital proved unacceptable to the banking 
industry’s shareholders.  Banks that demanded shareholders furnish paid-up and 
uncalled capital disappeared during the Amalgamation Movement.  The banks that 
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put their faith in liquid assets were the Amalgamation Movement’s survivors.  These 
banks prospered because they offered their creditors security without overburdening 
their shareholders.   
 
The banks of limited liability also turned to bureaucracy to eliminate the risk of 
loss through fraud, incompetence and other forms of employee misconduct.  The 
amalgamating banks imposed rules and regulations designed to constrain their 
employees’ freedom of action.  This focus on employee conduct was the product the 
‘agency problem’ created by the danger that those who control an enterprise will 
pursue their self-interests rather than the interests of their stakeholders.  The chapter 
begins with an examination of the agency problems associated with the 
administration of a joint stock bank. 
 
BANKS AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
Those who administer a joint stock institution of any kind often operate under a 
moral hazard.
2
  They can promote their interests whilst leaving other people to pay 
for their self-indulgence.  In February 1856, for example, John Sadlier (1813–1856) 
took prussic acid on Hampstead Heath.
3
  Sadlier appeared a man of sound business 
judgment before he died.  This Irish-born resident of London represented an Irish 
constituency in parliament, oversaw the conversion of his family’s private bank into 
the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank, served on the boards of several companies and 
secured a term as chair of the London and County Joint Stock Bank.  He had even 
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been a junior minister in Lord Aberdeen’s (1784-1860) coalition government.
4
  
However, Sadlier funded his apparent success fraudulently.  He depended upon his 
younger brother’s influence at the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank to borrow funds whilst 
his brother falsified the bank’s accounts.
5
  Eventually, John Sadlier’s debts drove the 
Tipperary into insolvency.
6
  John committed suicide to avoid a scandal and his 
brother James Sadlier (1815-1881) fled to the continent four months later.
7
  The 
Tipperary’s shareholders paid a heavy price for the Sadlier brothers’ 
maladministration because their bank was a creature of unlimited liability.  These 
shareholders compensated the bank’s creditors for the losses the Sadliers imposed.
8
  
Banks of unlimited liability like the Tipperary were the norm in for much of the 
nineteenth century.  Most of the Scottish joint stock banks were banks of unlimited 
liability.  The Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen 
Company were the only exceptions.  Every English and Welsh private bank and the 
joint stock banks established under the Country Bankers Act of 1826 were banks of 
unlimited liability too.   
 
The villain in Charles Dickens’ (1812-1870) Little Dorrit was a private banker 
respected by the “weightiest of men.”
9
  Unfortunately, Mr Merdle never earned the 
profits needed to justify his reputation.  Merdle misappropriated funds invested with 
him to create an illusion of success.  The nature of the fraud rendered it 
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unsustainable.  Every pound misappropriated only added to Merdle’s future 
obligations because his unsuspecting victims expected a return on their investments.  
Merdle’s bank must run out of money eventually.  Today we would call Merdle’s 
fraud a ‘Ponzi scheme’ although the term was not available to Dickens.
10
  When we 
first meet Merdle, he is suffering from an undiagnosed stress-related complaint.  By 
the end of the novel, Merdle has killed himself.   
 
Little Dorrit appeared in monthly instalments between December 1855 and 
June 1857.
11
  Two days after John Sadleir killed himself, Dickens introduced Merdle 
to his audience for the first time.  Most assume that Dickens modeled Merdle on the 
elder of the two Sadlier brothers for that reason.
12
  Nevertheless, Dickens ignored 
one vital aspect of the Sadliers’ fraud in Little Dorrit.  The fictitious Merdle was a 
private banker who was liable for his bank’s debts.  Those who lost the money they 
entrusted to him only did so because Merdle was bankrupt.  James Sadlier was an 
officer in a joint stock bank.  The Sadliers’ wrongdoing had an institutional 
dimension.  It exposed failings in the Tipperary’s corporate governance.
13
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The risk that the unsuspecting might fall victim to a banker’s incompetence, 
opportunism or recklessness was an ever-present danger during the nineteenth-
century.  Little Dorrit warned that a private banker posed a risk.  However, private 
bankers were, as Lord Eldon (1751-1838) once said, liable for their business debts to 
their “last acre” and their “last shilling.”
14
  Rational private bankers administered 
their banks diligently to avoid losing everything they owned.  Rational private 
bankers only took liberties knowingly if, like Merdle, they had nothing to lose.
15
  The 
joint stock banks always imposed a bigger risk of misconduct than private banks 
because those who administered them could leave their shareholders and creditors to 
divide any losses imposed amongst them.
16
  The separation of ownership and control 
created in a joint stock institution give rise to what we now call an agency problem.
17
   
 
Agency theory argues that in an unregulated environment, the corporate 
governance of a joint stock enterprise is the product of a bargaining process under 
which those who administer the firm accept ‘bonding’ and ‘monitoring’ 
arrangements to surrender opportunities to act in their own interests.
18
  Bonding 
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promotes congruent interests between the administrators and others.  Managers can 
bond with their shareholders, for example, by taking shares in the company to 
become shareholders too.  Monitoring holds administrators accountable for their 
actions.  An example of a monitoring arrangement is the provision of audited 
accounts, which give shareholders and creditors some insight into the stewardship of 
the company.  The agency theorist’s claim is that a company’s administrators incur a 
‘residual loss’ whenever the opportunity to act in their own interests remains open to 
them.  Shareholders offer less for their shares and demand higher dividends when 
they know they could fall victim to managerial opportunism.  Creditors lend to the 
company in smaller amounts and charge higher rates of interest under the same 
circumstances.  The agency theorists’ argument is that a company’s administrators 
have an incentive to enter into any bonding and/or monitoring arrangement that 
consumes fewer resources than the residual loss it eliminates.   
 
Alfred Chandler championed the virtues of professional management and the 
separation of ownership and control it entailed.  Yet the agency problem barely 
featured in his work.
19
  It is not as if he was unaware of the agency problem.  
America’s business schools devoted a lot of energy to the agency problem during his 
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lifetime.  As early as 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means warned American 
shareholders “surrendered the right” to have a company “operated in their sole 
interest” when they entrusted its administration to others.
20
  In the 1970s, agency 
theorists erected an entire research paradigm on the foundations of Michael Jensen 
and William Meckling’s seminal analysis of the separation of ownership and control.  
These agency theorists went on to influence the curricula taught in America’s 
business schools profoundly.
21
  Chandler thought professional managers were the 
unsung heroes of American industrialisation.  Chandler believed an owner-manager 
posed a far bigger risk to organisational effectiveness because they accounted to no 
one.
22
  Besides, the evidence seemed irrefutable to Chandler.  Large professionally 
managed firms acquired competitive advantages over their smaller owner-managed 
counterparts in so many cases.
23
  The economies of scale and scope realised in a 
large firm must have compensated for any costs the agency problem imposed. 
 
Chandler left others to worry about the agency problem, but this study of 
English and Welsh banking industry has to address this issue.  The English and 
Welsh were aware that a separation of ownership and control in their joint stock 
banks created difficulties and they experimented with several corporate governance 
regimes to resolve those difficulties.  As usual, the analysis begins in Scotland 
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because the Scots supplied the corporate governance model adopted by the first 
generation of English and Welsh joint stock banks in 1826. 
 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SCOTTISH JOINT STOCK BANKS 
Scotland’s unincorporated joint stock banks emerged in an environment subject to 
very little regulation.  The industry’s administrators, creditors and shareholders 
negotiated their corporate governance arrangements without the assistance of the 
state and they did so by entering into bonding and monitoring arrangements.  The 
Banking Company in Aberdeen (established in 1767) was typical of many of the 
unincorporated Scottish joint stock banks.
24
  It operated under the supervision of a 
Court of the Governor and Directors made up of a governor and 18 directors.  The 
bank’s shareholders elected the Court of the Governor and Directors and every one 
of them bonded with their constituents because they had to own shares in the bank.
25
  
The Banking Company in Aberdeen also employed a cashier and an accountant, 
neither of whom had to own shares although other arrangements compensated for 
share ownership’s absence.  A simple majority at a shareholders’ general meeting 
could dismiss them.  Opportunism would cost the cashier and an accountant more 
than their jobs.  The cashier signed a bond of fidelity and honesty for £5,000 and the 
accountant signed one for £1,000.
26
  These bonds of fidelity and honesty were a key 
feature of the Scottish banks’ corporate governance model.  As Thomas Joplin 
explained, the agents that administered a Scottish bank’s branches signed bonds too.  
Joplin wrote: 
                                                          
24
 Graeme Acheson, Charles R. Hickson, and John D. Turner, "Organisational flexibility and 
governance in a civil-law regime: Scottish partnership banks during the Industrial Revolution," 
Business History 53, no. 4 (2011). 
25
 Banking Company in Aberdeen, The Contract of the Banking Company in Aberdeen  (Aberdeen: J. 
Chalmers, 1767), 11. 
26




The Scotch Banks ... in the arrangements, which they make with their 
agents established in distant towns, assume that there is no risk 
whatever, and lay it down ... that if ... [agents] ... incur any loss, they 
are to suffer it themselves....  Securities are required of them ... to the 
extent, I understand, of not less than ten thousand pounds....  It is, I 
believe, generally calculated by the agent, that if he can make out a 
case of very unforeseen loss, it will be partly allowed him; but the 




An accounting system supplied the primary means of monitoring.  The Banking 
Company in Aberdeen brought its books of account to a “just and true Balance” 
every March in readiness for the shareholders’ general meeting in April.
28
  
Furthermore, three shareholders acting in concert could inspect the bank’s books at 
any time they wished.
29
   
 
The Scottish banks’ reputation for stability suggests they handled their agency 
problem well.
30
  No Scottish bank of any real significance failed between 1772 and 
1857.
31
  The lessons learned by Scotland’s provincial banks laid the foundations for a 
new generation of even larger institutions in the nineteenth century.
32
  In 1810, the 
promoters of the Commercial Bank of Scotland set out to create a bank that would 
rival the Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen 
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Company in size.  They followed precedents set by the provincial banking companies 
and the larger public banks to do it.  The Commercial Bank of Scotland had a 
committee of ordinary directors to supervise its day-to-day operations and another 
committee made up of extraordinary directors who met less frequently to advise it.
33
  
Nevertheless, the Commercial Bank of Scotland remained different to the Bank of 
Scotland, the Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen Company in one 
fundamental respect.  The law held an unincorporated bank like the Commercial 
Bank of Scotland’s shareholders liable for its debts on an unlimited liability basis 
whereas the three public banks were banks of limited liability.  The public bank’s 





An unusual feature of the Scottish banks’ corporate governance model was the 
relative absence of safeguards accorded to their creditors.  No Scottish bank made its 
balance sheet available to the public prior to 1865 for example.
35
  The creditors of a 
Scottish bank of unlimited liability did not demand more because unlimited 
shareholder liability offered them all the protection they required.  The creditors only 
needed an assurance that the shareholders remained wealthy enough to reimburse 
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them if the bank failed.  The Scottish unincorporated banks did not publish balance 
sheets because they published the names of their proprietors instead.
36
   
 
The creditors of a Scottish unlimited liability bank had allies who ensured its 
proprietors remained wealthy enough to compensate them if the bank failed.  When a 
bank of unlimited liability collapsed, the difference between its debts and the realised 
value of its assets was borne in the first instance by all the shareholders in proportion 
to the number of shares owned.  Unfortunately, once a shareholder exhausted his or 
her personal wealth, he or she had no more to give.  This meant that the greatest 
obligation would always fall upon the wealthiest shareholders who could afford to 
pay their share of the loss and then make good any amounts not collected from their 
fellow shareholders.  Consequently, wealthy shareholders had an incentive to ensure 
every other shareholder remained rich enough to meet their obligations to the 
creditors at the first time of asking.
37
  At the Dundee Banking Company, the 
directors could reject a potential shareholder nominated in a will.
38
  The Banking 
Company in Aberdeen took an even more draconian approach.  Share transfers had 
to take place in the presence of at least two directors.  The executors of a deceased 
shareholder’s estate had to sell their shares to parties approved by the directors 
within six months.  The directors even had the power to sell a deceased shareholder’s 
shares, at a loss if necessary, should an executor fail to nominate an acceptable buyer 
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Scottish law reinforced the tendency to exclude the poor from a bank’s 
shareholding constituency.  The shareholders of a Scottish company of unlimited 
liability remained liable for their share of the debts incurred during their tenure.
40
  
Rich shareholders could not escape their obligations to the creditors by transferring 
their shares to an impoverished risk taker at the first sign of difficulty.   
 
The Scottish corporate governance model proved so secure that it presented no 
hindrance to the growth of an unlimited liability bank.  The Commercial Bank of 
Scotland, its younger sibling the National Bank of Scotland (established in 1825) and 
several other banks like them established before 1844 were all banks of unlimited 
liability.  This generation of Scottish unincorporated joint stock banks demonstrated 
just how robust the Scottish banking industry’s unlimited liability corporate 
governance model really was by becoming as big as Scotland’s three banks of 
limited liability.  Lawrence White noted that by 1845: 
(1) the Commercial Bank of Scotland had more branches than any of the 
public banks, a greater note circulation than two ... and more 
shareholders than one; (2) the National Bank of Scotland had more 
branches than two of the three public banks, a note circulation only one 
per cent smaller than that of the second largest public bank and more 
shareholders than any of the three; (3) the North of Scotland Banking 
Company and the Edinburgh and Glasgow Bank each had more 
shareholders than any of the three public banks; (4) the Union Bank of 





This regime of unlimited liability also had an effect on a bank’s financial structure.  
Joplin noted that banks of limited liability generally demanded their shareholders 
                                                          
39
 Banking Company in Aberdeen, The Contract of the Banking Company in Aberdeen: 11; Acheson, 
Hickson, and Turner, "Organisational flexibility and governance in a civil-law regime," 514. 
40
 George Joseph Bell and Patrick Shaw, Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland: In Relation to 
Mercantile and Maritime Law, Moveable and Heritable Rights, and Bankruptcy vol. 6 (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1858), 224. 
41
 Lawrence H. White, "Scottish banking and the legal restrictions theory: A closer look: comment," 




supply more capital than a bank of unlimited liability did because shareholders 
subject to limited liability would contribute no more if the bank failed.
42
  An 
unlimited liability bank like the Dundee Banking Company maintained a debt to 
asset ratio that fluctuated around 80 per cent between 1775 and 1810.  During the 
same period, the debt to asset ratios of the limited liability Bank of Scotland and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland fluctuated around 50 per cent.
43
    
 
The Scottish banking industry took pride in the fact that its creditors had little 
to fear.  Scottish banks failed rarely and when they did fail, their creditors usually 
received full compensation.
44
  The English and Welsh panicked during the financial 
crisis of 1825 because their small private banks put them at risk but the Scottish 
public felt little inclination to orchestrate a similar run on their joint stock banks.  As 
Chapter Two explained, Liverpool’s government abolished the six-partner rule in the 
English and Welsh provinces in 1826, which gave the English and Welsh banks the 
opportunity to adopt Scottish joint stock banking for the first time.  However, the 
English and Welsh were embracing a corporate governance model that was new to 
them when they adopted joint stock banking in 1826.  They would have to learn how 
to manage the agency problem as effectively as the Scottish banks to replicate 
Scotland’s more stable banking system. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
The English and Welsh established 143 joint stock banks between 1826 and 1843.  
Only 25 banks left the industry during this period and 19 of those 25 failed, which 
yielded a failure rate of just 13.5 per cent.
45
  This was a significant improvement on 
the rates of failure exhibited by the English and Welsh private banks, which suggests 
joint stock banks improved the stability of the English and Welsh banking system.
46
  
Nevertheless, there was disappointment because some of the first English and Welsh 
joint stock banks failed to live up to expectations.  All too often, an English and 
Welsh joint stock bank entrusted its operations to those who had little or no banking 
experience.
47
  The result was a banking industry in which administrative standards 
were poor.
48
  In 1836, William Clay delivered a speech in parliament at the height of 
the joint stock banking boom.
49
  In this speech, Clay questioned three elements of the 
Scottish corporate governance model imported into England and Wales in 1826.  
Clay objected to unlimited liability, the absence of regulation with respect to paid-up 
capital and the failure to publish balance sheets. 
 
Clay warned a regime of unlimited liability threatened bank stability for two 
reasons.  First, wealthy shareholders would avoid shares in a joint stock bank 
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because the risks imposed on them were too great.  The result, Clay feared, would be 
an industry administered by directors accountable to poor and ill-educated 
shareholders who would demand high returns and have little regard for the risks 
incurred because they had nothing to lose.  “By the permission to establish banks of 
limited liability,” Clay said, “we should acquire the most important securities for the 
good conduct of such establishments, namely a certainty that the most respectable 
persons in the community would become partners in them.”
50
  The second problem 
was that unlimited liability induced creditors to trust their banks too much.  Clay 
argued:  
By permitting only joint stock banks with limited liability, I would crush 
at once the spurious credit ... enjoyed by these establishments from the 
responsibility of the individual shareholders, and reduce the credit ... 
obtained by a joint stock bank ... to the exact amount of its paid-up capital 




The absence of any controls over paid-up capital was the second failing of the 
Scottish corporate governance model in need of attention according to Clay.  In too 
many cases, he said, a bank’s promoters issued shares to themselves to establish the 
bank.  Clay complained these promoters then issued more shares to the public at a 
premium and treated that premium as profit rather than capital.  The promoters used 
the premium to pay a dividend, which meant money that ought to stay within the 
bank ended up in the promoters’ pockets instead.  Clay demanded, “The whole 
capital of a joint-stock bank should be paid-up by the time the bank opened its doors 
for business so there “could be no holding back of shares to be subsequently issued at 
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  Finally, Clay noted the English and Welsh joint stock banks followed 
the Scottish example to the letter and withheld their balance sheets from the public.  
Clay wanted every joint stock bank to publish balance sheets “making clear to the 
apprehension of all ... the circumstances of the bank, both as to its assets and 
liabilities.”
53
   
 
Clay’s call for reform in 1836 struck a chord because it resulted in a Secret 
Committee on Joint Stock Banks that began its deliberations in that year.  However, 
his views on limited liability were too radical for the age.  The Times expressed a 
general distrust of Clay’s commitment to limited liability in the following terms: 
Let ... [shareholders] ... be pronounced only partially liable, and they 
will scarcely remember the existence of the bank, except when they 
occasionally receive some interest for their investment; and ... would 
suffer an establishment ... to fall into decay or ruin with as much 
indifference as they hear of a breakdown of an old carriage or an old 
cow house.  No, it is to the wealthy shareholder that the public looks 
for security; destroy, or, which is the same thing, limit ... liability, and 
the bank becomes a delusion.
54 
 
Unlimited liability seemed essential to secure the creditors’ interests.  There was a 
risk that limited shareholder liability would promote shareholder neglect.
55
  In 1836, 
the Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks’ interim report noted that shareholder 
vigilance remained the primary guarantor of sound bank administration.56   
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The Northern and Central Bank of England collapsed in the middle of the 
Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks’ deliberations, which gave the committee an 
opportunity to take evidence on a failed joint stock bank when it reconvened in 1837.  
The committee called the Northern and Central Bank of England’s chair, its 
accountant, a bank director and its manager to give evidence.
57
  The interrogation 
revealed a litany of managerial malpractice.  The directors purchased shares from the 
bank, although their intention was not to bond with their proprietors.  Instead, the 
directors traded in these shares on their own account and profited by selling the 
shares at a premium.  The directors did not even pay the calls due on the shares 
traded, preferring instead to wait until they sold them to settle their obligations.  The 
directors also recorded the amounts they owed on their shares in a secret ledger that 
they never divulged to their fellow shareholders.
58
  The bank compounded this error 
by making loans on the security of the Northern and Central Bank’s shares, which 
would offer no security at all if the bank got into difficulties because they would 
become worthless.
59
  The bank also put its managerial hierarchy under stress by 
expanding too quickly.
60
  In Leeds, an inexperienced and poorly supervised branch 
manager ran up £40,000 in bad debts.  In Sheffield, a manager lost between £12,000 
and £14,000 and the amount lost in Nottingham was £12,000.  The bank tried to 
protect itself from the losses imposed.  It made all of the managers involved sign 
Scottish-style bonds but the bonds proved worthless.  The bank only made its 
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managers liable for acts of dishonesty.  It did not make them liable for acts of 
negligence or incompetence.
61
   
 
The Northern and Central Bank of England’s collapse in 1836 reinforced a 
widespread prejudice against geographically dispersed branch networks in England 
and Wales.
62
  Vincent Stuckey was as progressive a country banker as one could 
hope to find, having been one of the first private bankers to embrace joint stock 
banking in 1826.
63
  Yet, his view was that a bank could only administer its branches 
effectively if it limited them to “one or at the most two counties” with no branches 
located more than 50 miles from head office.
64
  A representative of the North of 
England Bank was even more cautious in his approach to branches.  He told the 
Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks that branches should be within 20 miles of 
head office so that a bank officer could visit it on horseback and return within a 
day.
65
  The Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks noted that the law did not “limit 
the number of branches or the distance of such branches” from head office before 
suggesting the oversight constituted a threat to “the future stability of the banks 
throughout the United Kingdom.”
66
   
 
The Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks’ claim that large branch networks 
constituted a threat to the industry angered a long-standing proponent of joint stock 
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banks like Joplin.  Joplin attacked the Secret Committee’s findings, arguing the 
English and Welsh distrust of branches made no sense.  Banks in Scotland and 
Ireland were supervising branches at far greater distances from their head offices 
than was the norm in England and Wales at no discernible risk.  In addition, the 
impeccably managed National Provincial Bank of England administered English and 
Welsh branches located beyond the 65-mile radius from its head office in London.
67
  
Joplin asserted the arrangements imported from Scotland in 1826 could supervise 
large branch networks effectively if the bank applied them properly.  Poor 
administration, not branches, constituted the industry’s greatest threat in Joplin’s 
mind.   
 
The evidence taken by the Secret Committee did not yield an immediate 
legislative response.  Nevertheless, the Bank of England’s charter was due for 
renewal in 1844 and by then the United Kingdom had a Prime Minister who was 
suspicious of the joint stock banks erected under the auspices of the Country Bankers 
Act.
68
  The findings of the Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks reinforced Robert 
Peel’s prejudices against the joint stock banks.  In 1844, Peel and his government 
took advantage of a reform of the laws relating to joint stock companies in general to 
pass special legislation designed to improve corporate governance standards in the 
banking industry.  That legislation was the Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844.
69
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THE JOINT STOCK BANKING ACT  
Legal historians consider 1844 a watershed year in British corporate history.
70
  The 
Joint Stock Companies Act of that year put a joint stock company’s right to litigate in 
its own name on a secure foundation.
71
  Every company registered under the Joint 
Stock Companies Act acquired a legal personality.
72
  However, the Country Bankers 
Act of 1826 had already given a legal personality to every English and Welsh joint 
stock bank registered under it.
73
  In 1844, only London’s joint stock banks lacked the 
capacity to litigate in their own right because the Bank of England’s belief that a 
legal personality constituted a privilege.  The Bank of England argued bestowing any 
privilege on London’s joint stock banks would breach an undertaking given to it by 
the government in 1833.
74
  The Bank of England could hardly maintain a legal 
personality continued to constitute a privilege now parliament made it available to 
every other joint stock company in the land.
75
  The Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844 
gave London’s joint stock banks the right to litigate in their own names for the first 
time.  London’s joint stock banks did not even have to register under the Joint Stock 
Banking Act to acquire this privilege. 
 
Parliament denied the English and Welsh banks the right to register under the 
Joint Stock Companies Act because it intended them to register under the Joint Stock 
Banking Act of 1844 instead.  Both acts exhibited one similarity by providing for the 
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incorporation of a joint stock company on an unlimited liability basis.  However, the 
Joint Stock Banking Act imposed corporate governance obligations that were absent 
from the Joint Stock Companies Act.  Consequently, the Joint Stock Banking Act 
singled the banking industry out for special treatment and as such, it constituted 
Peel’s response to the evidence taken by the Secret Committee on Joint Stock Banks 
in the 1830s.
76
  The Joint Stock Banking Act decreed a new joint stock bank would 
have to petition the Board of Trade for letters patent and append its proposed 
constitution to the application.  That constitution had to accord with the requirements 
of the Joint Stock Banking Act and the bank’s promoters would have to amend the 
constitution to accommodate any additional demands made by the Board of Trade.  
At the very least, an acceptable constitution would provide for monthly statements of 
assets and liabilities and annual financial statements audited by two or more parties 
chosen by the shareholders.  The constitution should also provide for minimum 
capital of £100,000 divided into shares of a value no lower than £100.  In addition, 
the bank must issue at least half its shares and collect a minimum of ten per cent of 
their value before the Board of Trade could entertain the application.  If the Board of 
Trade granted letters patent, then the bank would have to issue all of its remaining 
shares and collect half of their value before it commenced trading.  Finally, the bank 
would have to make an application to the Board of Trade if it wanted to issue more 
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The Joint Stock Banking Act and its Irish and Scottish equivalent met all but 
one of Clay’s objections to the joint stock bank’s corporate governance model.  
These acts regulated a bank’s paid-up capital and provided for greater publicity by 
demanding the bank produce balance sheets regularly.  However, banks registered 
under these acts were to remain creatures of unlimited liability, which disappointed 
Clay.  Clay intimated in parliament that he wanted to move an amendment to the 
English and Welsh legislation to provide for limited liability but he did not act on the 
threat.  Peel made it clear to Clay that he would do all he could to ensure such an 
amendment’s defeat.
78
   
 
The Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844 and its Irish and Scottish equivalent 
possessed a significant defect that turned them into dead letters in their respective 
jurisdictions.  These acts’ regulations only applied to banks registered under them or 
formed after they became operational.  Joint stock banks formed prior to the passage 
of the Stock Banking Act and its Irish and Scottish equivalent had a choice.  They 
could apply for letters patent under their respective legalisation, although doing so 
would entail a rewrite of their constitutions.  Alternatively, they could ignore the acts 
altogether and continue to operate under their old arrangements.  By now, every 
established joint stock possessed a workable legal personality.
79
  An established joint 
stock bank simply had nothing to gain from incorporation under the Joint Stock 
Banking Act or its sister legislation.
80
  Consequently, the boom banks of the 1830s, 
the banks whose perceived failings motivated the passage of the Joint Stock Banking 
                                                          
78
 "House Of Commons, Monday, July 22: Joint Stock Banks Regulation Bill," The Times, 23 July 
1844; "London, Tuesday, July 23, 1844," The Times, 24 July 1844. 
79
 Todd, "Some aspects of joint stock companies, 1844-1900," 49-50. 
80




Act in the first palace, avoided its regulations completely.  They chose not to register 
under it.   
 
The Joint Stock Banking Act may have been something of a dead letter but it 
influenced the English and Welsh banking industry nonetheless by discouraging the 
formation of new joint stock banks.  Chapter Three explained that the Bank Charter 
Act denied new banks the right to issue bank notes after 1844.
81
  This prohibition 
represented something of a barrier to entry to the industry in England and Wales but 
one could have surmounted it.  A prohibition on new joint stock banks of issue in the 
Metropolis did not prevent the establishment of the London joint stock banks after 
1833.  Only the Bank of England issued bank notes in London.
82
  In addition, some 
country banks had surrendered their rights to issue bank notes and were using bank 
notes issued by the Bank of England to conduct a deposit-taking business.
83
  In 
theory, one could have erected a new joint stock bank of deposit in post-1844 
England and Wales.  The problem was that the promoters of such an enterprise 
would now have to register under the Joint Stock Banking Act and having jumped 
that hurdle, they would have to compete with established rivals that were not subject 
to the Joint Stock Banking Act.  Those rivals could issue bank notes if they had been 
a bank of issue in 1844.  In addition, those rivals hid their failings from public view 
because they were not obliged to publish their balance sheets.  Finally, those rivals 
could increase their capital to issue more shares whenever their directors and 
shareholders deemed it necessary.  Achieving success on a playing field as uneven as 
this seemed so unlikely that few even attempted it.  One industry commentator 
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complained, “The framers of the ...  [Joint Stock Banking Act] … appear to have had 
in view the entire suppression of all attempts to establish future joint stock banks or 
they would not have passed such very stringent clauses.”
84
  Another wrote, “A more 
unfortunate specimen of legislation or one more entirely unsuitable to the nature of 
the business it related to has not emanated from parliament in recent times.”
85
  The 
flood of proposals to establish new joint stock banks turned into a trickle after 
1844.
86
  The Joint Stock Banking Act helped put an end to the joint stock banking 
boom by making it prohibitively difficult to establish a new bank. 
 
The Joint Stock Banking Act imposed no constraints on the size or the 
geographic reach of a bank’s branch network.  In theory, banks remained at liberty to 
amalgamate with each other if they wished.  However, Chapter Two explained the 
natural inclination of the English and Welsh banks granted rights to issue bank notes 
in 1844 was to retain their independence.  The Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844 only 
made it easier for these banks to pursue such a course of action because a new joint 
stock competitor was not going to emerge in their districts to take business away 
from them.  In Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot wrote of Sir Robert Peel, “Though 
he was exceedingly distrustful of the joint stock banks founded between 1826 and 
1845, yet he was in fact their especial patron and he more than any other man 
encouraged and protected them.”
87
  The Joint Stock Banking Act kept the existing 
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banks in business and the rate of bank amalgamations in England and Wales stalled 
after 1844.
88
   
 
The Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844 did not improve the banking industry’s 
corporate governance standards because most banks ignored it.  To make matters 
worse, the banks that ignored it enjoyed the moratorium on the new competitors 
needed to drive a poorly administered bank out of business.  Nevertheless, some 
bank promoters did manage to erect new joint stock banks under the auspices of the 
Joint Stock Banking Act.  The failure of the Royal British Bank in 1856 dealt the 
Joint Stock Banking Act its final blow.  Parliament repealed the Joint Stock Banking 
Act and its Irish and Scottish equivalent soon afterwards. 
 
THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BRITISH BANK  
Anyone studying English common law will encounter the ‘indoor management rule,’ 
a legal principle that states a party contracting with a joint stock company can 
assume its officers have complied with the company’s constitution.  The rule protects 
outsiders who cannot observe a company’s inner workings.  An outsider may assume 
a company’s officers have done all it takes to acquire the legal authority needed to 
bind the company to a contract.  The Court of Exchequer expressed the indoor 
management rule in Royal British Bank v Turquand, a case decided in the Royal 
British Bank’s favour in 1856.
89
   What a law student typlically does not know is that 
this landmark decision did the Royal British Bank very little good.  The bank 
collapsed soon afterwards. 
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Established in 1849, the Royal British Bank was one of the few banks erected 
under the Joint Stock Banking Act.
90
  It possessed the requisite capital of 1,000 shares 
valued at £100 each when it made its application to the Board of Trade.  The bank 
issued all of its shares and collected half of their value before opening its 
headquarters at 52 Threadneedle Street in the City of London.  In addition, the Royal 
British Bank reported its assets and liabilities every month and furnished audited 
accounts once a year.  There was even a provision in the bank’s constitution 
providing for its winding-up if a quarter of its capital were lost.  Consequently, the 
Royal British Bank should have had a lot going for it.  It had official recognition in 
the form of letters patent (hence the designation ‘Royal’ in its title), it reported on its 
operations to its creditors and shareholders diligently, it was well capitalised and its 
head office occupied a prestigious location in the City of London just a stone’s throw 
from the Bank of England.  None of this helped because the Royal British Bank 
stayed in business for just seven years.  It suspended payments in September 1856.   
 
Registration under the Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844 failed to render the 
Royal British Bank immune to poor management.  The bank’s promoters created it to 
fill a gap in the London banking market.  Their intention was to use a deposit-taking 
business to fund overdraft lending.  Unfortunately, the Royal accepted security on its 
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loans that no prudent banker would have deemed acceptable.  Bad debts ate into the 
bank’s paid-up capital.  To make matters worse, the bank’s administrators paid 
themselves generous wages that consumed paid-up capital too.  The directors also 
helped themselves to the bank’s funds, granting loans to themselves and their 
associates that they never disclosed to the shareholders.  This failure to disclose 
exemplified the poor state of the Royal British Bank’s financial reports.  At the end 
of its life, the bank published fictitious accounts audited by two elected shareholders 
who lacked the experience needed to undertake the task.  One of the auditors even 
had a conflict of interest because he ranked amongst those granted undisclosed loans.  
Consequently, the Royal British Bank’s shareholders remained unaware of what was 
happening until it was too late to avert a disaster.  The directors compounded the 
deceit by paying the shareholders generous dividends to create an illusion of 
profitability, which eroded the bank’s capital further.  The Royal British Bank had 
consumed all of its paid-up capital and more by the time it failed.  Karl Marx (1818-
1883) condemned the Royal British Bank’s directors for “cheering on” their 
proprietors with “high dividends” and “fraudulent accounts.”
91
  The Bankers 
Magazine suggested “the Royal British Bank proves how utterly futile is the 
dependence upon … published and audited accounts … as the criterion of the 
prosperity or the solvency of a joint stock bank.”
92
   
 
The Royal British Bank’s failure resulted in calls for its directors’ conviction 
under the criminal law.  The Times wrote, “In the annals of commercial fraud we 
have never heard or read of more outrageous acts of rascality than they have 
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perpetrated against the customers and shareholders.”
93
  However, the directors’ 
greatest failing was their exploitation of their positions to borrow from the bank.  
Consequently, those directors lacked the mens rea needed to secure convictions for 
larceny because they had intended to repay the funds borrowed.  The authorities 
struggled to identify an appropriate charge upon which they might secure 
convictions.  Eventually, the bank’s falsified financial reports furnished a solution.  
The directors faced a charge of “conspiring to falsely represent the condition of the 
bank to the shareholders,” a minor fraud offence that resulted in comparatively light 
sentences ranging from fines of one shilling to terms of imprisonment of up to a 
year.
94
   
 
The Royal British Bank’s failure showed that the Joint Stock Banking Act was 
no guarantor of sound banking practice.  This bank failure also demonstrated that 
unlimited liability could rest upon uncertain foundations because this time the 
shareholders did not compensate the bank’s creditors in full.  The Royal British 
Bank’s shareholders should have ranked amongst the directors’ primary victims 
because it was a bank of unlimited liability.  The directors deceived their 
shareholders to such an extent that they missed the opportunity to wind the bank up 
before it was too late to avoid significant loss.  Some shareholders had even 
purchased new shares issued by the bank after it received approval from the Board of 
Trade to increase its capital.
95
  None of those realities furnished a defence to the 
creditors’ claim against the shareholders and the shareholders with the most to lose 
began to protect themselves.  By May 1857, up to a third of the Royal British Bank’s 
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proprietors put their property beyond their creditors’ reach by moving abroad.
96
  The 
creditors faced a harsh reality.  They could press their claims against the remaining 
shareholders, which would have entailed legal costs with no guarantee they would 
recover everything owed to them.  Alternatively, the creditors could reach an 
agreement with the shareholders.  The creditors took the latter course of action and 
accepted repayment of their debts at a rate of 15 shillings in the pound.
97
   
 
The failure to compensate the Royal British Bank’s creditors in full suggested 
those creditors might have been better off if Peel had followed Clay’s advice in 1844 
and permitted banks of limited liability basis.  At the very least, limited liability 
would have put the creditors on notice that they might not recover the amounts owed 
to them.  In 1857, the member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Thomas Emerson Headlam 
(1813-1875), observed that banks of unlimited liability failed.  Banks of limited 
liability like the Bank of England, the three Scottish public banks and the Bank of 
Ireland appeared to stay in business no matter what.
98
  Surely, their stability 
confirmed that banks of liability limited liability discouraged managerial malpractice 
because creditors exercised greater caution when they dealt with them.  Headlam’s 
opinion elicited no response initially although the Royal British Bank’s failure did 
provoke two immediate legislative responses.  First, the struggle to secure 
convictions against the bank’s directors highlighted the criminal law’s inability to 
deal with corporate fraud.  Parliament created new offences designed to criminalise 
abuses of privilege like those perpetrated by the Royal British Bank’s directors soon 
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  Second, parliament repealed the Joint Stock Banking Act and its Irish 
and Scottish counterpart.
100
  The legislation repealing the Joint Stock Banking Act 
ensured the banks remained a special case in one important respect.  By now, 
companies in other industries could incorporate on a limited liability basis but joint 
stock banks were to remain creatures of unlimited liability for the time being.   
 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMES TO BANKING 
By the mid-1850s, some joint stock companies began to introduce limited 
shareholder liability by exploiting a legal back door.  They inserted clauses into their 
contracts limiting their shareholders’ liability for the debts incurred under those 
contracts and the courts started to recognise the validity of these clauses.
101
  In 
addition, there was a view that unlimited liability disadvantaged the poor who needed 
some protection to encourage them to invest in joint stock companies and to form 
companies of their own.
102
  A free trade argument also suggested that the market, not 
the parliament, should determine which form of liability was best.  Britons should 
have the right to choose for themselves whether they wanted to contract with 
companies of limited or unlimited liability.
103
  In 1855, parliament relented and 
embarked on a series of reforms that gave most British joint stock companies the 
right to adopt limited liability.
104
  However, parliament remained steadfast in its 
determination to deny limited liability to the banking industry.  The act repealing the 
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Joint Stock Banking Act in 1857 denied banks the right to incorporate on a limited 
liability basis.
105
  Within a year, that policy reversed. 
 
Another financial crisis struck the banking system in 1857.  This time the 
Western Bank of Scotland was one of the banks to succumb to the crisis.  Thus, in 
1858 a parliamentary Select Committee took evidence related to a major Scottish 
bank failure for the first time in living memory.
106
  The degree of mismanagement 
uncovered at the Western Bank of Scotland only added to a growing sense that 
something had to change.
107
  New legislation giving banks the right to incorporate on 
a limited liability basis soon passed into law.
108
  This 1858 act imposed three 
obligations on a bank of limited liability.  Its shareholders would remain liable on an 
unlimited liability basis for all bank notes issued, the minimum paid-up value of its 
shares would be £100 and the bank would publish a balance sheet at six monthly 
intervals.  In 1862, parliament abolished the £100 minimum on limited liability bank 
shares.
109
   
 
The editor of The Economist, Walter Bagehot, became one of the keenest 
advocates of the newly introduced regime of limited liability.  Bagehot observed that 
no system of banking could be entirely safe.
110
  There was an ever-present risk that 
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funds might be lost due to incompetence or fraud.  The vital question was “what kind 
of bank is safest?”
111
  Bagehot argued that in the small communities that typified 
Britain in the past, a small private banking partnership was safest.  Those who dealt 
with a bank like this knew who owned it, how much property they had and could 
expect them to manage the bank diligently because they were responsible for its 
debts.  In the urban environments that characterised post-Industrial Revolution 
Britain, a private banker acquired the capacity to deal with their property in relative 
anonymity.  According to Bagehot, this was why joint stock banking became a 
necessity after 1826.  The wealth supplied by the proprietors of a small bank might 
fluctuate but it was unlikely the collective wealth of a large number of shareholders 
could do the same.  “Changes there will be,” Bagehot wrote “but, in all probability, 
one will get richer, and another poorer.”
112
  A joint stock bank’s great advantage was 
that its enlarged proprietorship secured the creditors’ interests far better than a small 
common law partnership ever could. 
 
A joint stock bank’s enlarged proprietorship may have resolved one of the 
private bank’s shortcomings.  However, Bagehot thought joint stock banking created 
new opportunities for abuse.  Bank officers could incur a loss and leave the 
shareholders to pick up the pieces.  According to Bagehot, a joint stock bank’s 
shareholders could employ two defences to alleviate the risks associated with this 
agency problem.  The first was audited accounts, although Bagehot argued the failure 
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of the Royal British Bank demonstrated that an audit would not prevent the 
manipulation of a bank’s published reports.
113
  The second defence was that 
shareholders only paid a portion of their wealth into the bank.  The rest of the 





Bagehot’s fundamental conviction was that the security unlimited liability 
accorded was beginning to unravel.  The problem with unlimited liability was that no 
one could determine a priori exactly how much an individual shareholder would 
have to contribute when a bank failed.  Everything depended on the size of a bank’s 
losses in the first instance and then the amounts collected from all of the 
shareholders.  According to Bagehot, wealthy shareholders had good reason to avoid 
shares in a joint stock bank under these circumstances because they had the most to 
lose.  The observation was not new.  Clay said much the same thing in 1836 and like 
him, Bagehot predicted bank shares would soon accumulate in the hands of poor 
shareholders who would demand their banks take risks.  Bagehot wrote, “The system 
of unlimited liability ... fosters the most speculative management.  It is a system 
which makes bankers out of men ... who do not object to subject all their property to 
liability, because they have no property.”
115
  The key to establishing a secure basis 
for the banking system as far as Bagehot was concerned lay in enticing rich 
shareholders back into the industry.  Unlimited liability could not do this as long as it 
drove the rich away but limited liability might because it offered certainty.  “Rich 
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people would … see the maximum that they could lose and be able to estimate the 
worst,” he wrote.
116
   
 
Bagehot recognised that limited liability entailed risks too.  Fully paid shares of 
limited liability rendered all the property available to secure the creditors’ interests 
liable to loss.  If the law held shareholders liable for partially paid shares instead, he 
reasoned, things would be different.  The unpaid amount would remain with the 
shareholders where the bank’s administrators could not lose it.  Bagehot explained:  
It does not follow, because the liability of shareholders is defined, that the 
entire sum for which they are liable should be at the disposal of the 
directors.  A man [sic] may be made liable for twice his investment 
capital or thrice: A shareholder may now invest £1,000 in a bank; the 
directors may call up the whole if they please and lose it if they so please; 
but the shareholder may now be answerable for another £1,000 or £2,000; 
the limit of the liability may be placed where we please; the essential 
point is that a limit should exist.
117
   
 
Bagehot’s belief was that an obligation to contribute uncalled capital under a regime 
of limited liability offered greater security than unlimited liability could.  Unlimited 
liability encouraged poor shareholders with little to lose who would demand their 
banks take risks.  Rich shareholders liable for uncalled capital, on the other hand, 
would demand conservative bank administration to limit the size of any contribution 
they would have to make if the bank failed.  In addition, an obligation for uncalled 
capital imposed on rich shareholders would, Bagehot argued, make more property 
available to compensate the creditors because poor shareholders subject to unlimited 
liability had very little property to give.     
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The extraordinary feature of Bagehot’s campaign in favour of limited liability 
in the banking industry was that it rested on a false premise.  Rich shareholders were 
not abandoning the English and Welsh banking industry at the time.  The Scottish 
corporate governance model adopted by the English and Welsh banks demanded 
bank directors monitor their shareholding constituencies to exclude the poor.
118
  It 
seems English and Welsh bank directors fulfilled that obligation diligently because 
no evidence exists to suggest the wealth of an average shareholder declined when 
unlimited liability was the norm.
119
  Very few English and Welsh banks saw a reason 
to take up limited liability after its introduction in 1858.
120
  Similarly, none of the 
Scottish banks of unlimited liability felt any need to convert to limited liability under 
acts passed in 1858 or 1862.
121
  Those who controlled most banks continued to 
believe subjecting wealthy shareholders to unlimited liability remained an 
indispensable source of competitive advantage.  As late as 1880, the directors of the 
Liverpool Union Bank boasted their bank rested upon foundations supplied by 
“gentlemen of known wealth and standing who were … responsible to their last 
farthing.”
122
   
 
The industry’s commitment to unlimited liability ran so deep that the few banks 
adopting limited liability attempted to replicate the advantages offered by unlimited 
liability by following Bagehot’s advice in one important respect.  In 1879, The Times 
noted that banks of limited liability generally called only a fraction of their shares’ 
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value, which left their shareholders under an obligation to contribute significantly 
more if the bank failed.
123
  The Birmingham Joint Stock Bank incorporated under the 
1858 act.  It issued shares with the requisite value of £100 value but they were paid 
to just £25.  The Lloyds Banking Company adopted a similar arrangement in 1865.  
Lloyds incorporated under the 1862 act, which allowed it to divide its capital into 
shares of £50 called and paid to only £14/10/- per share.  The arrangement put 
Lloyds’ shareholders under an obligation to contribute another £35/10/- per share if 
the bank failed.  The Bucks and Oxon Union Bank did essentially the same thing.  Its 
shares had a nominal value of £25 paid to £5, which left the shareholders under an 
obligation to contribute another £20 per share if the bank failed.
124
  All of these 
banks feared that a regime of limited liability would put them at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis a bank of unlimited liability.  They followed Bagehot’s advice 
to utilise the added security an obligation for a significant amount of uncalled capital 
offered. 
 
The banking industry’s reluctance to embrace limited liability persisted until 
the 1880s by which time the Amalgamation Movement was already underway.  The 
Amalgamation Movement was yet to reach its peak, but a process of consolidation 
had begun nonetheless.  Banks started to convert to limited liability in increasing 
numbers in the 1880s after another Scottish bank failure shook the industry’s 
confidence in unlimited liability.  The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 
exposed the dangers a regime of unlimited liability imposed.  The City of Glasgow 
Bank’s creditors received compensation in full but the security unlimited liability 
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accorded to them came at a high cost to the bank’s shareholders.  The City of 
Glasgow Bank ruined many of its shareholders. 
 
THE FAILURE OF THE CITY OF GLASGOW BANK  
Throughout its life, the City of Glasgow Bank adopted policies broadly similar to 
those utilised by the failed Western Bank of Scotland, another Glaswegian bank that 
collapsed in 1857.
125
  Glasgow was Scotland’s preeminent industrial city and as 
such, its merchants and manufacturers offered the Glaswegian banks many 
opportunities for growth.  Banks like the Western Bank of Scotland and the City of 
Glasgow succumbed to the temptations on offer by tailoring their lending policies to 
the needs of their industrial and mercantile clientele.  Unfortunately, the City of 
Glasgow Bank’s lending also became increasingly concentrated until its capacity 
collect the amounts owed to it depended on the fortunes of a relatively small number 
of local borrowers.  To make matters worse, the City of Glasgow Bank broke one of 
the cardinal rules of banking.  It undertook long-term investments in faraway places 
that provided their returns slowly and proved difficult to sell at short notice even 
though most of the banks debts were payable at call.  The bank’s managerial 
hierarchy compounded the City of Glasgow Bank’s difficulties by supplying falsified 
financial reports.  They even misrepresented the state of City of Glasgow Bank’s 
bullion reserve on the returns needed to comply with the currency legislation.  The 
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City of Glasgow Bank eventually ran out of cash in October 1878 whereupon its 133 
branches stopped making payments.   
 
The City of Glasgow Bank was one of the largest banks of unlimited liability in 
Scotland.  When the dust settled, its shareholders confronted a harsh reality.  The 
City of Glasgow Bank’s liquidator made a first call of £500 on shares with a nominal 
value of £100.  Later, he made a second call of £2,250 per share.  Only 250 
shareholders out of 1,819 met both calls in full.  The rest paid what they could and 
were ruined.
126
  A report of a public meeting in November 1878 noted that the 
shareholders faced “destitution and bereavement” because the bank’s debts would 
reduce many of them to “absolute and hopeless beggary.”
127
  One industry 
commentator claimed the loss of the City of Glasgow Bank “was a calamity so 
unlooked for, so huge and disastrous, that it riveted men’s gaze and made their hearts 
stand still, and we shall all remember it to our dying day as a landmark in the history 
of our generation.”
128
  Those who held shares in the other joint stock banks 
throughout the United Kingdom and the directors who represented them saw the 
damage inflicted on the City of Glasgow Bank’s shareholders and began to question 
whether unlimited liability was worth the risks it imposed.     
 
The problem with conversion to limited liability under the limited liability 
legislation passed in 1862 was that nothing could stop a bank demanding its 
shareholders pay the unpaid amount on their shares after which the bank might lose 
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the all the capital available to secure the creditors interests.  A bank could convert 
partially paid shares into fully paid shares by calling the unpaid amounts if it wished.  
Consequently, it seemed prudent to offer some sort of guarantee that a bank’s 
directors could not call all of the capital available to secure its creditors’ interests.
129
  
Parliament introduced legislation in 1879 that created a new form of limited liability 
known as ‘reserved liability’ tailored to the needs of the banking industry.
130
  
Parliament took a leaf out of Bagehot’s book.  The 1879 act attached two values to 
the shares issued by a bank of limited liability.  The first was the share’s nominal 
value, which represented the maximum the directors could demand from their 
shareholders during the bank’s lifetime.  This was the amount liable to loss.  The 
second value remained with the shareholders because the bank could only call on it 
after it failed.  The amount ‘reserved’ in this fashion was uncalled capital waiting for 
a liquidator to utilise it to reimburse a failed bank’s creditors.     
 
The fate of the City of Glasgow Bank’s shareholders acted as a catalyst for 
change as joint stock banks throughout the British Isles converted to reserved 
liability.  Most of London’s joint stock banks converted to limited liability on a 
reserved basis in 1882.
131
  Scotland’s seven banks of unlimited liability converted in 
the same year.
132
  By 1884, 80 of Britain’s 138 joint stock banks had put a limit on 
their shareholders’ liability to their creditors.
133
  Initially, the added security reserved 
liability promised seemed so desirable that the Bank of Scotland, Royal Bank of 
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Scotland and British Linen Company all tried to convert to it too.
134
  These three 
banks owed their existence to special acts or royal charters that made no provision 
for a reserved amount on their shares whatsoever.  Consequently, the three banks 
petitioned parliament for the legislation needed to reorganise their capital on a 
reserved liability basis only to discover that the government would insist they 
surrender one of their ancient privileges in return.  All three would have to append 
the word ‘Limited’ to their names.  More importantly, the Treasury asked the 
government to re-open the question of the Scottish bank note issue’s regulation, 
whereupon the three public banks withdrew their request to reorganise their 
capital.
135
  The three Scottish public banks need not have worried.  Subsequent 
events showed that reserved liability bestowed far less of a competitive advantage 
than they feared.  Subsequent events would show that shareholders resented the 
imposition of a reserved value on their shares. 
 
The adoption of limited liability in the 1880s vindicated both Clay and 
Bagehot, although neither lived long enough to see it happen.  Both anticipated that 
the composition of the bank industry’s shareholder constituencies would change once 
limited liability became commonplace.  They were right, although the change ran in 
the opposite direction to the one they predicted.  The rich did not flood into the 
banks’ shareholding constituencies as they predicted.  Clearly, a shareholder’s wealth 
mattered even under the regime of limited or reserved liability because shareholders 
had to be wealthy enough to meet the obligation for uncalled capital.  However, 
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limited liability offered the richest shareholders protection by placing a limit on the 
maximum amount they would have to contribute if a bank failed.  Consequently, 
limited liability gave bank directors the freedom to admit less wealthy middle class 
shareholders into their shareholding constituencies in increasing numbers.  The total 
number of individuals deemed wealthy enough to own bank shares in England and 
Wales changed little under the regime of unlimited liability.  It was 22,031 in 1849 
and 22,980 in 1859.  This figure rose after limited liability became available in 1858 
and stood at 65,528 by 1879.  The widespread adoption of limited liability saw it rise 
again to reach 125,859 by 1899.  The vast majority of the newly admitted 
shareholders came from the middle classes.
136
   
 
Both Joplin and Clay had promised that banks of limited liability would 
become more reliant on capital supplied by their shareholders to fund their 
operations.
137
  However, an unexpected development accompanied the influx of 
capital from the middle classes because the banks admitting them economised on the 
amounts they raised from their shareholders.  The banks of limited liability became 
more reliant on their creditors to fund their operations.
138
  In the 1850s, an average 
English and Welsh joint stock bank borrowed £5 for every £1 invested in it by its 
shareholders although there was substantial variation amongst the banks.
139
  Larger 
banks borrowed more heavily than smaller ones because their creditors thought they 
were safer.  By the late nineteenth century, the largest banks’ higher debt ratios 
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became the norm as the Amalgamation Movement fostered an increase in average 
bank size.
140
  In 1909, the chair of the London and Westminster Bank made a 
startling admission to his shareholders.  He claimed the London and Westminster 
was disadvantaging them because it had taken too much capital from them.  Walter 
Leaf told his shareholders: 
Some of you may remember, as I well do, the downfall of the City of 
Glasgow Bank in 1876 [a voice: 1878, Sir], and the disastrous ruin 
which it brought upon hundreds of innocent shareholders….  At that 
time, limitation of liability was a thing unheard of in bank shares; but in 
the panic of that year … made it evident that a change was imperative.  
The lead was taken, as was right and proper, by the Westminster, which 
was the first to venture into putting the word “Limited” at the end of its 
name.  The Board of the day very properly made the credit of the bank 
their first consideration, and, not knowing how the public would view a 
step of such startling novelty, coupled it with an increase in paid-up 
capital, from £2,000,000 to £2,800,000.  There was no corresponding 
increase in business, and the result is that since that time our capital has 
stood at a figure of from 10 to 12 per cent of our liabilities…. 
 
This was a very cautious figure … but events have proved that it was 
over-caution, which has hampered us ever since….  Other banks 
followed our lead; but, profiting by our experience, they fixed their 
capital at much lower proportionate figures and if you will go through 
the list, you will find that our competitors generally have paid-up 
capital ranging from about 4 per cent to 7 per cent of their liabilities to 
the public.  …I will quote only the case of the [London and] County.  
While in our last statement, our paid-up capital represented 11 per cent 
of our liabilities that of the County was under 5 per cent…. 
 
Now consider the effect of our disproportionately large capital … it 
means a lower rate of dividends; and this means a smaller premium on 
our shares.  Whilst a County share is today worth over four and a half 




The London and Westminster Bank’s directors overestimated the importance of paid-
up capital when the bank converted to limited liability in the 1880s.  An 
amalgamation in 1909 with the London and County Bank corrected the mistake.  The 
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London and Westminster Bank’s shareholders exchanged their shares for shares 
issued by the London and County Bank because the latter bank’s capital was “more 




The English and Welsh banks’ increasing reliance on debt is a paradox.  The 
industry’s depositors and its other creditors allowed their banks to become 
increasingly indebted to them at a time when the industry limited its shareholders’ 
obligations to them.  Perhaps Bagehot was right on one point after all.  Maybe an 
obligation for reserved and uncalled capital imposed on an enlarged shareholding 
constituency really did make more property available to secure the creditors’ 
interests than a regime of unlimited liability ever could have done.  However, such 
an argument is hard to sustain.  Shares carrying liability for uncalled capital or 
reserved capital proved unpopular with shareholders who already stood to lose what 
they paid for their shares and did not relish the prospect of having to contribute 
more.  In 1912, Barclay and Company rearranged its share capital to issue fully paid 
shares with no uncalled or reserved value attached to them whatsoever.  The new 
shares proved an instant success.
143
  The obligation for uncalled and/or reserved 
capital on a typical bank share ran as high as three times the amount paid for it when 
the banks converted to limited liability in the 1880s.  That obligation had dwindled 
to virtually nothing by 1920s.
144
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A share swap negotiated as the purchase consideration in a bank amalgamation 
was all it took to relieve disgruntled shareholders of their obligation for uncalled and 
reserved capital.  Consequently, the Amalgamation Movement resulted in a 
progressive withdrawal of the obligation for uncalled and reserved capital.  The 
development went largely unnoticed until the Treasury Committee on Bank 
Amalgamations drew attention to it in 1918.
145
  When the National Provincial Bank 
acquired the Union of London and Smiths Bank in 1918, for example, the liability to 
contribute additional capital imposed on the Union’s shareholders fell by “over 48 
per cent.”
146
  In the same year, the London County and Westminster Bank’s 
amalgamation with Parr’s Bank reduced the “uncalled liability” imposed on Parr’s 
shareholders by “17 per cent.”
147
  An amalgamation between the London City and 
Midland Bank and the London Joint Stock Bank more than halved “the uncalled 
liability of [London] Joint Stock Bank shareholders.”
148
  The obligation for uncalled 
and reserved capital suffered a similar fate to the London and Westminster’s cautious 
debt to equity ratio.  Uncalled and reserved capital were reminders of a time when 
the banks feared the conversion to limited liability and demanded too much of their 
shareholders.  The Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations pointed to the 
withdrawal of paid-up, uncalled capital and reserved capital to accuse the 
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Amalgamation Movement of having created “substantial benefits to shareholders at 
the expense of ... security” for their creditors.
149
    
 
The banking industry’s creditors should have boycotted the banks imposing the 
risks alluded to by the Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations.  Creditors 
could have given a competitive advantage to the banks with the lowest debt to equity 
ratios and whose shareholders carried the highest obligations for uncalled and 
reserved capital by transferring their business to them.  Instead, most of the 
industry’s creditors patronised a small number of large English and Welsh banks that 
became increasingly indebted to them and withdrew the security accorded by 
uncalled and reserved capital.
150
  It is possible that these creditors had no choice and 
had to accept the changes the Amalgamation Movement imposed.  After all, the 
banks with lowest debt ratios and the highest liability for uncalled and reserved 
capital were the ones that disappeared.  However, it is also possible that the Treasury 
Committee on Bank Amalgamations overestimated the risks the Amalgamation 
Movement imposed because no one lost so much as a penny as the result of the 
failure of one of the Big Five English and Welsh banks after 1918.
151
  The next 
section argues the banking industry’s creditors tolerated the rising debt ratios and the 
reduction in liability for uncalled and reserved capital because bank amalgamations 
yielded inherently safer banks.   
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HOW AMALGAMATIONS MADE BANKS SAFER 
The banks of limited liability borrowed more heavily from their creditors at a time 
when they had released their shareholders from the obligation to secure their 
creditors’ interests.  These developments would have imposed greater risk on those 
creditors, but the banks compensated for the changes by redirecting a larger 
proportion of their resources into liquid assets.
152
  Lending on bills of exchange, 
short-term loans and overdrafts accounted for approximately three quarters of all 
English and Welsh bank assets in the 1860s and 1870s.  By the outbreak of World 
War I, that ratio had fallen to approximately 55 per cent.
153
  This reduction in the rate 
of commercial lending released funds for investment elsewhere and a significant 
portion of the funds liberated financed an increase in cash, deposits with the Bank of 
England, money deposited at call with the London money market and government 
securities.  Liquid assets like these constituted 30 per cent the English and Welsh 
banks’ total assets in the 1870s.  By 1914, that ratio had risen to 40 per cent.
154
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The Amalgamation Movement encouraged the trend towards greater security 
by removing those that could not adapt to a new corporate governance realities 
imposed by the conversion to limited liability.  An article published in the Bankers 
Magazine written by a Fellow of the Institute of Bankers noted that bank 
amalgamations nearly always promoted lending practices that were more 
conservative.
156
  Those who were used to negotiating loans with a small institution 
that depended upon their patronage were often shocked to discover that a larger bank 
with more customers to lend to could demand greater security from them.  Borrowers 
who complied with the demand for greater security received financial 
accommodation commensurate with the extra security they provided.  Those who did 
not provide sufficient security soon discovered that an enlarged bank could deny 
them credit.
157
  More telling was Collins and Baker’s discovery that the 
Amalgamation Movement’s predators generally possessed higher liquid asset ratios 
than their targets.
158
  In other words, a greater commitment to liquid assets 
differentiated the banks taking other banks over from the banks taken over during the 
Amalgamation Movement.  London’s joint stock banks possessed the highest liquid 
asset ratios in England and Wales.  Unsurprisingly, London’s banks ranked amongst 
the most Amalgamations Movement’s most active predators.
159
   
 
Unlimited shareholder liability was no barrier to bank amalgamations.  
Amalgamations undertaken under conditions of the old regime of unlimited liability 
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were a common feature of Scottish banking practice during the nineteenth century.
160
  
In England and Wales, the Amalgamation Movement was about to embark on its 
second decade when the banks converted to limited liability in greater numbers.
161
  
Banks of unlimited liability could and did amalgamate with each other.  However, 
the regime of unlimited liability secured their creditors’ interests.
162
  The regime 
disappeared because unlimited liability became unpopular with the proprietors who 
were guaranteeing the banking industry’s debts.  When a bank converted to a regime 
of limited liability therefore, it relieved its proprietors of an unwanted burden whilst 
putting its creditors at greater risk.  A newly converted bank of limited liability had 
to accumulate liquid assets to maintain its creditors’ confidence under these 
circumstances.  A bank that could not do both (convert to limited liability and 
accumulate adequate reserves) operated at a competitive disadvantage.  Either it 
imposed unwanted risks on its proprietors by remaining a creature of unlimited 
liability or it put its creditors at risk by becoming an under-resourced bank of limited 
liability.  Many banks resolved this agency problem by amalgamating with a better-
resourced rival.  Such an amalgamation gave the target’s proprietors the protection 
they craved because they emerged from the amalgamation with shares in a predator 
that had converted to limited liability.  In addition, the predator’s liquid assets 
offered the target’s creditors the security they demanded.  This was why the 
Amalgamation Movement accelerated following the industry’s conversion to limited 
liability. 
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Changes in financial reporting practices enhanced the tendency to remove from 
the industry weak banks that failed to invest in liquid assets.  Banks began to publish 
their balance sheets, which exposed their potential failings to their rivals and to the 
public.  The banks registered under the reserved liability act of 1879 were subject to 
an obligation to produce audited accounts.
163
  Of course, the demand banks produce 
audited financial statements was nothing new although audited accounts had proven 
virtually worthless in the 1850s when the Royal British Bank failed.
164
  However, 
joint stock companies were now far more common in Britain than at any time in the 
past and their reporting obligations to their shareholders created a growing demand 
for professional auditors.
165
  The Scots led the way by forming their first professional 
accounting body as early as 1854.
166
  In 1870, the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales also came into being.
167
  After that, financial statements 
audited by an independent, qualified and experienced accounting professional 
became increasingly common.  The published accounts demanded by the 1879 act 
proved so useful that banks not registered under the act came under pressure to 
furnish them too after the merchant banking house of Bearing Brothers came close to 
collapse in 1890.
168
  The Chancellor of the Exch equer, George Goschen (1831-
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1907), responded with a call for greater transparency in the banking industry.
169
  The 
private banks heeded Goschen’s warning and started to supply balance sheets 
voluntarily before he and the government intervened.  By 1892, The Economist’s 
half-yearly banking supplements displayed the balance sheet statistics of almost 
every bank (both private and joint stock) in the county.
170
   
 
The Amalgamation Movement had one last card to play in its pursuit of greater 
security by subjecting the English and Welsh bank employees to controls designed to 
eliminate the risk of loss caused by fraud, misconduct or incompetence.  The risks 
imposed by the industry’s employees diminished of their own accord as the English 
and Welsh banks became more familiar with the realities of joint stock banking.
171
  
Employee conduct became an insurable risk as bank employees stopped relying on 
relatives and associates to guarantee their good conduct and began to enlist the 
services of a guarantee and suretyship association to perform the same function.  
Some banks found the new arrangement so useful that they established guarantee and 
suretyship funds of their own.
172
  Greater professionalism reduced the supervisory 
burdens employees imposed on the banks even further.  The Scots established the 
Scottish Institute of Bankers in 1875 and its English and Welsh counterpart emerged 
soon afterwards in 1879.  Both organisations adopted an educational role by 
instituting a system of examinations and awarding qualifications to those who passed 
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  The risks posed by a large geographically dispersed branch network 
diminished as employees became less prone to error.   
 
The Amalgamation Movement contributed to the tendency towards greater 
professionalism by putting country bank employees under the control of an efficient 
bureaucracy.  As the Bankers’ Magazine observed in 1903, the banking industry’s 
control systems became increasingly impersonal and bureaucratic as banks grew in 
size during the Amalgamation Movement: 
In the old days of banking ... an energetic bank would be content with a 
head office and ten or a dozen branches,  Under these conditions the 
board [of directors] and general manager were able to maintain direct 
control over the whole business of the bank, without any elaborate system 
for such supervision.  When, however, one bank has over 400 offices, it is 
easy to see that the old rough-and-ready systems of management would 
fall short of the necessities of the case.  A general manager might look 
closely into ... the business conducted in ten or a dozen offices, but ... he 
cannot have the same intimate personal acquaintance with the 




Regional bank employees used to a small bank’s informal control systems employees 
found themselves subject to the expectation that they compile returns and reports for 
head office.  These employees encountered an expanding bureaucracy’s “red tape” 
for the first time.
175
  Rulebooks introduced during the early twentieth century added 
yet another layer of bureaucratic control.  Lloyds Bank put all of its employees under 
an obligation to report “any fraud, error or underhand practice” that came to their 
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“knowledge or of which” they “may have suspicions.”
176
  Lloyds also forbade its 
employees the right to marry before their income reached a level that could support a 
family, the right to guarantee another person’s debts without the directors’ approval 
and the right to gamble or engage in any other “speculative dealings.”
177
  Non-
compliance with these rules would result in dismal.
178
  Impositions on the 
employees’ private lives like these removed the temptation to engage in fraud by 
denying them the option of getting into financial difficulties.  
 
Scottish experience suggested the banking industry had always constituted a 
congenial host for large firms subject to bureaucratic control.  Adam Smith distrusted 
joint stock enterprises implicitly because those who established them under a special 
act or royal charter usually demanded monopolistic privileges to compensate for the 
agency problems imposed by a separation of ownership and control.
179
  However, 
Smith noted that joint stock enterprises needed few privileges in industries like 
banking where “operations are capable of being reduced ... to a routine or ... 
uniformity of method.”
180
  Smith wrote:   
Though the principles of the banking trade may appear somewhat 
obtuse, the practice is capable of being reduced to strict rules.  To 
depart on any occasion from those rules ... is ... extremely dangerous, 
and frequently fatal....  The principle banking companies in Europe, 
accordingly, are joint stock companies, many of which manage their 
trade very successfully without any exclusive privilege.  The Bank of 
England has no other exclusive privilege, except that no other banking 
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company in England [and Wales] shall consist of more than six persons.  
The two banks of Edinburgh
[181]





Smith thought bureaucracy made a joint stock banking company inherently safe by 
constraining its emplyees’ freedom of action.  According to Smith, banks could 
utilise bureaucratic controls to eliminate self-interested behaviour because the 
exercise of employee discretion in this industry was both unnecessary and dangerous.   
 
The organisational structures adopted by the Big Five enforced the rules 
imposed on a bank’s employees.  The London City and Midland Bank’s 
organisational structure demanded branch managers report to district superintendents, 
who reported to regional joint general managers, who reported to the managing 
director and the chair of the board of directors.
183
  In 1903, the London City and 
Midland Bank deployed three regional joint general managers to supervise the South 
of England, the North of England and London.
184
  The workload imposed upon these 
regional joint general managers must have increased as the Amalgamation Movement 
progressed and number of branches under their jurisdiction increased.  By the late 
1920s, the number of regional joint general managers at the Midland Bank had 
doubled to six, although in all other respects the bank’s organisation structure 
remained unchanged.
185
  Every branch manager at the Midland Bank possessed 
limited authority to grant credit and needed the approval from the district 
superintendent to exceed those limits.  These superintendents had limits as to how 
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much additional credit they could approve and could only exceed them with the 
approval of their regional joint general manager.  Regional joint general managers 
operated under lending limits too and could only exceed them with the consent of the 
managing director and chair of the board of directors.
186
  The result was an 
organisational structure in which the authority for the one of the most important 
operational decision made (how much the bank lent) ‘pyramided’ as one moved up 
the organisational hierarchy.  The arrangement ensured the bank retained enough 
funds in reserve to accumulate the liquid assets needed to placate its creditors.
187
  An 
accounting system subject to random internal audits undertaken by branch inspectors 
provided all the information the Midland Bank’s head office needed to coordinate its 
activities.  Branches reported their cash balances, deposits, advances, overdrafts, 
other assets and liabilities at intervals ranging from daily to yearly depending upon 
how critical they were to the bank’s success.
188
   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Amalgamation Movement resolved the agency problems that dogged the English 
and Welsh banking industry since the introduction of joint stock banking in 1826.  
Prior to the Amalgamation Movement, a regime of unlimited liability put the 
industry’s shareholders at risk by making them the guarantors of the good conduct of 
those who administered the industry.  A bank’s shareholders had to compensate their 
bank’s creditors when it failed.  However, the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 
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1878 demonstrated that shareholders could no longer bear the burdens imposed upon 
them.  The industry subsequently converted to limited liability, which made the 
security of a bank an even more important source of competitive advantage.   
 
The Amalgamation Movement facilitated a withdrawal of the burdens imposed 
on shareholders by reducing their obligation to supply paid-up and uncalled capital.  
The banks that asked too much of their shareholders disappeared.  This development 
should have put creditors at risk but the Amalgamation Movement facilitated an 
investment in liquid reserves that ultimately secured the interests of the industry’s 
creditors.  The banks that made the greatest investment in reserves became the 
Amalgamation Movement’s predators.  In addition, bank amalgamations put the 
industry’s employees under a system of bureaucratic control that eliminated the risk 
of fraud and error by constraining their freedom of action.   
 
The next chapter considers whether the need to build the banking system on a 
secure foundation turned British banking into a natural oligopoly in which new 






IS BRITISH BANKING  
A NATURAL OLIGOPOLY? 
In Scotland, the growth of banking has been extremely gradual....  At 
present, there are but 17 distinct establishments in the country, but these 
have 460 branches extending into every village in the kingdom....  To 
suppose the English system of joint stock banking bore any similarity to 
this would be the most egregious fallacy, and it was this difference chiefly 





If you apply from North of the Tweed, don’t say that having discharged 
… all of the duties of a branch in a Scotch village, you feel competent to 





Scotland conducted an experiment in banking that set a precedent for the rest of 
mainland Britain.  Scotland’s parliament established the Bank of Scotland in 1695 
with the intention that it would be a commercial venture that performed few favours 
for the state.
3
  The Bank of Scotland lent none of its capital to the crown, which 
meant that when Scotland joined the union with England and Wales the authorities in 
Westminster had little reason to protect it.  Consequently, the Hanoverian regime 
granted a royal charter in 1727 that incorporated the Royal Bank of Scotland.
4
  
Within two decades, a third incorporated joint stock institution emerged as the 
British Linen Company began to exploit an industrial charter to conduct a banking 
business of its own.
5
  In addition, Scottish law took a permissive attitude to large 
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unincorporated businesses founded on the joint stock principle.
6
  These 
unincorporated businesses possessed a workable legal personality and could issue 
transferrable shares.  The result was a generation of provincial joint stock banking 
companies erected during the eighteenth century followed by the establishment of the 
Commercial Bank of Scotland in 1810.  This latter institution that had genuinely 
national aspirations and the Commercial Bank of Scotland’s success furnished a 
precedent that the National Bank of Scotland followed in 1825, as did several other 




Scotland never really experienced an outbreak of bank mergers and 
acquisitions as dramatic as the English and Welsh Amalgamation Movement because 
a tendency to amalgamate had always been an inherent feature of joint stock banking 
as practiced in Scotland.
8
  The Scottish banking industry became increasingly 
concentrated over a prolonged period.  By 1850, Scotland only had 17 joint stock 
banks left open for business.  Fifteen years later, that number of had fallen to just 
12.
9
  No legal restriction or prohibition intervened to inhibit this gradual process of 
consolidation in Scotland.  Scottish banks were not subject to a six-partner limit that 
shielded the Bank of England from competition in England and Wales prior to 1826 
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  Furthermore, two amalgamating Scottish banks could aggregate their 





The English and Welsh banking industry could not have replicated the larger 
banks found in Scotland prior to the Amalgamation Movement.  The six-partner limit 
imposed to protect the Bank of England was an obvious inhibitor of bank size prior 
to 1826.  However, it is doubtful whether the English and Welsh banks could have 
been much larger than they were during this period even if the six-partner rule had 
not applied.  English common law demanded that every bank other than the Bank of 
England litigate in the names of all of their proprietors.  The only way around this 
inconvenience was to obtain a special act that bestowed a legal personality.
12
  In 
addition, clause 18 of the Bubble Act of 1720 could have rendered the promoters of 
large English and Welsh banks liable to criminal prosecution had they chosen to 
issue transferable shares.
13
  Consequently, the repeal of the six-partner rule in 1826 
was not the only facilitator of joint stock banking in provincial England and Wales.  
The repeal of clause 18 of Bubble Act in 1825 made it lawful to issue transferable 
shares whilst the Country Bankers Act gave every bank erected under it a legal 
personality.  Both developments played their part in making joint stock banking 
possible in the English and Welsh provinces.   
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The Country Bankers Act of 1826 effectively excluded unincorporated joint 
stock banks from London by erecting a 65-mile radius around the Metropolis.  This 
exclusion remained in force until 1833.  The Country Bankers Act also initiated a 
tentative process of consolidation in provincial England and Wales.  Between 1826 
and 1843, 96 English and Welsh private banks took advantage of the six-partner 
limit’s repeal either to convert to the joint stock form or to allow one of the newly 
established joint stock banks to take them over.
14
  This process of consolidation came 
to an abrupt halt due after 1844 due to the combined effect of the Bank Charter Act 
and the Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844.
15
  The Bank Charter Act forbade new banks 
of issue whilst the Joint Stock Banking Act made it difficult to erect a new joint stock 
bank of deposit.  Consequently, existing banks enjoyed a moratorium on competition 
from newly established joint stock rivals, which made it easier for them to stay in 
business.
16
  In addition, the Bank Charter Act demanded that in most cases at least 
one and sometimes both of the banks involved in an amalgamation would have to 
surrender the right to issue bank notes when they joined forces.
17
  The English and 
Welsh Amalgamation Movement could not begin in earnest until the regulations 
imposed in 1844 ceased to act as a disincentive to amalgamation.  When the 
Amalgamation Movement began, the process of consolidation it unleashed was 
already a long-overdue development.  Two additional factors accelerated the pace at 
which the Amalgamation Movement progressed once the process got underway.  The 
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first was the decline of the inland bill of exchange.  The second was the banking 
industry’s conversion to a regime of limited liability.   
 
The inland bill of exchange represented more than a convenient vehicle for 
industrial lending and a means of payment.  Bills of exchange gave the banks that 
discounted them an inherently liquid asset that matured at short notice.
18
  In addition, 
an industrial bank could obtain funds when it needed them by rediscounting bills of 
exchange in London to access the funds accumulated by the agricultural banks.
19
  
The demise of the inland bill and the growing dependency on overdraft lending it 
created presented a problem for an English and Welsh banking industry populated by 
small regional banks that relied on the market exchanges to sustain their operations.
20
  
Most banks no longer needed outside help to fund their lending because the amounts 
they collected on deposits had grown.  Nevertheless, some did need additional funds 
to maintain the reserves needed to assure their depositors that their banks were safe 
whilst others needed safe outlets for the funds they accumulated.  Bank 
amalgamations solved the problems imposed by the inland bill’s demise by putting 
these banks under the control of an administrative hierarchy that could allocate the 
industry’s financial resources rationally.  The result was an increase in bank size as 
industrial and agricultural banks merged with a bank domiciled in London.   
 
The banking industry’s adoption of limited liability in the 1880s made the need 
to maintain an adequate reserve of liquid assets even more pressing.  Thomas Joplin 
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and William Clay promised that banks of limited liability would demand an increase 
in the amounts of paid-up capital supplied by their shareholders relative to the 
amounts borrowed from the public.  Walter Bagehot argued that the banks would 
rely on uncalled capital to secure their creditors’ interests.
21
  All three were wrong.  
The banks of limited liability economised on the amount of paid-up capital they 
demanded from their shareholders whilst relieving them of the burden of having to 
supply more capital if the bank failed.
22
  These developments should have put the 
industry’s creditors at greater risk but the amalgamating banks compensated by 
making a greater investment in their reserves of liquid assets.
23
  Liquid assets offered 
the public an assurance that the bank holding them in reserve would always meet its 
obligations when the fell due.
24
  The banks that made the requisite investment in 
liquid assets held the upper hand during the Amalgamation Movement because they 
took their rivals over.  Banks that could not make that investment operated at a 
disadvantage and merged with a better-resourced rival.
25
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The amalgamating banks did not rely on reserves alone to offer greater 
security.  Administrative standards were improving of their own accord as the 
English and Welsh became increasingly familiar with joint stock banking.  By the 
1880s, the English and Welsh banks were making a concerted effort to raise 
professional standards under the auspices of the Institute of Bankers.
26
  Rulebooks 
introduced by the largest banks at the turn of the century played their part in 
eliminating the risk of employed error and fraud.  Bureaucratic control regulated the 




The Amalgamation Movement’s most obvious consequence was that it 
succeeded in making the English and Welsh banking industry safer.  No English and 
Welsh bank of any significance succumbed to a run after 1878.  The run of good 
fortune lasted until 2007 when a relative newcomer to the industry (a former building 
society called Northern Rock) fell victim to the Global Financial Crisis.
28
  Apparent 
immunity from financial collapse like this was important.  A growing post-Industrial 
Revolution economy needed an expanding monetary base and nineteenth-century 
Britain did not have access to enough gold and silver to sustain the transactions 
needed keep its resources fully employed.
29
  Bank notes could not have filled the 
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gap.  Abandoning the gold standard to issue fiat currency under peacetime conditions 
was out of the question because it would have jeopardised London’s place at the 
epicentre of a growing global payments system.
30
  The Bank Charter Act demanded 
Bank of England’s bank note circulation expand and contract to accord exactly with 
changes in its bullion reserves.
31
  In contrast, the Scottish banks supplied Scotland 
with its bank notes and they did so under less stringent restrictions than those 
imposed on the Bank of England.  Nevertheless, the Scottish banks confronted a limit 
the amount of bank notes they could put into circulation also.
32
  The British had no 
choice but to adopt cheques to create an increasingly deposit-based monetary stock 
to meet their needs.
33
  The currency reforms introduced in the 1840s ensured that 
banks other than the Bank of England would furnish a growing proportion of the 
British money supply just as the banking school predicted they would.
34
   
 
The British public’s willingness to use and accept cheques as means of 
payment depended on the account balances they mobilised and their capacity to act 
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as a store of value, which in turn depended upon the banks’ capacity to meet their 
obligations when they fell due.  It is unsurprising that bank safety became an 
increasingly important consideration under these circumstances.  As such, the 
Amalgamation Movement was the final step in a century-long quest for monetary 
stability.  The process began with the recoinage and the adoption of the gold standard 
in 1816, included the resumption of cash payments in 1819-21, the introduction of 
joint stock banking into provincial England and Wales in 1826 and London in 1833 
and the passage of the Bank Charter Act in 1844.
35
  The ideas promulgated by 
Bagehot in Lombard Street also made their contribution by turning the Bank of 
England into the banking system’s lender of last resort.
36
  The Bank of England, 
Treasury and successive governments may have done little to initiate or encourage 
the Amalgamation Movement, but once the process of consolidation got underway 
they gave it their tacit approval.  The Amalgamation Movement proceeded 
unhindered by any regulatory interventions until finally the degree of concentration it 
fostered seemed a threat to competition.
37
  The authorities did not intervene in the 
Amalgamation Movement because it yielded safer banks.  Safer banks diminished 
the burdens imposed on the Bank of England by its obligation to act as lender of last 
resort and reduced Britain’s vulnerability to financial crises. 
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No system of banking is entirely safe; and yet, the British banking industry 
proved safer than most.
38
  Britain’s banks enjoyed an extraordinary run of good 
fortune after the Amalgamation Movement that lasted until the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2007/08.  Caution lay at the heart of this remarkable record of stability.  
Britain’s banks maintained their reserves, restricted their lending and managed their 
affairs diligently.  By the 1930s, those who wanted to turn British manufacturing’s 
fortunes around began to tire of this conservatism.  In 1931, a parliamentary 
committee chaired by the Scottish lawyer Hugh Patterson Macmillan (1873-1952) 
that included John Maynard Keynes amongst its membership accused the banks of 
having failed British industry.  The committee identified what became known as the 
‘Macmillan Gap,’ an alleged shortfall in the banks’ industrial lending that denied 
British industry the funds it needed to invest in new and emerging technologies.
39
  
After that, the idea that Britain’s banks failed British industry became a widely 
accepted conventional wisdom.  However, the banks were in a difficult situation after 
the Amalgamation Movement.  Their proprietors demanded the protection of limited 
liability and were not prepared to guarantee the industry’s debts as they had done in 
the past.  In addition, most of the banking system’s assets had fixed or 
indeterminable maturity dates and the vast majority of its liabilities were payable at 
call or short notice.  The banks had little choice but to exercise caution under these 
circumstances to balance the interests of their stakeholders.  Britain’s banks would 
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not have served the national interest if they prioritised profitability to lend so 
generously that they put Britain’s monetary and financial stability at risk.  The 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007/08 highlighted the dangers imposed when British 





The apparent ease with which the English and Welsh banks joined forces to 
create large firms during the Amalgamation Movement coupled with the apparent 
stability the Big Five English and Welsh banks enjoyed after World War One stands 
in marked contrast to the experiences of Britain’s manufacturing industries after 
1918.  Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick argued that Britain’s manufacturers 
struggled to come to terms with the administrative realities imposed by large-scale 
production and distribution during the twentieth century.
41
  They explained that what 
British industry needed to compete on the global market during the twentieth century 
was an increase in average firm size so “the visible hand of coordinated control” 
could replace “the invisible hand of the self-regulating market.”
42
  Unfortunately, 
those who administered British industry lacked the experience, education, training, 
and expertise needed to manage a large manufacturing combination effectively.  
Elbaum and Lazonick claimed the “absence of leadership from within private 
industry” put “increasing pressure upon the state to try to fill the gap.”
 43
  Dirigisme, 
economic planning modelled on policies adopted in post-war France, came into 
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fashion during the 1960s as a Labour government sought the collaboration of 
privately owned manufacturing firms to resolve the nation’s economic problems.
44
  
In the 1970s, the state’s commitment to the manufacturing economy increased even 
further.  Businesses like the aero-engine division of Rolls Royce, British Leyland, 
British Shipbuilders and British Aerospace came under public ownership.
45
      
 
Successive post-World War II governments intervened in Britain’s 
manufacturing economy to arrest relative economic decline only to see their efforts 
fail.
46
  By 1975, the Conservative Party was under the control of a party faction that 
believed state interventionism was the cause of relative economic decline rather than 
a cure.  In 1978, Margaret Thatcher made her economic intentions clear.  She 
declared, “The long night of collectivism must come to an end.  The time has come 
to move to a new common ground.”
47
  Andrew Gamble explained her government’s 
underlying economic assumptions in the following terms:  
The cause of Britain’s economic decline … [was] … the wholesale 
perversion of the market order….  [Decline] involved the supplanting 
of individualism with collectivism and it led … to the proliferation of 
obstacles to the working of free markets throughout British society, so 
that Britain was … transformed from a country with some of the most 
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sensible and efficient social and political arrangements … to sink into 




On March 26 1980, Geoffrey Howe (1923-2015) (Margaret Thatcher’s first 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) delivered the his second budget speech.  That speech 
contained the following committment: 
For many years, the fashion both in government and industry was to 
favour mergers and amalgamations.  No doubt, mergers have brought 
advantages in some cases, but now it is quite clear that the fashion for 
industrial elephantism was greatly exaggerated.  I believe that there are 
cases where business are grouped together inefficiently under a single 
common umbrella.  They could in practice be run more dynamically and 





Britain’s attempt to invoke Alfred Chandler’s managerial revolution from above 
through a state-sponsored increase in average firm size was at an end.   
 
Industrial elephantism may have been out of favour in the 1980s but the 
Amalgamation Movement began over a century earlier in the 1870s.  In 1980, the 
Midland Bank, Lloyds Bank, Barclays Bank and NatWest dominated the English and 
Welsh market for banking service.  The Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and a Midland Bank subsidiary (the Clydesdale Bank) did the same in 
Scotland.
50
  These seven banks came under little pressure to ‘demerge’ during the 
1980s.  Nevertheless, these banks were not immune to the Thatcher government’s 
reformist agenda.   
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The ‘Big Bang’ of 27 October 1986 liberalised the London Stock Exchange by 
abolishing fixed commissions, removed the distinction between stockjobbers and 
stockbrokers and replaced an open-outcry trading system with a system based on 
electronic screens.
51
  Another deregulatory effort undertaken in financial services in 
1986 was the Building Societies Act, which allowed building societies (mutual 
organisations owned by their members) to compete with the banks on a level playing 
field.  Traditionally, building societies only offered a limited range of banking-
related services to their members.  They collected deposits but unlike the banks, they 
used the funds raised to offer their residential mortgages and to accumulate their 
reserves.  The Building Societies Act of 1986 allowed these building societies to 
expand the range of financial services they offered their members to match those 
provided by the banks.  In addition, a building society could ‘demutualise’ to raise 
capital by issuing shares to the public.  Demutualisation effectively turned a building 




Ten building societies took advantage of the Building Societies Act (1986) to 
convert into banks between 1989 and 2000.  The ten demutualised building societies 
were Abbey National, Cheltenham & Gloucester, National & Provincial, Alliance & 
Leicester, Bristol and West, Halifax, Northern Rock, Woolwich, Birmingham 
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Midshires and Bradford & Bingley.  Ultimately, these new entrants to the banking 
industry did little to disrupt the pre-existing oligopoly.  Every one of the 
demutualised building societies either failed or fell under the control of another bank 
or some other financial services institution.
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  Today, the banking industry in 
mainland Britain remains as much a concentrated oligopoly as it was in 1980.  
NatWest became a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group in 2000.
54
  
HBOS (an amalgam of the demutualised Halifax and the Bank of Scotland created in 
2001) became a subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group in 2009.
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  The Midland 
Bank merged with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1992 and 
subsequently changed its name to HSBC Bank to comply with the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation’s global branding strategy.
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  Barclays Bank 
continues to trade as an independent publically listed company.
57
  Finally, Scotland’s 
Clydesdale Bank has regained its independence.
58
  The Midland Bank acquired the 
Clydesdale Bank at the end of the Amalgamation Movement only to sell it to the 
National Australia Bank in 1987.
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  In 2015, the National Australia Bank sold the 
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The British banking industry now stands at a crossroads.  In 2008, the Global 
Financial Crisis exposed the dangers inherent in Britain’s dependence on a domestic 
banking oligopoly made up of banks deemed too big to fail.  On 8 October 2008, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a bank rescue package that would eventually 
see the government make a capital investment in the domestic banks.
61
  The Royal 
Bank of Scotland Group raised funds through the sale shares to government’s Bank 
Recapitalisation Fund.  Both HBOS and Lloyds utilised the Bank Recapitalisation 
Fund too to raise money prior to their merger in 2009.  The government’s ownership 
stake in the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and the Lloyds Banking Group eventually 
peaked at 83 per cent and 41 per cent respectively.
62
  Partial nationalisation was 
supposed to be a temporary measure designed to stave off the crisis and the Lloyds 
Banking Group has subsequently returned to public ownership.
63
  In contrast, the 
British state remains the Royal Bank of Scotland Group’s largest shareholder to this 
day. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis and steps taken to mitigate its effects on the 
domestic banks had a profound effect on the Labour Party that was in power at the 
time.  The notion that the banking oligopoly retards Britain’s regional economic 
development by denying native industries the funds they need now informs official 
Labour Party policy.  Labour’s 2015 election manifesto promised, “We will increase 
competition on the high street….  [We] want a market share test and at least two new 
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  Two years later, the Labour Party’s 2017 election manifesto 
stated: 
We will take a new approach to the publicly owned Royal Bank of 
Scotland and launch a consultation on breaking up the bank to create 
new local public banks that are better matched to their customers’ 
needs….  [We] need a strong, safe and socially useful banking system to 
meet the needs of our own regional economies and communities.  We 





Labour is committed to winding back the process of concentration in the 
banking industry that began in Scotland and encompassed the Amalgamation 
Movement.   
 
Whether the new entrants to the banking industry the Labour Party hopes to 
coax into existence will retain their independence is open to question.  The fate of the 
demutualised building societies suggests that British banking is a natural oligopoly in 
which new entrants have little hope of long-term survival.  Nevertheless, Labour’s 
determination to restructure the industry reflects a conflict that always lay at the heart 
of the Amalgamation Movement.  The creation of a banking oligopoly entailed a loss 
of competition and regional autonomy that seemed justifiable if the large banks 
created offered stability.  The largest banks fulfilled their side of the bargain during 
the twentieth century by proving immune to failure.  The bargain seemed a good one 
until 2008 when confidence in Britain’s biggest banks collapsed during the Global 
Financial Crisis.  A resurgent Labour Party now opposes a minority Conservative 
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government in the House of Commons.
66
  If the Brexit negotiations go badly for the 
government, the Labour Party might obtain the mandate needed to restructure the 
banking industry at the next general election. 
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